

LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
BERKELEY



Charles Frankl Herne

REVELATIONS OF RUSSIA:

OR

THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS

AND HIS EMPIRE,

IN 1844.

BY ONE WHO HAS SEEN AND DESCRIBES.

•

"Tôt ou tard, tout se sait."—MAINTENON.



IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

LONDON:

HENRY COLBURN, PUBLISHER,

GREAT MARLBOROUGH STREET.

1844.

D 425
H 425
v. 2

CONTENTS

OF

THE SECOND VOLUME.

CHAPTER I.

	PAGE
REGION OF THE STEPPE, AND OF THE NOMADES	1

CHAPTER II.

THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED	22
--------------------------------------	----

CHAPTER III.

MILITARY STRENGTH OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE	39
---	----

CHAPTER IV.

THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED	60
--------------------------------------	----

CHAPTER V.

THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED	92
--------------------------------------	----

CHAPTER VI.

THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED	132
--------------------------------------	-----

CHAPTER VII.

THE NAVY OF RUSSIA	164
------------------------------	-----

CHAPTER VIII.

	PAGE
FINLAND	198

CHAPTER IX.

REFLECTIONS ON THE COMMERCE, MANUFACTURES, AND MINES OF RUSSIA	230
---	-----

CHAPTER X.

CIRCASSIA AND GEORGIA	279
---------------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XI.

THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED	299
--------------------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XII.

THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED	323
--------------------------------------	-----

APPENDIX,

ILLUSTRATIVE OF RUSSIAN INFLUENCE AT THE COURT OF BERLIN	350
---	-----

REVELATIONS OF RUSSIA.

CHAPTER I.

REGION OF THE STEPPE, AND OF THE NOMADES.

AFTER the regions of wood and plain and morass, come those of the *steppes*, which, with few interruptions, cover the whole of the south of the Russian empire, European as well as Asiatic. The vast and monotonous plains which are thus denominated, stretch from the foot of the Carpathian mountains, across the whole of Asia, with slight variation in their character, except where some wide river or its tributary branches wind across their wide expanse to pour its waters into the Euxine, the Caspian, or the sea of Ural.

These steppes are neither desert nor prairie; they partake of the nature of both. Deeply impregnated

with nitrous and saline particles, the soil is everywhere productive, when not scorched up by heat or parched with drought; and from the frontiers of China to Little Russia and Podolia, these steppes present the same aspect of successive aridity and fertility. Exposed to the most opposite extremes of temperature, the aspect differs according to the varying seasons. In the first week of spring, from the earth on which the snow has scarcely disappeared, springs up a rich and luxuriant vegetation; converting the waste into a fairy scene, and offering fair promise to the herdsmen whose cattle revel in the profusion of nature's gifts.

On this carpet of rich green grass, variegated by the hyacinth, the tulip, the crocus, and the wild mignonette, besides a thousand other flowers, a traveller, mounted on the fleetest steed, and riding without intermission, night and day, if such a thing were possible, would find the spring elapse before he could reach the end of it, so large a portion of the earth's surface does it cover; and so little would he find it differing, from the frontiers of the Ukraine to those of Chinese Tartary, that at his journey's end he might still imagine the same scene surrounded him as when he began it; the steppe resembling almost everywhere the steppe, on its eastern the same as on its western confines.

With the first summer months, the soil, which is badly watered, becomes dry and arid in the burning sun; the grass withers, and turns brown, and then more dusky still, as it gets covered by the black dust which the wind disturbs; until at last the whole steppe

assumes the same sombre hue ; life and vitality seem for ever destroyed, and all the withered vegetation, except wormwood and prickly weeds, which cover whole tracts, still thriving in the rankness of the nitrous soil, in which they have grown to such gigantic size, that the thistles rise like little woods, capable of concealing a whole encampment, and in which a mounted rider is perfectly hidden when sitting on the tallest horse.

Towards the end of summer one parched and arid wilderness extends around on every side, in which the cattle grow thin and languid, and often perish in great numbers from want of water. The Tcherednik (Russian herdsman) can no longer extract a draught of milk from his cows ; the Tartar finds that the dugs of his mares refuse him the needful refreshment.

Towards autumn, the steppe is constantly set fire to ; sometimes through carelessness, sometimes through wilfulness, at others for the sake of the young crop of grass which shoots up through the ashes, when the mists and dewy nights of autumn give a fresh and ephemeral life to the productions of the earth. The fires sometimes extend for many hundred versts, and give rise to frequent accidents.

The method of escaping from the flames, which come roaring and crackling on over an extent of many miles in width, is not by flight, because though the steed may carry his rider faster than the fire can travel, it is sure to overtake the fugitive in the long run. The inhabitants of the steppe resort to the same means as those of the American prairies to save themselves ; they combat fire by fire, and kindling the grass lee-ward, they advance in the rear of the flame which

clears the way for them, and leaves no food for the burning sea, which is fast flowing up to the spot which the fire preceding it has already devastated.

In the autumn, water is less scarce; a partial verdure springs through the withered stems of grass and plants, from the revived roots, and the herds recover. The winter months, which may be accounted from five to three, (for during three they are everywhere felt in full severity,) are, notwithstanding the southern situation of the steppes, more intensely cold than in Sweden or in Norway.

The piercing winds which have swept across the North American continent, and the arctic regions of Siberia, howl over these now desolate and cheerless districts, where nothing breaks the monotony of thousands and thousands of miles of level ground, excepting the tumuli of the ancient Mongul warriors, the tents of the Calmuc and the Tartar, and the huts of the Cossac or the herdsman, and where nothing intervenes to arrest the violence or to modify the rigour of the freezing blast.

In the European steppes the cold often reaches thirty degrees of Reaumur, or far below the point at which boiling water cast up on high falls to the earth in a shower of frozen hail-beads. Even where some of the most southern Asiatic steppes—between the Caspian and the sea of Ural—assume more of the character of the “Sahara,” and where the camel in the summer sinks up to his knees in the burning sand, in winter the icicles gather as thickly upon the few straggling hairs of the Tartar’s chin, as they do upon the bushy beard of the Muscovite on the banks of the Neva.

Perowski, the governor of Orenburg, on his expedition to Khiva three winters since, was arrested by the impassable snow, on the very route which he dared not undertake in the summer months for fear of being buried under the hot and drifting sand, as it has not unfrequently happened to the caravans which ventured to invade the solitude of this desert. Fearful snow storms sweep over all the desolated winter steppes; and the severity of the season every few years decimates and destroys the flocks and herds which in a few favourable years have increased with rapidity.

In general, the sky is grey and covered; and the atmosphere, often misty as well as intensely cold, gives the same grey cheerless aspect to the diminished horizontal ring. With the exception of the damage done by the fearful tempests, which in the European steppes are called *vjugas*, the losses experienced by the pastoral inhabitants are occasioned by their own improvidence and idleness, which prevent them from gathering in the summer a stock of hay that might last the winter through. And the same may be said of most of the Asiatic hordes; though in a few cases they emigrate at different seasons to parts of the steppe some hundred miles distant,—which would naturally render this impossible. Like the Calmucs, they have their winter and their summer territory.

There are also some of these steppes in the vicinity of the Caspian, which differ from the wide plain with which they are connected, by being either wholly barren, or producing their green crop at a much earlier period. There are even some districts, such as the steppe

of *Mugan*, in the south-western “corner” as it were of the Caspian, where, sheltered by the Caucasian Alps, the winter is like the spring of other parts. Covered with verdure and studded with flowers at a season so rigorous elsewhere, it is the resort of Kurds, Calmues, Turcomans, and Tartars, who, to the number of fifty thousand, cover it over with their tents and innumerable flocks. But, on the other hand, in the spring, the vegetation already begins to wither here, and the heat of the sun arouses from their torpidity myriads of snakes and serpents, which in the winter months apparently bury themselves in the earth, but in the summer swarm so thickly on its surface, as to render it uninhabitable to man, even if the verdure of the soil or water continued to enable his cattle to feed upon it. These reptiles are represented as being in some places in such dense numbers as to render it impossible to walk without treading upon them. But whether they are either venomous or carnivorous is not yet clearly ascertained, notwithstanding the assertions to that effect of those who frequent the winter pasturages.

The region of the steppes is the home of the Cossacs, of a portion of the Mongul race, and of more than a score of Tartar tribes. It is the home of the camel and of the fat-tailed Kirguise sheep—of the wild steed and of the Tabune-horse, scarcely tame—of the grey oxen, which furnish nearly all our tallow—of the antelope and of the bustard. The wolf, driven to change his habits, burrows in these immense plains like a fox; the jackal infests some part of them, and the destroying locust falls like a blight and a curse on the young green grass of the free space, or on the

rising harvest of the agricultural pioneer, who, on the frontier of the steppe and on the banks of some great rivers, has begun to colonize and to cultivate, and whose successful efforts still seem so puny when compared with the immensity of the waste which he is endeavouring to reclaim, that it reminds one of the slow process of the Dutchman's dyke winning its way by inches against a world of waters. A large proportion of these colonists are Germans, plodding, industrious, and indefatigable; their communities advance and flourish, and the husbandman and the herdsman are dwelling, in some places, next to each other.

On some part of these wide steppes dwell the most hideous of the human race, the Calmucs and Baskirs; and on other parts of it, in their predatory excursions, the Circassians, the most beautiful of their species, still sometimes descend into these plains. The noble rivers which cross one's path if one travels eastward from the most western point of this vast level, and whose general direction is southward, seem generally to divide and fix a kind of limit for the different tribes who inhabit the steppe, sprung as they all are from four great families—the Hindoo, the Mongul, the Tartar, and the Slavonic.

After we have crossed the Dniester and the Dnieper, which water the Ukraine, and the lands where the steppe and the corn land intervene alternately, we traverse great deserts, till the banks of the Don, which the Cossac has richly planted with the vine, to the immediate prosperity of the Russian empire. This is the most important part of the great plain; immense herds of cattle, the “tchereda,” bred in these prairies,

furnish the chief part of the hides and tallow for the foreign markets ; large herds of horses, (*tabune*,) are also reared : and of late the breeding of sheep has been undertaken with unparalleled success, and promises to become a source of inexhaustible wealth. It is common to find proprietors possessing herds of ten thousand cattle, and as many as twenty, forty, and even eighty thousand sheep, which in a short space of time will all be of a mixed merino breed.

It is difficult to place any limits to the extent of the future produce of Southern Russia, in wool, in tallow, and in hides ; but assuredly these pasturages suffice to yield far more than the *whole of Europe* produces at the present moment. Rapidly as the stock of the cattle breeders has been increasing on the steppe, there has existed up to the present moment a cause retarding the full prosperity of his enterprise, in the heavy periodical losses which the want of winter forage has hitherto occasioned. As the steppe becomes a little more populated, and as the breeders become more sensible to their true interest, which the attention lately devoted to the subject is rapidly rendering them, measures will be taken to gather in the hay, which, covering thousands of square miles, now rots and withers on the soil on which in winter the herds are always pinched by want ; and in the event of unusual winters, during which the ground is too long covered with snow, more than half commonly perish from famine. In Besarabia, it is not uncommon to see the herds falling back on the habitations, and consuming even the thatch of the roofs. The additional annual expenditure of labour in the collection of the hay crop

would, in the long run, render the cattle-breeding not only a much more certain, but in all cases a much more profitable speculation; and these means are likely to be very speedily adopted, and would probably have been so long since, but for the manufacturing mania in which the principal capitalists have for some time indulged, but with which its barren fruits cannot fail to disgust them.

The rivers which flow towards the Black Sea and the Sea of Azof furnish a ready means of conveying abroad the produce of the steppe. The connexion of these rivers with those which flow towards the northern seas completing the chain of inland communication, furnishes the means of scattering it all over the empire.

The steppes feed three principal varieties of oxen: the small dark cattle of the Kirguise and Tartars, and the large grey oxen, with dark legs and muzzles, bearing much resemblance to the wild oxen which formerly inhabited the forests of Germany, and of which a few still exist in some of the royal forests of Poland. In European Russia this species is the most numerous, and is principally bred for the hides and tallow; but as the cows furnish very little milk, a mixed Dutch breed has been gradually introduced, and is in great favour with the colonists.

There are also four varieties of sheep: the Kirguise, the Wallachian, and the 'gipsy, or those crossed with the merino and the Circassian. The Kirguise, which is the most common in Asia, is called fat-tailed, though the fat is contained in two monstrous protuberances on the haunches;—the Circassian is a small mountain

sheep, distinguished by the delicious flavour of its flesh, but soon degenerating in the too rich vegetation of the pasturages of the steppe ;—and the Wallachian breed, which in Southern European Russia is as widely diffused as the grey ox amongst the horned cattle, is large and coarse woolled, and distinguished by its tail, which is one mass of fat, weighing sometimes twenty pounds, and something in the shape of a large peaked apple on its stern, only growing more pointed towards its extremity. The merino breed is rapidly gaining ground, though still far from being as numerous as the Wallachian, and will eventually people the steppes, and vastly conduce to the prosperity of the empire.

The herdsmen who lead these prodigious flocks and herds—the *tabunchiks* (horse drovers), the *tscheredniks* (cowherds), and the *tchabans*, or shepherds—are a singular and peculiar race, whose habits and mode of life are full of interest for the traveller. Leading a life almost as nomadic as the Tartars, who a few thousand miles away inhabit another part of the same plain, if they have general features of resemblance in common, they still in other points differ as much from each other as the beasts which it is their profession to tend.

The most useless, but the most interesting of these herdsmen, is the *tabunchik*, almost as wild as the half-wild horses which are committed to his guardianship. Usually a little Russian, a Cossac, or having a strong dash of Cossac blood in his veins, he offers a strange mixture of the South American gaucho, the Yorkshire horse-jockey, and the wandering Tartar; three-

fourths of his life are spent in the saddle, the other fourth in gambling, drinking, swearing, and thieving; for he scarcely sleeps, except upon his horse. The horse-breeder entrusts to him a tabune, or a herd of horses, varying in number from two hundred to a thousand, of which perhaps about half may be breeding mares, with one stallion to every five-and-twenty, and the rest foals and colts of different ages. It is his business to conduct this herd from pasturage to pasturage, or rather, to follow it in its capricious wanderings, to keep it together, and to protect it against the devastations of the horse-stealers and the wolves.

The trade of the tabunchik is one which requires so much skill, activity, and zeal, that none but a free-man, and a freeman deeply interested in the prosperity of the herd, could ever be found to undertake it with success. He receives commonly five shillings per annum for each horse in the tabune, but at the same time he is responsible for every horse that is lost, beyond a certain number which is allowed for unavoidable contingencies. Thus the pay of one of these drovers may amount to 200*l.* or 300*l.* per annum, in a successful year, when undiminished by casualties, and then the sudden loss of half his herd may swallow up at once the savings of several years, for every horse is averaged at 5*l.* a head.

The animals committed to his care are shy of every body but their drover, as the wild horses of the Kirguise steppes are, for the most part, as ignorant of the restraint of bit and rein, and the humiliation of the saddle's ignominious weight, as their perfectly free brethren, who know no lord but the patriarchal stallion;

for, with the exception of a few dozen which the tabunchik selects for his own riding, no attempt is ever made to reclaim them till purchased in detail at the horse fairs, whither occasionally the surplus of the tabune is sent for sale.

Restless as the wind, the horses of the herd can never be depended on for an hour. At all times, they are liable to quit their pasturage and roam forward, in the daintiness of their fastidious taste, or the mere wantonness of their caprice, and the drover must follow to prevent them from dispersing. Night and day he cannot snatch an hour's rest, without, as he himself expresses it, "sleeping with one eye, and watching the tabune with the other;" and the first dawn of daylight calls forth the exercise both of his activity and sagacity, in collecting his wild troop together, and following on the traces of those who have rambled far away.

The tabunchik alone, of all the nomades who inhabit the steppe, whatever be their race or name, is without some humble dwelling; his mode of life will allow him to use neither hut, nor tent, nor wagon, and he has no more bulky "impedimenta" than his saddle. Living, as it were, on horseback, and mounting at once the wildest horses of the tabune, these men are generally good and bold riders, and like the gauchos, they use with admirable skill the lasso, of which the use is common to all the inhabitants of the steppe, as well as to the Caucasian mountaineers. The lasso enables them at all times instantly to catch any horse of the herd, which otherwise would be a matter of the utmost difficulty. They are also armed with a for-

midable whip, in the lash of which is an iron button, which when swung by a vigorous and dexterous arm is as formidable as a pistol bullet, and far more certain of striking the destined object.

The horse may here be studied in a state of nature. Born on the steppe, and never having seen a roof between him and the heavens, his habits are all those of the wild horse. Here, as amongst his brethren who have no connexion with mankind, the strongest and boldest stallion is the lord and ruler of the community, until the growing strength and courage of some young competitor induce him to dispute his sovereignty, when, after a desperate battle, the vanquished either is reduced to obedience, or sullenly abdicates his dignity.

The stallion also displays much natural gallantry ; he is evidently always on the *qui vive* for the safety of the herd, for every strange object attracts his attention and excites his suspicion, and he is fretful and uneasy long before the mares and their foals appear alarmed ; but when they are so, they fly at once, whereas the stallion wheels snorting round the stranger, to reconnoitre the danger, and always lingers behind the flying herd, when he imagines it to menace on the rear. Alone he attacks the wolf with ungovernable fury, and it seldom happens unsuccessfully, although he is far from making the best use of the formidable weapons which nature has given him ; for the stallion never strikes with his hind legs, of which the kick is so effectual, but only with his fore-feet, with which he strikes his adversary, biting and tearing him also with his teeth. The mares and geldings, which

seem to consider that all arms are fair for the weak to use, in general resort at once to kicking, but do not themselves to this mode of defence.

The wolves that infest the steppe in great numbers, and endeavour either to surprise the straggling colts, or the foals of improvident mares which have wandered too far from assistance, are sometimes, though rarely, known to gather in a pack, and make a night attack on the tabune ; and they sometimes venture on it in the broad daylight of a winter's day, at a season when the herd is enfeebled by hunger, or at a time when it is bewildered by the snow-storm. These battles are always very bloody, and are sure to terminate fatally to some of the assailants, who can never carry off the carcases of the young foals they may have succeeded in killing, when once the herd is aroused ; for they have all the instinct of attacking and pursuing the wolf with the most vindictive fury, and it is therefore only after the tabunchik has taken off the skin, and the field of battle has been abandoned, that the marauder dares return to profit by its spoils.

Immediately on the alarm of such an attack, the herd gathers together in a close column, in the centre of which the foals and colts are enclosed, and it comes rushing on, trampling and beating down its assailants, who are always driven from their prey, directly the united tabune have gathered against them. But the stallions, who disdain to share the safety conferred by its united strength upon the mass, gallop in front of it, attacking at once their baffled assailants, or cutting off their retreat. The wolf is generally struck down, and sometimes several times successively, by a power-

ful blow of the stallion's forefeet, as he attempts to fly at his throat, until the stallion at last seizes him with his teeth by the neck before he can recover, and shakes him as a terrier shakes a rat. Sometimes he kneels upon him, but in every case, if he can only parry the assault of the wolf, and once seize on him, the rapacious animal can never escape, for the whole tabune gather round the combatants, and tear him and beat him to pieces in the dust or snow. But at least it is always a mortal struggle ; the wolf dare not trust himself to turn and fly when so near his adversary ; his only chance is in grasping his throat, which, if he can reach it, he tears open as quickly as a razor could sever it. But in this attempt he usually perishes as we have recorded, unaided as he is ; for however numerous the pack may be, as soon as they see the herd in martial order, they sheer off, leaving a few unfortunates who have been compromised in the attack.

The chase of the wolf is a favourite pastime of the tabunchik, though he can never find time to indulge in it, unless a wolf comes within sight when he is in the saddle. But the wolf, who in more than one country is supposed to have some indirect connexion with the author of all wiles, is much too cunning to give him often so fair an opportunity, though he will be prowling all day within sight of the sheep or ox herd, who cannot pursue him, or following the wagon of some wandering Israelite, who, led by the universal incentive of his race, comes to sell brandy to the deep-drinking tabunchik, and perhaps to traffic in the skins of departed wolves.

Whenever, on a tolerable horse, the horse-drover can get a fair gallop after the wolf, he is almost sure to run him down; for though this animal has both speed and endurance, and when hunted by slow hounds, or at a moderate pace, is untiring—as in the old hunts in France and Germany he formerly proved himself to be, when it was only by means of many *relais* of dogs that he could be tired out—yet, just as we see with a fox, if made to fly beyond a certain degree of speed before a lurcher, the wolf, when closely pressed at starting, is soon exhausted.

As soon as the wolf finds himself beaten, he commonly lies on his back and whines like a dog; for against man all his ferocity seems absorbed in his fears. But the iron-tipped whip of the hunter descends mercilessly and fatally; and he never receives from his pursuer quarter, which neither his craven-like conduct in the strife, nor the antecedents of his civil life, have deserved at his hands.

On the whole, the wolf, if he does much damage on the steppe, has many enemies whose supremacy he must acknowledge. He is trodden down by the angry stallion; he is gored by the furious oxen when he ventures to attack the tabune or tehereda; and when he approaches too near the otara, or the vast flock of sheep, the fierce sheep-dogs of the steppe, the long-legged, shaggy-haired otscharki, are upon him in an instant.

The wolf is strong in the jaws, fierce, and active; he can make prodigious bounds; and he has such power in his jaws, which are armed with a formidable set of grinders, that when he snaps them together, the

sound is betwixt that of a pocket-pistol and a carter's whip. But he is stiff in the neck, and when resolutely attacked, or what is called in English sporting phrase, "collared," his heart entirely fails him. When seized on by one of these dogs, which much resemble in form but surpass him in size, and which have all his ferocity, added to considerable courage, he often dies without defending himself, though as long as they have not laid hold of him, he still fights amidst the whole pack, which generally collects on the scene of affray. It is also remarked, that when beaten to death, he never utters a groan or cry; but if a limb should be broken, he yelps and screams like a beaten hound.

Few instances ever occur of the wolf attacking men, even in the severest winter; but it is common for him to carry off the dogs from the villages all through the empire, and a few instances are related of children carried away, which are however mostly apocryphal. It is true, he is sometimes killed with clubs and pitch-forks, at noon-day, in the very centre of a populous village, where he has furiously attacked everything he met with. But these are in cases of hydrophobia, which in the severe winters are not very uncommon; for in an intense cold, it is impossible, even for a man, heated with walking, to satiate his thirst with snow; his teeth and his jaws ache so much in the attempt to thaw it, that he is obliged to desist: and the same is probably the case with the wolf.

It is related of a mother, who was travelling with her three children in a sledge, which was beset upon the road by a pack of hungry wolves, that when on the point of being torn to pieces by them, she flung one

child to them to save the rest; but the wolves still followed insatiate, till she sacrificed to them a second; and at last, yielding to her terror for her own safety, she abandoned the third and youngest of her children.

The Russian monarch—(either John the Terrible or Peter the Great, for we forget in whose reign it is said to have happened,) was so indignant at the unnatural conduct of the heartless mother, that he ordered her to be cast to the wolves which he kept for his hunt; but these animals, though they directly strangled her, refused to touch the body: a proceeding more remarkable in the wolf than in any other carnivorous animal; for nothing but the wolf will eat of the wolf's flesh, so strong and carrion-like it is, and so little fastidious is his taste; the author has himself seen the leather covering of an old carriage devoured by one of this rapacious family.

We have heard a story almost similar, which is much better authenticated, and may have given rise to the preceding tale; it is at least more dramatic, should it, as we must hope, be as little founded. A colonel's lady was beset in the same manner as we have described, travelling with her two children. After the wolves had once or twice sprung at the horses, in her despair, she sacrificed the elder of her children, to save—not herself, but the youngest and best beloved, a weak and puny child, which she put beneath the sledge-cover under her feet. When she reached the place of her destination, she found, however, that the object of her culpable preference, to whose safety she had sacrificed her elder born, was

stiff and cold as marble, having been frozen where she had placed it for security on the fearful journey.

The tcheredenik, or driver of horned cattle, tends his herd on foot. His office, although far from being a sinecure, requires neither the activity nor the intelligence of the tabunchicks, and he appears to have imbibed in some measure the gross and heavy nature of the animals entrusted to his care.

The ox is less sensible to thirst and cold, more difficult to steal, and less easily bewildered in the snow storms. It is, however, remarkable, that he is much more easily mastered by the wolf than the horse is ; that is to say, if isolated from the herd, he is more awkward in defending the throat, which it is mortal to any beast to let the wolf once gripe in his iron fangs.

In the environs of the Black Sea, and in all favourable localities for water communication all over the European steppes, vast establishments are formed for slaughtering the cattle and melting down the tallow. They are generally conducted by some Muscovite speculator—a man who probably can scarcely write his name—who is sometimes what is called in English commercial jargon, a mere man of straw, and who, with money advanced him from London, of which he scarcely knows more than we know of Timbuctoo, proceeds to buy up the cattle of the tcheredes. He generally rents about his “*salgan*,” as the smelting establishment is called, many thousand acres of rich pasture land, for which he pays rather more than one farthing English per acre. Here he fattens such of the oxen as

are lean, and allows those which his agents have purchased at a distance to recover from the fatigues of long driving. After the month of September, the work of slaughter begins.

Each of the salgans has a large slaughterhouse, which may contain some five-and-twenty victims at a time, and innumerable kettles, into each of which fifteen whole oxen are cut up and boiled down, the flesh skimmed out, and thrown to manure the meadows.

The butchers, who are usually Muscovites, are employed to the number of eight or twelve at a time. Covered from head to foot with grease and blood, which have soaked their sheepskins and boots, clotted their beards, and matted their thick hair,—they present the most disgusting spectacle. These men,—who earn high wages, as is common with all whose trade is only productive for a few months of the year—when following their sanguinary avocations, slaughter in batches of a hundred oxen at a time, which are at once boiled down; and in the course of a few weeks as many as two, three, or five thousand of their bellowing victims are sacrificed.

Nothing can be more barbarous than the manner in which they proceed about their work, and never was the interference of the society befriending animals—which, amidst the humbug of five hundred similar institutions, does so much honour to Old England—more needed than in this proceeding. The butchers, having introduced their victims by five-and-twenties into the reeking chamber of death, place them in a row, and then with one stroke of the

natchet across the back-bone, sever the spine ; the unhappy beast falls powerless, but alive to the most acute sensations of pain, and remains weltering in its gore, and struggling in its agony, until it comes to its turn to be cut up and relieved from its misery.

Not that we can accuse the Russian generally of cruelty to animals, for the reverse is the case. Where the love of gain does not interfere, as in the instance alluded to, he is generally kind to them, as he shews by his conduct towards his horses and dogs ; but here the wish to diminish the amount of labour leads him to make a horrible exception. It will be readily understood, that without the trouble of tying up or securing, the ox is thus at a single stroke disabled, and prevented from offering more resistance than if he were already dead meat.

The tallow which is boiled out of the carcases from the gigantic smelting kettles, according as the uppermost or lower part of it is poured out, is accounted of different quality. The best is exported to Turkey, where it is used as butter ; the next sort, to the amount of nearly six millions sterling, is exported to the north, and nearly all to England ; and the inferior kind is consumed in the empire. The hides are frequently sewn up, wherever the axe or knife of the butcher has rent them in the process of slaughtering and stripping the skin ; and filled with the molten tallow, and ranged in rows, they personate again, erect on their short, stumpy legs, the living cattle, of which they are the spoil, and remind one strongly of the frozen markets of the north.

CHAPTER II.

REGION OF THE STEPPE, AND OF THE NOMADES.

ON the southern side, the European steppe is bounded only by the Black Sea, into which the Dniester and the Dnieper cast themselves. The latter, the Borysthenes of the ancients, after roaring over numerous cataracts, hushes its turbulent waves, which have been noisy and impetuous during a course of fifteen hundred miles, into a dead calm as it unites with the tideless waters of the Black Sea,—forming a kind of pestilential marsh extending some fifty miles along its banks; which are here from seven to nine miles apart, and which far higher up continue sedgy and marshy, the crane, the wildgoose, the swan, and innumerable wild fowl, nestling in the wilderness of reeds.

A little further on, the steppe of Taurida continues, over the bridge or isthmus of Perekop, to invade the peninsula of the Crimea, which only at its southernmost extremity becomes mountainous. The inhabitants of the Tauridian steppe have a more Asiatic aspect than we find for many hundred miles eastward, the population being of Mongul, Hindoo, and Turcoman origin,

represented by the Calmucs, the gipsies, and the race erroneously denominated Krim Tartars, who all lead a nomade life over these plains, which their caravans of wagons and camels traverse, conveying salt and other goods, and uniting commercial pursuits with their wandering and pastoral habits.

The southern and hilly shores of the peninsula, where the Krim Tartars have adopted a sedentary mode of life, are considered as the Russian Italy; they only want wood to render them delightful. Here the vineyards and the beehives overspread the country; here the northern colonist improves the soil and flourishes; and here the country seats of the wealthy Russian aristocracy, embellished by all the luxury of art, overlook the blue Euxine, and add fresh graces to one of the most lovely scenes in nature.

Let us return to the steppe. Further eastward it is bound by the sea of Azov, into which the Don (Tanais) pours the sludge and mud which it washes down from its banks. This process, which is more or less perceptible in all the rivers that flow into the Black Sea, has been carried on by the waters of the Don for so many years back, that the inland sea into which it empties itself, was named by the ancients the Paulus Maeotis. Further on it is bounded southward by the Caucasian mountains and the Caspian Sea, and traversed by the Wolga, which winds with snake-like tortuosity for three thousand miles, and then divides into innumerable hydra heads, and beyond it again by the Ural. All this part of the steppe bears evident traces of having been recently raised up from the Caspian, which the saltiness of its waters and the

aspect of its flat lands, which lead towards the Black Sea, must induce one to believe was once united through it with the Mediterranean.

These rivers are all filled with fish, which forms a capital article of internal commerce ; but the more easterly they are, the greater appears to be their produce. We find the Cossae the principal fisher. He uses the net and the lance, the latter by torch-light ; and by the tramping of his steed, he makes a kind of battue in the water, and drives the monsters of the finny tribes into such parts of the shallows where they can be secured. As the fish is principally consumed by the Muscovite population, whose long and rigorous abstinence from meat during the fasts imposed by their church, renders this food in great demand, the principal speculators are bearded Russian merchants, who purchase and traffic with it, and who manifest, in all matters of interior trade, a very enterprising spirit.

Caviar, or “Ekra,” as it is called in Russia, the raw roe of the sturgeon, the celebrated national delicacy, which although eaten salted is much more esteemed when fresh, is put in barrels as soon as it is ripped from the belly of the fish, and conveyed with relays of post-horses many thousand miles to Moscow and St. Petersburg, to gratify the luxurious taste of the inhabitants, and to contribute to the fortune which the bold speculators rapidly amass.

This fish trade is, however, one of very little importance in the future destinies of the Muscovite empire, because it is limited to making the most of a fixed produce, which can never much increase, and

may probably diminish. With the growth of the vine, which is making rapid progress in Podolia, in the Crimea, and on the banks of the Don, the case is different ; for though the wine produced is hitherto not a staple article of importance, in a short space of years it must become so, and without interfering with the sheep or cattle breeding, it may help to raise these southern provinces to an incalculable degree of prosperity.

To attain this, to an extent that would occupy double the whole of the present population of the Russian empire, it would only be necessary that the banks of all the southern rivers should be perfectly colonized and cultivated ; and these call only for the plough of the husbandman. But if this were effected, it would be far from being the limit of its rapid increase ; for the only obstacle to the cultivation of any part of the steppe is the summer drought. But as the colonist proceeds onwards, and plants the vicinity of the ground which he has reclaimed to the purposes of husbandry, experience proves that moisture will be retained where drought now parches everything in the summer, and that rills and streamlets, that contribute to the streams, which in their turn swell the tributary branches of the great rivers, instead of drying up, will continue to diffuse a salutary humidity, and that as the rich soil of the steppe becomes gradually wooded, it will cease at any season to be arid.

The principal population of this vast southern plain of the Russian empire, is the Cossac, the Mongul, and the Tartar. The Cossacs, of whom about one

million may be taken as inhabitants of the steppe, will be described in treating of the military force of Russia. The Monguls, divided into several tribes of Calmues, scarcely amount to half a million. The Tartars, about two millions in number, are divided into more than twenty tribes, of which the Kirguise and Nogais are the most important, each horde approaching to half a million.

These twin races are associated so closely all through their eventful history, that, distinct as their physical character is to this day, we find them mingled and confounded in every page of the past. These tribes, which came forth from the same inhospitable land to overspread so wide a portion of the earth together, have now sunk back to the insignificance and obscurity from which six centuries since they suddenly emerged, to threaten the whole of the rest of mankind with annihilation. In the beginning of the thirteenth century, we read of a Mongul nation, that occupied the sterile and mountainous wastes between China, Persia, and Siberia, and who there is nothing to lead one to believe were much more numerous than these united Mongul and Tartar descendants are at present. We read also of the Tartar, or Tatar, horde, then only comprising sixty or seventy thousand families, dwelling in amity with the Monguls, and even owning their sovereignty.

Fired with the lust of conquest, and the mania of devastation under a Mongul chieftain, the celebrated Temugin, who assumed the pompous title of Zingis, or "the most great," under which appellation he is better known, we find these united hordes, to the number

of 700,000 warriors, spreading their conquests and extending their ravages north, south, east, and west. Under his successors, a few years after, from the walls of Pekin to the shores of the Baltic, they mark their track by fire and blood. At the battle of Lignitz, where they defeated the Grand Dukes of Silesia, the Polish Palatines, and the Grand Master of the Teutonic order, they fill nine sacks with the right ears of the slain, and render for a moment doubtful the existence of the Christian world. We find the successors of Zingis in their deserts, when the tide of conquest and adventure had begun to ebb, dividing, after their repast of roasted sheep and mares' milk, five hundred wagons laden with gold and silver spoil.

Two centuries after, the same insatiable and restless spirit breaks out again under Timour the Tartar, in a fever of conquest, with a violence which left all the deeds of his predecessors far in the shade. This lame warrior, the sanguinary herdsman, the grasping philosopher, the lawless legislator in a long career of bloodshed and murder, in the course of which he conquered Persia, Georgia, the present Tartary, Russia, India, Syria, and Anatolia, deserved the name of "scourge of the human race," by occasioning the death of eighteen millions of his fellowmen; or at the rate of nearly fifteen hundred per day during a reign of five-and-thirty years of uninterrupted bloodshed and rapine. This was the terrible mission entrusted to the Mongul and Tartar hordes, that they appear jointly to have accomplished, the Monguls leading and the Tartars following, till their second and most terrible outbreak,

when the former follow, as it were, in the wake of the latter.

It is a question if these united tribes were ever much more numerous than at the present day. But though now that they are scattered far from each other, unconnected and watched, a repetition of their former conquests is no more to be dreaded than the subjugation of Europe by the modern Romans, yet it is difficult to say how far their spirit might not be awakened by the Russian government, or how successfully it might not be directed towards the extension of her dominion on the Asiatic side.

Those powers of endurance, and that habit of desert life, still exist, which render the natural barriers that are impassable to another race, only difficult, but not insurmountable obstacles to these tribes ; and the physical peculiarities are not changed which enabled the same hordes to march from the walls of Pekin to the banks of the Vistula, or from the Polish frontier to the extremities of India, from India to Syria, and from Syria to the Chinese border, setting distance at defiance, and traversing habitually, and apparently with ease, at every fresh suggestion of their ambitious spirit, an extent of space which we find that other nations have once in the course of ages, and at intervals of centuries, toiled painfully over, either in those early migrations, when a people, like a swarm of young bees, wander forward to seek a home, or at the beck of some adventurous conqueror, the boldness of whose exploit has been marked as an era in his country's history.

When we contrast the expeditions of the Greeks

and Romans with those of the Monguls and Tartars,—expeditions which were so seldom carried through, and never but at the expense of prodigious loss and suffering,—they remind us of the comparative progress, over a sandy plain, of the heavy oxen and the light-footed and enduring dromedary; and yet all who will take the trouble attentively to examine this portion of the history of the ancients, and compare their marches with the most memorable of those executed or attempted by modern European armies, will be forced to acknowledge how far inferior we have been, all through the middle ages, and up to the present day continue, to the Athenians, the Maeedonians, and Latins.

Let us look to the recent expeditions of the British, Russians, and French to Caboul, Khiva, and in Africa. Accomplished with the utmost difficulty, or utterly failing, do they warrant the belief that any modern armies could penetrate where the Greeks and Romans did?—and yet what were all the united expeditions of the Greeks and Romans, compared to the mighty undertakings of the Tartars and Monguls?

It must also be observed, that in all these extraordinary irruptions, the hordes, that passed like the sword of the destroying angel, seem seldom to have settled, but to have rambled in a few successive years from the centre of one continent to the extremity of another, and that it was chiefly the nature of that prodigious plain, the Russian and Siberian steppes, which appears, by affording a home so congenial to their habits, to have led them to settle on it;—for we may

call it settling, when a people, whose wanderings the limits of one of the territorial divisions of the earth could not bound, and who roamed for thousands of miles, confine their periodical rambles within a circle of a few hundred. Here, scattered and divided by the very extent of the territory they occupied, they have been enfeebled, and, at last insensibly overpowered ; the small and weakened hordes have long entirely forgotten their former connexion, and the rabid spirit of conquest which animated their ancestors five centuries ago. But the Mongul and Tartar is still individually the same, and that spirit might be again breathed into him, its people scattered abroad might still be collected together ; the belt of desert and of wastes which divides the northern from the fruitful parts of Southern Asia might again be traversed, and innumerable warlike tribes would probably now, as formerly, join in the general movement ; and though it is true that if, at the present day, this tide were turned against Europe, the nature of her surface, and the present condition of her armies, would enable her to laugh to scorn the invasion of a mere deluge of horsemen,—Asia, on the other hand, can offer still less resistance to such an encroachment than she could in the days of Zingis and of Timour.

If we observe attentively the progress of the desolating hordes that followed these sanguinary leaders, we shall find their conquests attributable solely to the physical endowment of the race, no matter from what cause arising—to the power of living and thriving in regions and through changes of climate, which the rest of the human species have never been able to brave with

the same impunity, and to the entire absence of the attribute phrenologists denominate “locality,” which, whether it be wanting or not upon their skulls, has proved so in their history. But there is nothing to shew that they were more numerous, more brave, or better instructed than at the present moment. Such as they were, and are, the extraordinary talents of men, as remarkable for their genius as their crimes, found in them materials for the subjugation of a large part of the world. Both Zingis and Timour were as profound politicians as they were accomplished warriors, and their successes against the European and Turkish armies were due to their admirable tactics against nations widely their inferiors in this respect. But there is nothing to warrant the supposition that their people were a whit more instructed or civilized than at present; and we can never find more than fifteen hundred thousand of them assembled to put into execution the boldest scheme of conquest; a number formidable indeed as an army, but small when considered as perhaps half the nation. Not only did these chiefs owe, indeed, the gain of battles to the superiority of their own genius; not only to their own foresight the conquest of Hungarian or Polish cities, whose walls they caused to be battered by captive Chinese engineers; but it was only with Tartar armies that they could ever have reached such distant fields of battle, or sat down before fortresses so remote.

The Tartar tribes, on the other hand, without such leaders, though they could have traversed space and distance, must have been crushed and annihilated in the first field against the chivalry of Europe, or the

disciplined and victorious armies of Bajazet, had it not been for the genius which arrayed their masses. Such adversaries as Zingis or Timour conquered, they might conquer again, led as these chiefs led them—for the materials still exist to work out similar conquests.

The policy of those who have subdued, and keep separated, the Mongul and Tartar tribes, may unite them, and its Machiavelian spirit may easily inspire these nations, and push them forward in an enterprise of which those who plan it expect to reap the benefit, and which they have the intelligence to direct, and the means to take advantage of. If the Russian government had not such a powerful auxiliary in the Cossac, it could naturally never dream of exciting tribes, still impatient of her dominion, on a career in which success would render them at once independent of her rule. But the Cossac, without whom indeed she could never have subdued them, is becoming every day more intimately mixed up with the hordes which his colonies adjoin; he will advance with them, and ensure his obedience both by his example and his presence. He is playing now the part of the tame oxen, yoked alongside the wild animal just taken from the herd, to be driven onward with it as soon as they are securely lashed together, to render thus the strength available, which could not otherwise be governed.

That Russia has long turned her attention towards Asia, and especially towards India, and aspired to the sovereignty of these regions, her conduct during the last century too amply testifies; justifying in its fullest extent the suspicion excited by the precepts of

policy laid down by Peter the First, for the guidance of his successors, wherein, after recommending the most proper means to weaken Sweden, and to subdue Poland, he says, textually—"One must become thoroughly imbued with the conviction that the commerce of India leads to the dominion of the world"—a suspicion which would have been singularly strengthened by the close observation of all his political bequests, which, fulfilled successively, have left only this one yet unexecuted, though avowed, and even boasted of, as a project, by the organs of government, and many of its most responsible agents.

Nevertheless, we have every reason to believe that, of late years, and especially since the Russian government has permitted her subordinates and her press, even ostentatiously, to avow her intentions in this respect, that though never eventually relinquishing the scheme, she has become sensible that the period was still far off when it would be practicable, and that another, of even more colossal aggrandizement, and which has generally escaped the suspicious eyes of Europe, has been put forward in her councils, as more immediately feasible. Of no modern date in its conception, it is said to have been always intended to follow the invasion of India, until the difficulties of the latter undertaking proving, on a closer inspection, far greater than had been anticipated, it was destined, as more easy in its execution, to precede and pave the way to it. We allude to the conquest of China, for which, during more than a century, the Muscovite empire has been silently preparing, making herself thoroughly acquainted with the exact situation of a

country, which, in every other case, had so long succeeded in concealing everything of importance regarding itself, from the most searching glances of western curiosity and penetration. She maintains to this effect a mission in Peking, at the expense of truckling to the bloated arrogance of the Chinese, and by means of her trade upon the frontier of China Proper, keeps up a communication with the inhabitants of that portion of Chinese Tartary which intervenes between her own frontier and the great wall, and with whom, as well as with the still independent Tartars, according to the accounts of officers long employed upon the border stations, the Russian agents have succeeded in exciting such a spirit of discontent and ambition, that they would be ready, at the beck of the Russian government, at any moment, to disown their allegiance, and turn their swords against the Celestial Empire.

But the time had not arrived, and now, in consequence of the British triumphs in China, may never arrive, in which Russia will be prepared to throw aside the mask, and cast out of its pagoda the idol which her humble and noiseless footsteps have been allowed insiduously to approach, and which the servile obeisance of her agents had lulled into security. Her Cossacks are not yet sufficiently numerous, the Tartars of her steppes are not yet trained sufficiently to push them forward in the direction she wishes, without risk of failure ; and the chain of her establishment in that part of Siberia which she must make the basis of her operations, is not yet sufficiently complete. Although, upon the map, the frontiers of the Russian and Chinese empires blend into

one common line, a vast tract of territory lies between the nominal border of each of these states, and the limits of that which they may really be said to occupy, and only a few years since, if invited to take peaceful possession of the Chinese empire, it would have puzzled Russia to have conveyed thither for that purpose even the semblance of an army, so surely would it have melted away upon the road.

Since then, however, Russia has rapidly progressed in this quarter, and probably in less than another five-and-twenty years, the means for the execution of a plan so long matured would have been really ripe, and if the recent war between England and China does not, as it bids fair to do, change eventually the face of the whole of that part of Asia, it would have been in her power at any time to open the flood-gates of invasion, and turn upon the Chinese empire the full tide of her Asiatic hordes, by that time broken into such rude obedience as may answer her service, and mingle with the faithful tribes of Cossacs, to whom the use of horse artillery will always give a sure preponderance.

The independent Monguls and Tartars, reduced as their empire has been to an insignificant extent by the converging encroachments of the Chinese and Russian frontiers, and the Tartars under the Chinese dominion, to whom tradition points out the rich and densely populated lands of China, as from time immemorial the natural prey of their people, are all ripe and ready to join in such an enterprise. If their active co-operation were not, as it would be, very valuable, it would have

conduced to success, by throwing open the gates of the empire, and by the mere fact of allowing a free and uninterrupted passage through their country.

Even now all the danger that may menace any part of central and southern Asia from Russian ambition, is owing to the nature of this people. What native power could resist an inroad of a Russo-Tartar tribe of several hundred thousand souls, accompanied by fifty thousand Cossacs with a hundred pieces of cannon, and followed by ten thousand infantry on dromedaries and camels? Yet some of the author's informants, men whose shrewdness has led them to indulge in no very sanguine anticipations of Russian success on the western side of Asiatic Russia, and who are therefore above the class of mere ambitious enthusiasts, look to the time as rapidly and certainly approaching, when such an inroad as we have supposed will be feasible, not as one exhausting and isolated effort, but as one of many waves which Russia will pour in succession over the natural barriers which divide her from Southern Asia.

It is only for this purpose that Russia values her Tartar population, and for no other that she can be labouring so hard to introduce, amongst its remotest tribes, some features of the Cossac organization, as with the Kirguise she has partially succeeded in doing. These, at least, are the projects which her own Asiatic agents attribute to their government, and even when they suppose them to embrace the eventual subjugation of the whole of Asia, there is nothing so chimerical as would at first appear in this bold design, nor even is there aught we can see, considering

the means at her disposal, if we except British interference, which is likely effectually to thwart its execution.

The Tartar race, who once in history emerged from its pastoral solitude to scatter desolation and death, during a long reign of terror, over a great portion of the globe, may therefore be destined again to play an important part in extending the dominion of a government whose demoralizing rule, worse than the sword and brand of Timour's hordes, blasts and withers all the fairest and most rational fruit of civilization, and carries with it moral death and degradation.

The pure and unmixed 'Tartars, are middle-sized, well-made, and active, dark-complexioned, dark-eyed, and almost beardless ; their hair is long, black, and lank. The Monguls are shorter in stature, and exceedingly hideous in features ; their low foreheads, cat-like eyes, high cheek-bones, broad faces, and misshapen forms, contributing to give them an aspect scarcely human. Such tribes as are of mingled blood, exhibit more or less of the characteristic traits of each race. A great resemblance exists in their general habits—some breeding sheep, some oxen, some camels, according to the part of the steppe which they inhabit, and feeding on the flesh and milk of all these animals, but ever preferring the flesh of the horse to any other. Even the Tartar princes long domesticated in St. Petersburg, and accustomed to every western luxury, still have their feasts of horsemeat, which is dressed in twenty different forms, and which they wash down with the choicest vintages of France and Germany.

All these tribes use a beverage made from sour

milk, called koumis, and most of them make brandy from the sweet milk of the mare, extracting the alcohol of its saccharine matter. Their vegetable food, of which they are very sparing, consists of rice, or of grits of different grain, with which they make the universal “ pilaff” of the East.

They have a hard sour cheese, which is of the colour and consistency of a brickbat, made also from the mares and camels’, or the sheep’s milk, which they pound, and drink with water; and their greatest luxury is tea, which they get of very inferior quality, and pressed into hard cakes, like oil-cake, that require dividing with the hatchet, and which will not yield its aroma on mere infusion in boiling water, but requires decoction, and is commonly boiled by the Tartars, in mare’s milk.

It is a singular fact that the Mongul and Tartar are utterly valueless as a breeding stock, its increase, always slow, entirely ceasing when forced from its Nomadic habits. Thus whenever the Russian government has succeeded in fixing a tribe belonging to these people, it is found, in a few years, not to form as populous a colony as would have arisen from the progeny of a dozen Muscovites, or a handful of Cossacs, settled in a similar locality.

CHAPTER III.

MILITARY STRENGTH OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE.

To form an approximate idea of a state so essentially warlike in all its institutions as the Russian empire, it is not only necessary to acquire a correct knowledge of its actual military strength, but we must also investigate the latent elements which may be called into action to increase it; we must consider how far its subjects are adapted for the purely military character with which its government appears so anxious to invest them, and to what extent they are, or may be, fitted for the mission of extensive conquest which its ambition probably destines, and which the apprehensions of Europe ascribes, to them.

In his endeavours to enable him to accomplish this object, the author must crave the indulgence of the reader for leading him through a mass of technicalities, on the plea of its being necessary to the elucidation of the subject before us, as well as for the retrospection of the past; for here it is only by reference to the his-

tory of the past that we can unravel the present, or find a key to the future.

If we examine dispassionately and calmly the military history of Russia during the last century, we shall find, in proceeding with our task, more causes of alarm than have ever been admitted by the prejudice with which everything regarding this people seems to have been viewed. Yet, if we continue our investigation as far as the late Polish war, and combine its results with the aspect presented by the Russian army to the eye of a minute observer, we shall find our apprehensions rapidly disappearing before the researches which have led to the explanation of facts apparently anomalous and perplexing. We shall, then, at first, find ourselves startled by the conviction that the Russian armies have been much more formidable than we had accustomed ourselves to believe; we shall be forced to admit that in the public estimation their actions have been universally undervalued, and to recognise that the share of glory which was justly their due, has never been awarded to them.

We have learned to regard the Russian army as barbarians, whose victories were insured by the mere superiority of number, and only rendered memorable by the barbarities which tarnished them. In both judgments we should be wrong; for they have never been distinguished by any peculiar cruelty in the field, and, from the reign of Catherine I. to the decease of Paul, a period of almost uninterrupted success for the Russian arms, we shall find that when they were appealed to, to forward the ambitious views of the sovereigns in whose name they were wielded, they

were in most instances opposed to a numerical superiority of their opponents. A careful perusal of impartial histories shews us that, eighty years ago, of two great battles, fought with almost equal forces by the Russians, against an army as highly disciplined as any which has ever been collected together in Europe, either before or since that period, and commanded by one of the greatest captains of that or any other age—Frederick the Great—one remained undecided ; and in the other, Russians obtained the victory. It reminds us, that under Suwarrow, whose armies never exceeded forty thousand men, and often consisted of less than twenty thousand, they drove out of Italy, in a series of successful combats, one hundred and twenty thousand of the troops of the French Republic, commanded by Moreau, by Macdonald, and by Joubert.

When we reflect, therefore, on what the Russian soldier has proved himself, and consider that the empire which threatens to send him forth again to conquest has now about a *million* of men under arms, there would appear to be in the conjunction of these facts most serious cause of alarm. Fortunately, however, for the independence of Europe, the Russian soldier *is no longer what he was* ; and such as he was in the small armies of the Generals of Elizabeth and of Suwarrow, it will be impossible ever again to render him, in the overgrown masses into which Russia has diluted its military vigour, like most other continental states, since the fatal example of France in her revolutionary war.

Many causes have concurred to render the Russian armies less formidable than formerly,—as, by a compa-

rison of their former with their recent campaigns in Europe, we shall very easily demonstrate ; and we may readily understand the reasons of this unfavourable change, when we distinguish the peculiar features which at that time constituted their excellence. All their successes have been chiefly owing to a good and steady infantry ; and, probably, they have never had but one General, Suwarrow, who had a right to share with the private, triumphs which were solely due to the superiority of the soldier over those to whom he was opposed. To the talent of their chiefs, excepting in the case of this remarkable man, they have seldom been indebted.

This infantry still continues to render the Russian armies respectable ; but its officers, who have been at all times indifferent, even when the comparatively limited extent of the army allowed a more careful selection, are now most lamentably deficient, both in personal gallantry and intelligence. The fanatic confidence in the holiness of their cause, the blind belief in fatalism which formerly animated the masses of the military, and supplied the place of a more noble enthusiasm, exist no longer. This feeling, which Suwarrow took such pains to keep alive amongst their ranks, has been allowed gradually to subside. Its last flashes were seen at the battle of Borodino, where the levies just recruited from the peasantry, and still in their grey dresses, moved steadily and unflinchingly in the face of destruction,—trembling and crossing themselves, indeed, but still pushing forward, in their first and last field, to the death which awaited them.

It is not that the soldier has become sceptical ; but

there is a wide difference between that negative state of mind, the absence of doubt, and a fervent and vivid faith. It is the difference between the passive belief of the Moslemin of the present day, who does not question his creed, and the enthusiasm of his ancestors, who strove to propagate it through the world of old, with the Koran in one hand and the cimeter in the other.

The Russian peasantry, who, when disciplined, constitute some of the best infantry in Europe,—superior in steadiness to any, excepting the English, the Swedes, and the Swiss,—are naturally a most pacific race, and, of all others, would seem least calculated for the career of arms. Timid in their disposition, feeble in constitution, they can neither endure long marches nor resist the hardships of a campaign. In even a greater degree than the inhabitants of any other European countries, accustomed to a watery food, of which they require great quantities, they soon fall victims to famine, and diseases and epidemics rapidly thin their numbers when exposed to scarcity or fatigue. How different in reality from the picture we have been accustomed to contemplate of bold and enduring barbarians, whose iron frames set at defiance all privations and fatigue ! In what, therefore, consists their superiority ? Only in this—that they obey ; that servitude has taught obedience without a murmur.

A Russian regiment, if destined for a long march, cannot go more than twenty-five wersts, or sixteen and two-thirds English miles per day, marching two days and resting the third. If this distance be augmented, it leaves many men upon the road ! With

sour black bread-biscuit for his food, and upwards of eighty pounds English, in arms, cartridges, and equipments, to weigh down a frame which has no stamina to support it, it is not surprising that seventy-five miles in six days should be the limit which the soldier cannot pass with impunity. But, nevertheless, if he should be ordered to perform ten times that distance, he would at least *try it*, and without repining.

We find in the annals of Russian campaigns, accounts of long and painful marches performed by Muscovite troops. We find them submitting indeed to every hardship without complaint, but marking their track as they went by the dead bodies of those who succumbed to fatigue and to disease. In two campaigns in the last Turkish war, the Russian army lost at least 150,000 men from sickness and fatigue alone; and although their European tactics and discipline rendered them everywhere, in a fair and open field, more than a match for the Turks,—who appear not only to have lost all their military skill, but not even to have perpetuated in their armies, traditionally, the system of attack so peculiarly applicable to the wild and desultory forces of which they are composed, which once rendered them so formidable, and of which Monte-euculi, in his military memoir, has left us so spirited a description,—yet, notwithstanding these advantages, so much was the strength of the invaders reduced, that it is probable that a little more firmness, or a little further prolongation even of a passive resistance on the part of the Ottoman Porte, would have led to results most disastrous to the Russian arms.

When the Russian soldier, who, as we have stated,

is little fitted *physically* for his profession, has at last survived the marches, the privations, and the inclemency of the seasons, and finds himself before the enemy, he stands trembling and timid in the place that discipline allots to him in the ranks, behind which he sees his officers, insensible to any feeling of honour, too often shamelessly hiding themselves from the adverse fire. The reader may be strongly inclined to doubt the opinion we have expressed, that this identical infantry, constituted of component parts so despicable, is yet, *as a whole*, comparatively formidable; and, what we were about to add, that probably, in a continental struggle, notwithstanding its deficiency of proper officers, it will always shew a marked superiority on the day of battle against that of Austria, Prussia, and many other continental nations. Yet so it is; for the simple reason that experience has proved that these Russian troops, whatever may be the individual feeling which animates them, will preserve their line, or continue to move in unbroken column, where the Austrians and the Prussians give way.

We must observe that the conduct of the bravest troops in Europe, if witnessed by the great mass of the public, who have derived their notions of actual warfare from reading the accounts, or listening to the narration, of those who have been engaged in it, would offer to the disappointed eye of cool spectatorship little to applaud or to admire. But courage, whether of individuals or of collective bodies, like every other quality, is comparative; and for this reason an infantry, which will steadily maintain its order, and continue its fire in the face of an advancing column, or remain

without breaking up when threatened by impending masses, though every man in its ranks should be maintaining his post with cheeks blanched and lips quivering with terror, is yet so rare and valuable in the present condition of European armies, as to give those who possess this advantage a marked superiority over any other to which they may be opposed who do not,—even though accompanied by decided inferiority in the intelligence and bravery of officers, and in the efficiency of their cavalry and artillery. And such, in a few words, is the case with the Russian troops, as compared with those of most of their continental neighbours.

The steadiness of infantry, indeed, is so important a feature in the present state of the art of war, that it may be said to constitute the very soul of military strength, and that the other arms, though both necessary and useful accessories, are still only accessories, of which the *mere inferiority*, if there be no *actual deficiency*, may be more than compensated by it. This steadiness neither the Austrians, the Prussians, the French, nor the Poles, have shewn in the same degree as the Russians, though their officers are surpassed by those of all these nations in intelligence and conduct, and that the French and Poles have over them the further advantage of the fiery valour of their masses, and the peculiarly military genius which characterizes both these people. If we judge of the future by the past, we may conclude that probably the Muscovite armies will always prove more than a match for those of all the German states, and that numerical superiority will enable them to triumph

over the French, as it has over the Poles. Even during the least brilliant period of the Russian military history, that which has elapsed since the recall of Suwarow by the Emperor Paul, (from which date up to the present time a visible deterioration is discernible in the Russian armies,) we shall still, if we follow them step by step in their campaigns, everywhere distinguish their superiority over the Prussians and Austrians, with whom we find them fighting so constantly side by side, and we shall be forced to acknowledge that defeat may be always traced to the conduct of their allies, their joint success mainly attributable to themselves. The French, if they repulsed and out-maneuvred the Russians, and carried their positions, displaying everywhere the superiority of their fiery courage and of their martial talent, could yet, in the full tide of success, obtain few of those *marked and decisive victories which signalized their contests with the Germans.*

After denying to the Russian soldier both the war-like spirit and the bravery which are often supposed to animate him, the reader, whose thoughts recur to charges at the bayonet, of which so much is spoken in all accounts of modern wars, will deem the assertion paradoxical which states that an infantry composed of such elements as are here described, and in which we have allowed personal valour to constitute so trifling an ingredient, can possibly be very formidable.

To explain satisfactorily this apparent discrepancy, as well as to furnish a key to many subsequent observations which we shall have to make upon this subject, we must endeavour, in a few words, to point out to

such of our readers as may be ignorant on this subject, the actual condition of the military art—an art the history of which is enveloped in so much mystery and contradiction, and which offers such limited interest as often to escape the research, or to weary the patience, of those who have no especial object in view to induce them to the prosecution of a study so ungrateful.

There are few, however, who are not aware that the science of war is divided, besides all that part which relates to the preparation for it, into strategy and tactics. The former relates to all the movements a general must make, from the beginning to the end of a campaign, with his army, both before and after the battles he fights. Its *true principles*, since the most remote antiquity, have never changed; and the ancients appear to have been quite as well acquainted with them as the moderns. The tactical part, which concerns the method of disposing of troops preparatory to and during the battle, has undergone considerable modifications since the introduction of the use of fire-arms: but some of its main features continue still the same, and the question of fighting in *deep* or *extended order*, or otherwise, line or in column—the phalanx or the legion—is just as much the subject of controversy now as it was in the time of the Greeks and Romans. Both systems have been successively adopted and abandoned by all European armies, and they usually appear to have been so after the example of some successful general who has made use of one or other of these orders of combat. The distinctive character of the extended order is, in modern

times, *chiefly its reliance on the physical effect produced by the musketry of an army ranged in line*, so that every firelock may be rendered available, and of the consequent influence produced by the destructive result of its fire.

Its application on this principle (for the ancients in their extended order sought their advantage in elasticity, and the effect of reserves,^{*)}) was the invention of the celebrated Gustavus Adolphus; and his system was carried to its greatest perfection by Frederick the Great. It was subsequently adopted as the order of combat of all the armies of Europe, and has remained so in the British to the present day. The system of profound order, or of attacking in columns, that of the Macedonian phalanx, and of the degenerate legions of the declining Roman empire, was the first used in modern warfare, before the innovations of Gustavus Adolphus, and since the French revolution it has been again adopted by nearly all continental armies. It is based on the *moral effect* produced on an enemy by the sight of masses advancing rapidly, to charge either the line or the columns opposed to them; but masses which have relinquished all the advantage of their fire-arms, by the very nature of their formation, in which one rank masking another to a considerable depth prevents the possibility of its firing. It was employed with great success by the

* The disposition and tactics of the legion allowed one line of combatants to retire, when hard pressed or fatigued, *through* the one behind it, which the distance left between man and man, to give each soldier full play for the use of his weapons, enabled it to do.

galaxy of brilliant generals which sprung from the French Revolution, inclusive of Napoleon. It was found that invariably the Prussian, the Austrian, the German, and the Spanish lines gave way, whenever a French column *came within a certain distance of them*, and the French generals never experienced much difficulty *in bringing up their columns to this critical point*, at which they were accustomed to see the enemy give way. At last the superiority of the system of profound order was, for a time, triumphantly established, by the victories of the children of the Revolution, and its universal adoption by the vanquished.

But when the generals of the empire, and, lastly, Napoleon himself, came to try this method of attack against a really steady infantry,—that of the British,—they were surprised to find that, when their columns had come nearer to these adverse lines than they had ever approached the Germans without seeing them give way, the British line still remained as steady and immovable as before, and from their increased proximity to it, the effect of the musketry grew every second so much more deadly, that, since the line did not break up, it became evident that the column must do so. In all the long wars of the French, in Germany and in Spain, scarcely an instance was seen in which the German, Austrian, and Prussian lines did not *give way before the French masses, long before these came up with them*; and, on the other hand, no example was afforded of these same masses ever *breaking through a line which waited for them*,—as the British did. Thus the bayonet, which national prejudice considers as the weapon on which the armies of England pecu-

liarly rely, is, on the contrary, characteristic of the system of tactics which the French have always used since the Revolution, and which continues to be used by all the continental nations who, after being vanquished by the French, adopted it.

Although these columns of attack were set in motion with the sole view of breaking through the opposing line, or shattering at the point of the bayonet the adverse columns against which they were directed,—a charge with this weapon, such as it is commonly understood, where bayonet crosses bayonet in the “tug of war,” is a thing which has never been known, excepting partially, or where a dense smoke has brought troops unconsciously close upon each other. It has never taken place premeditatedly, or to the extent of a whole corps; because either one or other party has invariably given way before an actual contact has taken place, and when the victors have only had to strike at flying men. Thus, when in the numerous battles fought between the French and English in the peninsula of Spain the bayonet proved destructive only to the former—though it was upon this weapon they principally relied for success against the British, who placed their chief confidence in the musket—it was because the French columns were thrown into confusion by the close and deadly fire of their opponents, who used their bayonets at that propitious moment to prevent them from rallying, or to pursue their flight.

It has always been the same where column has been opposed to column; the *contest is merely a moral one*, for long before they meet, one wavers—halts—and is lost. It is a contest of which the decision is

influenced by the greater resolution displayed by one or other of the adverse bodies, in approaching nearer than its opponent dares to do, to a danger which, probably, the bravest army of the present day could not be brought in reality to face—the hand-to-hand combat of large masses, such as formerly took place when men wore defensive armour, and were protected by shields—a struggle in which their now defenceless breasts would be exposed to a deadly weapon, which must, when such an encounter took place, mow down all the front ranks as soon as they met.

The least reflection will dissipate the popular illusion on this subject, and show that anything like a contest, such as took place in the good old times, when men thought themselves comparatively safe within their iron shells, and which the name of *charge at the bayonet* suggests to the imagination of the vulgar, could never now be possible, without reducing the contending forces in a few minutes to the unenviable condition of those two Kilkenny cats, who fought in a saw-pit, according to their Irish historian, till only the tail of one of them remained. At the first shock of bodies armed with a weapon so deadly to destroy, so powerless to defend, one-half the combatants opposed to each other must perish; at the next stroke of the survivors half of these must fall, and thus, by the rapid process of geometrical diminution, both sides must, in a few brief seconds, be almost utterly destroyed.

To return to the gravity which our subject merits—(for what can be more serious than the contemplation of a science in which the common children of Adam have reduced to rule the crime which branded Cain?)

—whenever two bodies of infantry meet, it is therefore the least daring *mass* which gives way. Now as it may perfectly well happen that individual courage does not suffice to constitute the courage of the mass, so the courage of the mass may exist without individual courage. Of the former position innumerable examples have been afforded us. We see warlike tribes of savages, the meanest of whose warriors shows a fearlessness and contempt of death which is not possessed by the bravest in the disciplined armies which his tribe unsuccessfully endeavours to oppose. Yet, when formed into a body, we have seen these crowds of heroes swept away like chaff before the wind, by these civilized masses,—an aggregate of comparative cowards, united into a strong and daring body, against valorous individuality forming a body cowardly and timid. It was thus, that in the Peninsular War, the regiments of Portuguese,—a people, beyond all question, inferior in personal courage to their Spanish neighbours,—when commanded by British officers, and under Spanish discipline, became some of the most efficient in the Duke of Wellington's army. The Spanish regiments, on the contrary, notwithstanding every effort to improve them, remained so unsteady, that, according to the universal testimony of our Peninsular veterans, they were, at least until near the end of the war, worse than useless.

Of the second case, the Russian soldier furnishes the most remarkable instance; for the infantry of which he forms a part is brave, though he, generally speaking, is not so. Uninspired by any military enthusiasm, or any patriotic feeling, or even by the spirit

of natural pugnacity, which for its own sake invests the very act of strife and contention with charms in the eyes of certain races of men, the Russian private will do his duty; he will stand passively to be cut to pieces, or he will advance as he is directed; his arm may be unnerved, indeed, by his individual terrors, but still he *keeps his place*; the man is there, at his post, forming part and parcel of a *brave and formidable whole*,—a whole which stands unawed by danger, or which itself advances threatening. We have shewn that this passive valour is all that the infantry soldier, a component atom of the mass, which never acts except as such, is likely, in the present state of European warfare, to be ever called upon on any occasion of importance to display.

Lightly as we might be induced to hold this negative quality, it becomes of importance, from the fact that so few European nations possess it, and that it is one of which the place can never be supplied by the fitful starts of irregular valour.

But if the Russian infantry soldier does his duty,—no matter from what motive,—this is seldom the case with his officer, particularly in all the subaltern grades of the profession. Equally devoid of patriotism, or of any passion for military glory, and naturally as little courageous as his men, his very ambition does not lead him to conquer his fears, nor any sense of honour, or any public opinion, to conceal them. He knows well, from the state of things which prevails in the armies, as everywhere else, notwithstanding the efforts of the emperor to remedy the evil, that flagrant cowardice is just as likely as bravery to secure the

recompence intended for the latter. To this must be added, that everything in his early education, and the circumstances in which he afterwards finds himself placed, contribute, as far as possible, to damp and suppress that slender portion of animal courage with which nature has originally endowed him; and thus he too often offers to his soldiers a lamentable spectacle of his cowardice in the field. These remarks apply chiefly to the officers of the line, though, in some measure, they equally apply to those of the guards.

The soldier, whether infantry or cavalry, of the guards, or of the line, is taken almost invariably from the class of serfs, though all who are not noble are liable to the conscription; but the freeman and trader always exempt themselves by the payment of a tax, which forms a branch of revenue. Every proprietor of slaves is bound to furnish a yearly per centage on the number he possesses—a proportion which varies according to the exigencies of the state. He generally selects the most idle and worthless of his peasants; but they are seldom admitted if incapacitated by any physical infirmity for the service. It is not uncommon for the moujik, as it was with the French conscript, to knock out some of his front teeth, (which prevents his biting the cartridge,) or to chop off the forefinger of his right hand, which prevents him from pulling the trigger of a musket, for the purpose of rendering himself unfit for service.

The recruit takes his leave of his family as if he was quitting them for ever, and departs amidst mutual lamentations. The law tells him, that from the moment he has entered the service of the emperor,

he is become a free man ; but, nevertheless, it is found necessary to forward him to his regiment chained to some other unfortunate, like a desperate malefactor. Once arrived at the place of his destination, he soon becomes reconciled to his fate, as men are apt to be to a fate that is hopeless, especially when his greatest trial is over—the separation from his beard and his long dense locks of hair. If of unusual size, he is usually drafted into the guards or the cavalry ; for the Russians indulge in the error common to all other countries, of selecting the tallest and heaviest men for horsemen, though there are few countries possessing horses fit to carry even troopers of a moderate size, with all their paraphernalia.

The duration of the soldier's service, formerly fixed at twenty-five years for the line, and twenty-two for the guards, has been reduced by different stages to twenty and fifteen. At the expiration of this term, he ought therefore, according to law, to be freed from service ; and so he is, whenever he proves no longer fit for it. But so long as he continues to be of any value, he is retained in the ranks, much as if no ukase on the subject existed. When too old or too much worn out for service, he is dismissed, after being obliged to take oath that he will never beg, and never allow his beard to grow. The first part of his oath he might keep, because it was optional for him to starve ; the want of a razor often renders the second an impossibility. Formerly, he was turned adrift without the slightest provision ; but the present emperor has done much to ameliorate the condition of the discharged soldier, affording him some government suc-

cour, and reserving for the veteran every place he can possibly be fitted to fill. The porters and domestics of every government establishment in the empire, are old soldiers, even to many of the servants of the imperial palace. But still the relief is inadequate, and their general condition is miserable in the extreme.

It is true that the soldier receives his manumission from private servitude, but it is, unfortunately for him, only when he can no longer turn this partial freedom to account ; he has become independent precisely at the only moment in which slavery is exhibited in a favourable light—at the moment when he would often willingly exchange his independence for a servitude which would have ensured him bread, and have obliged the master, for whose advantage his vigorous years had been spent, to bear the burden of his old age and decrepitude.

The average pay of the Russian soldier is about twelve shillings per annum. In some corps it is more, in others less, but the difference is only a few pence per month. He is, however, allowed to go out to work, and has also facilities for learning a trade, which considerably ameliorates the condition of many of his class. What he can earn by out-door labour is not much, because during the short summer he is kept hard at work exercising and manœuvring, and during the long winter labour is at a discount. His food consists of sour rye bread, fermented cabbage, and buckwheat grits, to which a little hemipseed oil is added. In the regiments of the guards, where the soldiers are considered to “live like fighting cocks,” they receive half-a-pound of meat either twice or thrice

a week. They are supplied with quass, a beverage not very intoxicating, as may be inferred from the fact of a couple of slices of sour rye bread allowed to ferment in half-a-bucket of water, being the usual recipe to make it; though, where carefully made for the use of the luxurious merchant, it approaches, with a pleasing effervesceence, to the strength of very small beer! Of this we are incessantly told that the Russian is so passionately fond that he cannot live without it. The author must confess that he has always seen him shew good taste enough to prefer to it any other liquid he could get hold of, excepting water, unless it be warm water which has passed over some attenuated tea-leaves, which, though they have long ceased to yield extract and colour, or at least any that is discernible to the naked eye, still in his imagination confer on the beverage qualities which render it preferable to quass. The fondness of the soldier, as well as of the peasant, for *voodtka*, or corn brandy, is less apocryphal; in this he spends all his scanty pay.

Some enthusiastic philanthropists lately proposed to establish temperance societies, both amongst the military and the people; but they found in the Emperor Nicholas too determined an enemy to all “societies” to tolerate such a thing for a moment.

The soldier has the prospect of rising to the rank of officer: a large proportion indeed of the infantry officers of the line have either attained their present station thus, or are the children of men who have done so. Others amongst them are the sons of shopkeepers, merchants, and employés, and a very small portion belong to the families of the aristocracy of

birth or of office, and these occupy principally its higher grades, being men who have exchanged from the cavalry, the artillery, and the guards, to obtain the command of battalions and of regiments.

The Russian infantry consists of 72 regiments of the line, of 7 battalions each, 12 regiments of the guards, and 12 of the grenadier corps, and amounts, on paper, on the peace establishment, to 624,000 men, inclusive of the infantry of the independent armies of Orenburg, of Siberia, the Caucasus, and Finland, and the garrison battalions, an account of which will be found in the general summing up of the forces of the empire. The number of battalions to each regiment varies in the line, the guards, and grenadier corps; but each battalion numbers 1000 men, unless on the peace establishment of a reserve corps, or in depot, in which case it consists of 500 men.

It is naturally impossible to do more than guess at what number of soldiers are really embodied of those appearing on paper, since the emperor himself is in ignorance on this point, it being equally the interest of the commanding officers to reduce the list as low as possible, and to conceal this reduction. Still, as the framework of all these corps is effective, whenever required for active service the gaps in their ranks would be speedily filled up, and must be so at the responsibility of the chiefs of these corps. The total number of foot soldiers under arms probably exceeds in reality 450,000 men.

CHAPTER IV.

MILITARY STRENGTH OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE.

THE regular cavalry of the Russian empire consists of forty-eight regiments of the line, twelve of the guards, and twelve of the grenadier corps; one of Caucasian dragoons, and one model regiment, of nine squadrons of 160 men each, of which eight take the field: it thus amounts, on paper, to upwards of 94,000 men who take the field, and to 103,000, inclusive of those in depot—in reality, probably to 85,000 men. The irregular cavalry amounts to about 135,000 men, and is composed of the Cossacs of the Ural, the Don, and Black Sea, the Kirguise, the Tartars, the Bashkirs, and other tribes. Of these about 90,000 are as well disciplined as the line. The Russian cavalry of the line is decidedly inferior to its infantry,—especially all that part of it which is purely Muscovite, or composed of the natives of Old Russia. The passive qualities which render the Russian formidable as an infantry soldier do not so advantageously apply to the horseman; in whom an active and fiery valour is as necessary an element of excellence as obedience and discipline. The Russian peasant is also by habit no rider; though horses

everywhere abound in his country, he drives, but seldom mounts them. It is true that a portion of the Russian regular cavalry is recruited from the Ukraine, and other populations, Cossac, or of Cossac origin; and so far it is good, for the Cossac is brave, warlike, hardy, and thoroughly accustomed to the horse, which he backs from his earliest childhood. But as this is only partially the case, on the whole the regular cavalry of the Russian army may be considerd as a very inefficient force; and such it unquestionably proved itself in almost every engagement of the late Polish war, when opposed to that of the Poles.

In general the whole army of the line presents a very wretched appearance; the dirty brownish-grey great-coats, the usual dusky and shabby habiliments of the soldiers, their sallow complexions, their half-starved meagre frames, and the mean appearance of their officers, are far from offering an imposing spectacle. With the imperial guards the case is different: if seen for the first time at a review, they strike the beholder almost with awe; for though he may have seen many finer regiments than any which pass before him, nowhere in the world can he have seen so large a body of fine-looking troops together. The imperial guard, which has always been the hobby of the Russian sovereigns, and is so peculiarly of the present Emperor Nicholas and of his brother Michael, consists of 41,000 infantry and artillery, and of 15,000 cavalry, and, with addition of the regiments of the young guard, or grenadier corps, does not fall short of 120,000 men. This force is stationed in the government of St. Petersburg, principally in and about the capital, and is under the command of the Grand Duke Michael.

The guards, the picked men from the whole army, are all either five feet eleven inches in height, or exceeding that stature. On first view an observer is struck to find them all dark, and bearing to each other as remarkable a similitude as the sheep of a flock. When his eye wanders over thousands of faces, he cannot readily point out one man who might not pass for the brother of the one most dissimilar to him; they seem as if nature had moulded them all by ukase, according to a given pattern; and the precision and uniformity of their attitude and equipment, make one man look the reflection of the one beside him. This similitude of personal appearance he afterwards finds to be much owing to their general dusky and sallow complexions, (probably produced by the excessive warmth of the artificial atmosphere in which they live, and the abuse of the steam-bath,) as well as to the black moustache, of exactly the same cut and trim, and which, whatever its original colour, receives the same dark gloss by being anointed and plastered with an unctuous compound, something similar to our English cart-grease. This is applied by *order*. An "ukase" also fixes the length of a soldier's or an officer's hair at a finger's width, and determines on which side it must be brushed, and how low the whiskers may be allowed to invade the cheek. These orders are the same for the general as for the drummer.

As long as we see these soldiers of the guards embodied, they are very imposing. High of stature,—of martial though rigidly stiff carriage,—they are clad in tasteful uniforms, of which the materials, though coarse, have been fashioned with all the skill of art,

and fitted to each man individually; they are worthy of having come from the hands of the late King of Prussia, of whom the Emperor Alexander said that Fortune had spoiled an admirable master-tailor in giving him his crown. There is one effect, however, strikingly ludicrous, in the attempt to improve the figures of both soldiers and officers:—their trousers are tightened so much by a band at the waist, that the stomach protrudes most ungracefully, particularly in the soldier, who eats enormous quantities of his black bread.

When we come to examine the soldier after the review, without his “making up,” we are surprised to find how miserable a creature he is,—how meagre, narrow-chested, and ill-shaped,—what a want of muscle, sinew, and elasticity to animate that great body, which reminds one of an overgrown schoolboy—how different from the healthy cheek, the athletic form, and the symmetrical figure of our own life-guardsman. There is scarcely in these regiments, which are considered as the pride of the imperial army, one man in ten whose shape is not glaringly defective. But this observation does not apply to the regiments of the line, which are composed of men of much inferior stature, and we must, therefore, conclude that these tall men, collected from a people of sixty millions, are rather its monstrosities in point of size, than its flower. In point of fact, the Russians are not a tall race, but the emperor has been determined to have guards as tall as those of nations whose stature averages several inches more; and though there has been no difficulty in procuring the number required from the vast popu-

lation of his empire, they are overgrown, deformed, or weedy, and such as our picked men would be in England if the standard were raised to six feet three. In the Polish war the guards are said to have proved very inferior to the line, which we cannot but attribute to the same cause—a cause which equally affects the cavalry of the guards, whose efficiency is further diminished by the fact that their horses are still less fitted for arduous service than the men; and yet in the composition of that centaur-thing, in which the man and steed ought to be blended together—the mounted horseman—two-thirds of their joint excellence must depend upon the physical qualities of the brute.

On the whole, therefore, when we examine closely this apparently magnificent army,—for the guards alone, which the emperor reviews in one square of the city of St. Petersburg, constitute an army more numerous than any which the British have, within the memory of man, ever collected together on one spot,—we are soon convinced that it is more calculated for show than effect; and with regard to its cavalry, this opinion is abundantly confirmed by their condition at the close of the annual manœuvres at the camp of *Krasnoe-Zelo*,—a very small foretaste of what an army must necessarily encounter in the most favourable campaign. Nothing, it is true, can be finer as a “spectacle” than to see the whole corps of the guards defiling at a review. The infantry regiments, with scarlet-breasted uniform, high and ponderous shakos, which add to their stature, surmounted by a long black feather, half the height of a man, march

past with unerring precision, and in apparently interminable thousands. Then follow the chevalier guards, in their white uniforms, and gold and black cuirasses; the horse guards, and the Gatchina cuirassiers, blue and white, also cuirassed and helmeted; the heavy dragoons of the guard, the lancers, and the hussars, with their red uniforms and grey horses; and, lastly, the regiments of Cossacs, in scarlet and blue, with their long naked lances, of which the painted shafts rise like a red or purple forest over their ranks.

All these regiments of cavalry are above twelve hundred strong, and the whole of each regiment is mounted on horses of the same colour, whether it be black, bay, grey, or chesnut. Next follows the artillery and the pontoon trains, complete and compact. The wagons with the pontoon-boats, the gun-carriages, and the ammunition-wagons, are all painted a light pea-green, which is the imperial colour. The horses in this department are well adapted for the service for which they are intended. Then follow the four squadrons of the Mahomedan regiment, composed of Circassians, Kourds, Turkomans, and the different tribes that border the Caucasian Alps,—exiles, adventurers, renegades, and hostages. The costume of each squadron is different, but each is picturesque in the extreme. One is arrayed in the peaked Persian lamb's-wool cap, another in the low turban-like hat peculiar to the Caucasian provinces, and also of black lamb's-wool. They are armed with the cimeter, the rifle, the yatagan, and the bow and arrows, and in the contrast they offer with the European-clad troops are strikingly characteristic of the various tribes and na-

tions which the overgrown empire to which they belong comprises, in the millions of square leagues over which its dominion extends.

There is one of these squadrons, however, whose appearance is far more striking than the rest : it is solely composed from the Circassian nations, principally of the tribes immediately inhabiting the border, or belonging to families which have submitted to the Russian rule ; and they may be considered nearly all in the light of hostages. They are all princes or nobles, and wear, with a slight alteration, the native costume peculiar to their class ; the iron helmet, with its steel spike, instead of plume, and the shirt of mail, which descends, glittering and bright, over their tight-fitting scarlet frocks. They display all the Oriental fastidiousness in their arms and equipments, and manage their little thorough-bred and fiery horses with a grace, ease, and dexterity which contrast advantageously with the awkward and tutored stiffness of the Muscovite trooper, and the inelegant though firm seat of the Cossac. There is an air of high blood and breeding about these men, as about their horses ; their forms are spare, active, and elastic, and the eyes of both men and steeds flash forth the fiery spirit which the rein of the rider in one case, and the rule of Russian servitude in the other, are in vain endeavouring to restrain. Those horses which are grey have the lower half of their white tails dyed crimson, which adds to the wild aspect of this Oriental cavalry.

Assuredly no army in the world can offer the same contrasts of costume as the Russian ; for, besides the peculiar dress of the Cossac regiments, and every

variety of modern European uniform, there are some regiments of the guards which have retained such as have been long obsolete, and are now striking from the very novelty of their antiquity. Thus we see the dragoons of the guards with the helmet of Frederick the Second's horsemen, black, with a feather extending transversely from ear to ear, and a long pointed tail of gaily coloured cloth hanging down the back, which no doubt was intended formerly to shelter the pigtail. There is a regiment of infantry (the *Pablovskoi*) which still retains peaked caps of scarlet cloth, with a sheet of solid brass in front, shaped like a bishop's mitre, and often shewing, by one or more bullet-holes, that in the wars in which the regiment has been engaged, several of its unfortunate wearers must have perished beneath it; reminding the beholder that those who ruled had been more careful of the *hats* than of the *heads* which successively filled them. This head-gear strikes a stranger as quaint and ludicrous, and is generally said to have been the result of one of the numerous vagaries of the Emperor Paul's fantastic imagination; but an old picture of Hogarth's, representing the march to Finchley, shews that it was formerly worn by our own foot guards.

When we come to examine in detail the horses of the Russian guards, we find them miserably inefficient to carry the ponderous weight which they are made to bear. Neglecting her own breed of native Cossac horses, amongst other materials which the southern provinces of Russia offer towards the formation of a truly formidable cavalry, and to which we shall presently advert, every effort has been made by the go-

vernment to obtain those round-necked, sleek-looking animals in which the German riding-school delights. It has encouraged breeders to produce for the use of the cavalry, a stamp of horse common to the west of Europe, and of which the beau-ideal is peculiar to England, uniting size and power with fineness of limb and smoothness of coat, but which with the continental breeders degenerates into a very sorry beast. This horse, the half-bred, which in England *always owes its origin directly to a thorough-bred*, in the sire or dam on one side, though the cross should be a mere cart-horse on the other, is in point of fact nothing but a mule, and as such is subject to the partial action of that law of nature, which either altogether forbids to the mule the reproduction of its species, or accompanies the propagation of it with rapid deterioration. Unacquainted with this principle, which in England is universally understood, or at least, so practically that every farmer acts upon it, the Russian, like most other continental breeders, mixes two half-bloods, which is *producing from mules*, instead of constantly recurring on the one side to the pure fount,—under the delusive idea that the result will be the same; and in consequence, the foals have some of the characteristics of the breed they wished to produce, but none of its more useful ones. They have the heavy body of the under-bred horse, with the slight limbs of the thorough-bred, and limbs which, though as slight as those of the thorough-bred, have neither their hard and ivory bone, their strongly-braced sinews, nor their nervous vigour. They shew the smooth coat and the fine legs, but the thighs are wanting; and the ponderous arched crest

and comparatively heavy body supported on these slender columns, indicates at once, that so far from being able to carry a rider and his accoutrements, such an animal must work to pieces if subjected to a little fatigue, from sheer inability to carry the weight of its own carcase. So far from being able to stand the arduous work of a campaign, one cannot but doubt, on examining them closely, their ever even reaching a distant frontier; an opinion which is abundantly confirmed by their jaded and exhausted appearance after a few days' field work.

The men ride according to a system adopted of late years in Prussia and the Netherlands, and the peculiarity of which consists in throwing the leg further backwards, so as to break the perpendicular line formed in the French riding-school by the position of the body and the thigh. It is a shade better than the method taught by this French and the old German riding-school; but it would have been difficult to deviate from that in any manner without improving upon it.

The Cossac regiments of the guards, both as regards the men and horses, differ widely from the other cavalry. There is a freedom of carriage about the Cossac, a fire in his dark eye, and a rich glow upon his cheek, which all bespeak a race whose spirit servitude has not yet broken, and whose physical powers have not been deteriorated by the frugal fare to which the masters of his Russian brethren, harsh and unpitying as their climate, have for generations back accustomed their serfs. His frontless cap stuck sideways with a galliard air, his bold and independent

look, contrast strangely and painfully with the terrified and rigid stiffness of the slavish Muscovite, who seems, beneath the eye of his officer, to feel as if he existed only by his sufferance. The Cossacs of the guard are the picked men of a fine race; they are clad in the wide plaited trowsers to which they have given the name; they wear a close-fitting jacket, over which is a second, which is fastened in front without buttons, and of which the sleeves hang loose. A pistol is slung to the back, and their cap is black Astrachan lambskin, with the imperial arms on its front. They are armed with the sabre, and a long and heavy lance. *Like all equestrian nations, they ride with very short stirrups, and they use only the snaffle bridle.*

Singularly enough, all the regular armies of Europe, including that of England, have adopted a style of riding, which has no single advantage excepting that of pleasing the eye, and, in reality, only the eye of those unacquainted with the subject. Whether we view the aim of correct equitation to be to enable the rider to sit most firmly in his saddle in a struggle with an opponent, to restrain, to guide, and to conquer the spirit or indocility of the steed,—to lift him over the greatest distance with the least possible fatigue to both the animal and the man upon his back, or to wheel and turn him with the most rapid obedience to the impulse of the hand,—for all these purposes, the old riding-school equitation was the most inefficient which could have been devised. The very perpendicularity of the position of the leg which it enjoins, destroys nearly all power of adhesion in it, so far as to render the seat almost a matter of balance. It is difficult for

the rider to endure the very violent motions of a vigorous horse, whether in his leaps or his struggles with the cavalier. Should he manage to keep his seat, he loses the indispensable control over the mouth of the animal, and all the necessary power to guide, support, and check him.

According to all the varieties of the long or riding-school system of riding, the horse requires as much teaching as the rider, and nearly every horse of a vigorous and spirited breed is ruined by this course of teaching. Bending the leg not only brings into protuberance the muscles of both calf and thigh, giving an enormous power of adhesion, but, as it is well known, enables the rider to throw back his body and preserve his equilibrium in the most trying leap, to rise slightly from the saddle, and thus avoid the bow-like shock of a horse's backbone.

All equestrian nations ride with the bended leg, or as it is commonly termed, *short*, simply because experience has taught them its advantages. The English jockeys, fox-hunters, and steeple chasers, who get the utmost possible speed out of the horse, who enable him to traverse, and assist him over the most tremendous leaps, all ride short. The South American Indians—men who live and die as it were on the backs of their horses—the Moors of the coast of Barbary, and the Bedouin Arabs of the desert, all ride short. The extinct body of Mamelukes, who were Circassians, and the tribes of Circassians now inhabiting the Caucasus, the most dexterous men in the universe in the use of their arms, and the management of their horses for all the purposes of combat,—who stop them

in their wildest gallop, who wheel them round a hat, and who, not riding more than an average of eleven stone, can lift from his saddle the most brawny and burly riding-master as if he were a child,—these men not only use nothing but a snaffle, but actually double up the leg and thigh almost in the following manner < One moment's examination of the limb in this position will, by shewing the muscles both of the calf and inner thigh brought to their utmost prominence, at once explain how singularly the powers of adhesion must be increased by it.

The seat of the Cossac, who is accustomed to back a horse from his early childhood, is about as short as that of the English fox-hunter. Although notoriously, and almost avowedly, inferior to the Circassian as a horseman, there is far from being the same difference betwixt the skill of the Cossac and of the Muscovite horseman of the regular cavalry of the empire. It is amusing, in the sham fights at the camp of Krasnoe Zelo, to see the contemptuous ease with which a single Cossac forager will disengage himself from a dozen or two of the cuirassiers of the guard, raining the blows of his lance-shaft about their helms and shoulders, and loosening in their saddles those who attempt to stop him, and then getting away from them like a bird, with a laugh of derision in answer to the curses they mutter after him.

The horses of the Cossacs, bred in the steppes, though far inferior to those of the Circassians, are nevertheless, a serviceable race, strong-boned, well-limbed, and with a good proportion of blood; though their forms are angular and inelegant, and their necks

ewed, they are fast and hardy. The horse is the personal property of the rider, and is generally sound and in good condition, never having been tortured in the riding-school, and pulled back on its haunches by a powerful bit, until strained in limb, and crippled and cramped in all its paces, as is the case with the horses of the regular cavalry regiments. Nevertheless, there is one glaring discrepancy in these Cossac Polks; the horses are disproportioned to the men, the former being too small, and the latter too tall and heavy. The steed of the Cossac, like that of the Circassian, never stumbles, because it is ridden with a loose rein; but, of course, on this account, the rider cannot make it go as fast as if he helped it to bring itself together, when stretched out in its gallop, and "lifted along" in its stride by the assistance of his hand.

Before the reviews in St. Petersburg terminate, the cavalry are always made to charge along the Champ de Mars. It is observable that the regular regiments start in a most beautiful line, whilst that of the Cossacs is a little wavering and irregular; but when they have galloped a few hundred yards, the Cossac line becomes as even as the line of the regulars when they started, and that of the regulars becomes much more disordered than that of the Cossacs was at first. Lastly, the Circassians and the Mahomedan regiment, uttering their wild war-cry, charge up to the emperor *en fourrageur*, at the full speed of their blood horses, their arms and equipments rattling, and the ground thundering beneath the rapid tread of glittering hoofs which dash up the dust or the snow.

At the very moment when it seems inevitable that this furious crowd must ride right over him, they suddenly check the full gallop of their steeds, a feat of dexterity in which Orientals delight, to the great prejudice of their horses.

These Circassian squadrons are treated with much indulgence, for there is sometimes an indomitable obstinacy about them with which it is considered most politic not to meddle. On one occasion, at a review in the Champ de Mars, they received orders to charge "*en echelon*,"—that is, one after the other, but the emperor was surprised to find when the moment came at which they were to have executed this movement, that they remained motionless. An aid-de-camp having galloped up to reiterate the emperor's commands, found that a dispute had arisen amongst them, and that the Circassian squadron refused to follow the one which was ordered to lead the charge ; threats and entreaties were equally unavailing to change their resolution, until at last Count Benkendorf himself rode up to ascertain the cause of this delay. But, though the presence of this functionary usually excites as much awe as that of the emperor himself, the question of precedence had become a point of honour with the mutineers, and all his persuasive powers were put forward in vain. He therefore ordered the Circassian squadron to lead, and the squadron originally intended to have led, to follow the Circassians ; but this in their turn they peremptorily refused to do, and, after wasting his menaces and his eloquence in vain, the vizier was obliged to retire. The emperor did not think proper to try the effect of a personal appeal,

which it is likely would have proved equally ineffectual; he felt very well that though he had the power to cut them to pieces for their disobedience, he had not that of making them obey, and he therefore prudently ordered them all to advance in line, which settled the question to everybody's satisfaction.

In general, the Circassians in St. Petersburg, half hostages, half exiles, mix very little with the Russians, but live exclusively in their own circle, exciting an amusing degree of awe in the peaceful population which surrounds them. The Russian, in all his pride of uniform, whether he be officer, soldier, or policeman, has a salutary dread of interfering with this fierce race, so sensitive to insult, and so prompt to revenge it. In the street, whenever you see a crowd carefully making way, you may be sure that it is either a general, a policeman, or a Circassian.

Sometimes, these Circassians are subject to a temporary madness, which, whether it be produced by home-sickness, or by ennui, or that it be an hereditary insanity, is no less fearful in its results. When the fit seizes them, they snatch their arms, and go forth slaying whoever comes in their way. Their companions immediately shoot them down, as the only means of putting an end to their fury. It is worthy of remark, that this hereditary tendency to periodical fits of frenzy was common amongst the Northmen, or Normans, who are distinctly made out to owe their origin to the Caucasian tribes; and a thousand years back, the Scandinavian Berserk, when he turned his destroying wrath on his relatives and companions, and bit in his iron-plated shield, was only subject to the

same dreadful aberrations as the modern Circassian. A few years since, one of these Circassians was in the habit of driving every day to the same spot in one of the public vehicles, called *droshkies*, which replace in St. Petersburg the cabs of our London streets. Un-acquainted with the language and the usual prices, he always gave a silver piece, which being double the customary fare, was commonly received by the driver with gratitude. On one occasion, however, he stumbled on a fellow who, judging that he might easily impose on a foreigner who displayed his ignorance by giving him so much more than his due, boldly and insolently asserted that it was not enough. The Circassian, without observation, gave him another. The driver was still not satisfied. He gave him a third. The *isvostchik*, who saw no reason why he should cease to demand while the other continued to pay, still asked for more, on which, without uttering a word, he snatched his yatagan from his side, and stabbed him to the heart. He then proceeded very quietly to call another *droshky*. When interrogated and asked why he had slain the driver, he replied with *bonhomie*, “Because he was a bad man and a robber, and, according to the law of Mahomet, it is meritorious to destroy such.” He was merely sent back to the Caucasus.

The officers of the guards—both of cavalry and of infantry—belong, in general, to the families of the landed aristocracy, and of the higher employés, both civil and military; but there are many exceptions. The former are usually collected into the guards, because, in the first place, their fortune may add to its

brilliancy ; and, in the next, because in this manner those who are likely to be the most restless of their class are immediately under the imperial eye ; and here they are kept with all the severity which a tyrannical schoolmaster exercises over his scholars. No opportunity seems to be neglected of humbling them, or of breaking their spirit—a spirit usually servile enough, but which is judged to be still too independent in the children of the wealthy aristocracy, brought up in the privacy of home, amidst a family perhaps brooding over its degradation, and not bred in a cadet school to mechanical submission. It is therefore these men who are principally the objects of imperial severity. The German adventurers, and the offspring of the bureaucracy, get off more easily ; for at the same time that they are more supple than the high-born Russian—being divested of all pretensions to personal influence—they give less outrage to a jealous watchfulness which never slumbers.

But if most strict for those of more elevated rank, a painful surveillance nevertheless exists for all the officers of the guards ; they are always subject to the observation of an unceasing vigilance, which seems to pry into their most private concerns. For instance, every time an officer comes from his quarters into the town of St. Petersburg, he is obliged to inscribe his name at the gate ; this book is forwarded every morning to the Grand Duke Michael, and if the name should strike his eye too often, the officer is sure to be reminded of it, though it has indicated no dereliction of duty. To witness, indeed, what every Russian officer is obliged to submit to from his

chiefs, one would certainly imagine that no exuberance of spirit could possibly be dreaded ; but it would appear that those who rule think differently, for they spare no humiliation which can keep those beneath them accustomed to the chain. Even the Grand Duke Michael, the chief of this chosen army,* may be heard venting the tempestuous violence of his temper in epithets so unmeasured, that no French or English officer would hold his commission under him for a day ; reminding one strongly of those old naval captains of fifty years since, who have been so happily described by our novelists. His irritable temperament is roused, and his boisterous eloquence awakened, on the most insignificant occasions ; the bad riding of a cadet, or the discovery that the horse of an officer has broken, during ten yards, from a trot into a canter at a review. Nevertheless, he has his good points ; for though he has inherited from his father Paul the mania of descending into ridiculous minutiae, as well as something of his overbearing character, there are yet many traits of the lion about him, which render him popular in the army : he is known to be brave—he is exceedingly generous—and ruins himself to give pensions to old officers, whilst his palaces are filled with old veterans, only fit for an invalid hospital. He is also generally known to repair the injustice of the moment, by a subsequent benefit, as soon as he has cooled down to a due sense of it.

Sometimes, however, the worm is found to turn upon the foot that tramples it, in Russia as well as

* Of the guards.

everywhere else. The Grand Duke was one day abusing, with the utmost violence, an officer, whom he had sent for to reprimand for some insignificant offence. The delinquent kept retreating, and the grand duke following him, step by step, until he drove him against the wall, venting, in the storm of passion into which he had lashed himself, his saliva through his teeth, with his expletives, till at last the officer, losing all patience, tore the insignia of his rank from his shoulders, and threw them on the ground, exclaiming, “Since your imperial highness has spat in my face, and upon my epaulettes, I will no longer wear them.”* This rash offender was only banished to the Caucasus for this; but, some time after, he was recalled, at the Grand Duke’s own intercession, and taken into favour by him. With the Grand Duke Michael’s officers, the respect they entertain for his rank, and the esteem they have for certain of his good qualities, palliate his brutality; but there are many of his generals from whom, when obliged to submit to equal insults, they are naturally much more bitterly felt.

The rigorous abolition of duelling has become as great a curse in society and in the army as its toleration in some other countries. The exceeding severity of the imperial regulations on this point has tended as

* It was afterwards represented, both by this delinquent, and repeated by some of his brother officers of the guard, that he had said, “Spit on me, but do not spit on the emperor’s epaulettes.” “As for my part,” observed the Englishman, to whom they related the circumstance, “I should have said, ‘Spit on the epaulettes as much as you like—they are the emperor’s—but not on me.’”

rapidly to smother the last germs of independent spirit as their framers could have wished, and has left no distinction in society between honour and infamy which the epaulette of the wearer cannot remove. It is not that here and there instances to the contrary have not occurred, as there always will, in the multitude, be some who will brave even the most rigorous prohibitions. But, generally, no Russian will accept a challenge ; and men find themselves therefore obliged to put up with the grossest insults, without any means of redress ; and since they do not lose caste by this unmerited dishonour, that which they may have merited does not exclude them from the very circle which has witnessed it.

It was not yet, however, enough to satisfy the Emperor Nicholas, that he should have gone further than any of his predecessors in rendering his officers machines, but he appears also determined to make them isolated machines. He has endeavoured to effect his purpose by waging a private war against all “esprit de corps” amongst his officers, and has resorted to underhand measures, which have had the effect of banishing all that cordiality and good fellowship which formerly distinguished the intercourse of all those in one regiment, between whose rank there was not too great a disparity. At the present time, so great a change has taken place, that not only the captain dares not shew any familiarity to the captain-lieutenant, the captain-lieutenant towards the lieutenant, or the lieutenant towards the ensign ; but even amongst those whose grade is precisely the same, all bond of union is broken up, and every one is made more or

less a spy upon his neighbour's conduct, or feels or imagines that he is spied upon, and consequently mistrusts the man with whom he would have fraternized, even if he does not intrigue against him, as this system encourages him to do.

It is true, this system has perhaps its advantages, in as far as causing the details of the service to be more strictly attended to; but it is scarcely doubtful that this will be more than counterbalanced by still further lowering the character of the officer, which so many circumstances have contributed to debase. With the great mass of officers, all individuality of character has been destroyed; for the last successors of Peter, whilst endeavouring to carry out the project of converting the Muscovites into a people of Spartans, such as Lycurgus left them, in rendering military every institution of the state, have quelled the last gleam of martial spirit and personal valour in the breasts of their subjects, and so far from founding an imperial Lacedaemon, are every day more narrowly approaching to a despotism of Chinese centralization, in which all individuality is effaced and lost. The *last* of Peter's successors, because the rigorous measures to which he resorted were calculated not to smother all independence of character, but to enforce obedience in his nobles, indispensable for the furtherance of his vast plans of civilization, for he found the Russian *servile* but not *obedient*; but there is nothing to induce the belief that he would wantonly have continued to break after controlling the spirit, which would have proved so valuable a stimulant in his warlike masses.

His immediate successors, moved apparently by

these considerations, slackened the rein which he had tightened for a particular purpose, as soon as it was attained ; and though none of them ever allowed to any of their subjects a shadow of political rights, they extended to them more or less of civil liberty. In the whole period during which Catherine reigned, for those who did not thrust themselves into court or state intrigues, more personal freedom and even more licence of speech were attained than in any other European country excepting France, whose revolution dawned as the life of this remarkable woman drew towards its close. Under Paul, the moody madman—under Alexander, the liberal in foreign countries, the tool of tyrants in his own—and under Nicholas, the inflexible and persevering despot—not only have the class of nobles, once deprived of all political rights by the deed of Peter I., and parked up within the insurmountable pale of absolute and irresponsible power, been denied the free range of the ring-fence which has ever since enclosed them; but they have been made by Nicholas to submit to the harness, the bit, and the rein.

At all periods of Russian history, perhaps the greatest gallantry was to be found in the ranks of the Russian nobles ; for though servitude deteriorates equally the character of the tyrant and the slave, the vices to which it gives rise in the oppressor and the oppressed, are of a very different nature. The courage which servitude tends to stifle in the enslaved, usually characterizes his enslaver, tarnished and mingled as it may be with brutality. Now the Russian noble, himself both slave and master, partakes of some of

the bad qualities attendant on both these unnatural situations. Never indeed possessing the lordly and ferocious valour of the Polish noble who ruled and knew of no superior, yet, in comparison with his serfs, he has been during centuries only partially enslaved, and only made to feel occasionally that he was subservient to a will mightier than his own. It may therefore be conceived that in his breast this feeling would not be so much depressed and deadened as in that of the race of hereditary bondsmen, whose servitude and degradation had never known the intermission of an hour.

On the other hand, in the Russian aristocracy may still perhaps linger some traces of the faint sprinkling of the warlike and adventurous blood of the handful of Norman sea-kings, who, under the name of Varangians, conquered the Muscovites, and led them to ravage the territories of the Greek empire. It was from this source that, up to the reign of Paul, a class of officers creditably brave was drawn to second the efforts of soldiers whose blind and fanatic confidence stood them in lieu of courage, and rendered the Russian arms the terror of all who opposed them. But as these officers died off or retired, those by whom they were succeeded shewed too well that the personal oppression to which they were subjected, was fast reducing the lord, by the same process, to the pusillanimity of his serf; and it is since this date that we hear of the excellence of the Russian armies declining, and of the Russian officer in the front of battle ignominiously betraying his terrors to the men.

In the present state of society, education, and

feeling in Russia, everything must tend to break and subdue the spirit of the young Russian destined for the career of arms, and render him effeminate and cowardly. But nothing more so than his being trained up in a cadet corps, as is now almost universally the case, the government having established these military schools all over the empire. Accordingly, the few exceptions to this rule are found amongst the wealthier aristocracy, who educate their children at home until such time as they go directly into the army as *younkers*, keeping them thus, for a few years of their childhood, in some measure abstracted from the evils of corruption, which in public life must everywhere surround them. It is to such individuals that the lesson of submission, which, according to imperial notions, must have been culpably neglected in all private education, is always taught most bitterly.

On the other hand, the young officer brought up in the cadet school, who, in the course of his military studies, has gone through all the grades of mimic rank, who has learned to handle a tiny musket from his infancy, and been disciplined and tutored, like a soldier in the ranks of his companions, to all the military evolutions—who has been forced to wear a coarse shirt, to live on coarse food, and to sleep on a hard bed—turns out more of a Sybarite than a Spartan. From his infancy he has seen every sally of vivacity checked, every display of hardihood and spirit repressed and punished as ruffianism, and he has all his life been witness to one continued scene of subservience to authority, and to see every noble and generous feeling subverted by it. Even his amusements have never been

of that rough but active description, which brace the mind, and give a tone of vigour to the youthful character, as well as health and muscular power to the body. On his entrance into the army, he finds life what his school was. If he depends on his profession for his fortune, he is usually imbued with the idea that a strict attendance to forms, a cringing servility to his superiors, a starched demeanour, and a tone of brutality with inferiors, comprise everything required, with the help of a little intrigue, to fit him for his profession and procure him promotion in it; and as far as regards his advancement, his judgment is perfectly correct. If, on the other hand, he be one of those unfortunates whose service is expected as a tribute, he can be expected to take no interest in a profession, of forced adoption, which he considers as a painful state of probation.

Almost always utterly unacquainted with the use of arms, and unaccustomed to field, or any other active sports, the Russian officer is often really no more manly than an English school-girl. This effeminacy may be judged from the fact, that though in the guards every officer has several horses, they never ride excepting when on duty or in the riding-school, and, although Petersburg has generally a garrison of 70,000 men, a mounted officer, unless going to or coming from a parade, is a sight not witnessed ten times in the year.

Is it surprising, therefore, that the courage of which from their infancy every appearance has been carefully repressed, should fail to flow suddenly into the bosom of these men, at the very moment when they are for

the first time allowed to evince it,—when in face of the enemy?

Generally, all ranks are ignorant of their profession; but in addition to this there is one very singular feature which characterizes the condition of the corps of officers of the guards, which no other army in Europe exhibits: so far from expressing, even by the mouth of its youngest members, that thoughtless anxiety for war and action which pervades the junior ranks of all other services, you hear with surprise, in their conversation, a philosophic strain of raillery directed against all pretensions to hardihood, and ridiculing unmercifully the idea of men exposing themselves to more personal danger than can possibly be avoided in actual warfare; a sentiment implying the hidden thought, to which no one dares give utterance, “That it is folly to expose oneself for the advantage of one’s worst enemy.” Thus, though an incessant war is carrying on against the tribes of the Caucasus, from this innumerable army it is a thing of very rare occurrence to hear of an officer volunteering to go to the scene of action, and the few who do, unless their desperate circumstances drive them to this step, are only laughed at for their folly.

With regard to the officers of the guards, it is difficult to give an idea of the painful surveillance and the ridiculous restraint to which they are subjected, or to imagine the vexations manner in which the emperor and the Grand Duke Michael find time to interfere with the most absurd trifles in their conduct, which one would have thought that the former, at least, would scarcely have had leisure to notice; for in-

stance, some officers of the guards, whilst the emperor was absent, got up some hurdle-races, but immediately on his return he expressed his disgust that men wearing the imperial epaulettes should make jockeys of themselves. This opinion put an end to the thing for ever.

An officer, wealthy, and in the full exuberance of youthful life and spirits, although never allowing his pleasures to interfere with his duty, is thought to spend his money too joyously—he is banished for a twelve-month to some government town. Another officer of good family, and in whom, therefore, little things are not easily forgiven, has the misfortune to meet the emperor several times successively in the street—he falls into disfavour. “How is it,” said the Emperor Nicholas to Prince Menchikof, “that wherever I go—on the English quay, in the Newsky prospect, or to the Summer gardens, I meet with your scape-grace nephew idling his time?” “Uncle,” replied the nephew, to this august observation, which was carefully repeated to him by the prince, “how is it, tell me, that wherever I go, to the English quay, to the Newsky prospect, or to the Summer gardens, I everywhere meet with the emperor idling his time?” We must add that this bold youth has been twice banished to the Caucasus, and that unless he very much mends his manners he is likely to end his days in Siberia.

A certain Jakovleff, one of the wealthiest men in Russia, and proprietor of the most productive iron works, presuming on his wealth, as people are apt to do, was supposed to have shewn a tone too independent to be tolerated, in having evaded such ho-

nours and offices as it was supposed his fortune would invest with *éclat*. A man who indulges in any illusions of any sort of independence in Russia is, however, soon made sensible of the chain to his leg. He was refused permission to travel. He had three or four hundred thousand pounds in the national bank; but when he attempted to draw out a large sum at once, it was intimated that he could not be allowed to do so, unless he could show very satisfactorily what he intended to do with it. As a peace-offering, he placed one of his sons in the chevalier guards, where, after some years' service, he was appointed to superintend the purchase of regimental horses. It is customary in all the regiments of the guards to intrust this commission to young men of fortune, as an economical means of getting expensive horses at a cheap rate. They have a year's leave of absence granted them, and usually at the expiration of this time are promoted; but they are expected to bring back no animals which are not worth about double the regimental price, so that an undertaking of this nature usually costs them from one to several thousand pounds. Jakovleff acquitted himself much to the satisfaction of the colonel; but, nevertheless, he was not promoted. As soon as it was possible to do so, naturally not much enamoured with the service after this, he left it; but he also was, and has been ever since, refused permission to travel.

Obliged thus to remain at home, Jakovleff consoled himself by going the full length of Anglo and Gallo-mania, and whilst in this state of mind was one day disporting in the Newsky prospect, in all the

glorious foppery of the most *outré* Parisian costume ; on his head was a little peaked hat, resembling a flower-pot reversed, a handkerchief, with a gigantic bow, was tied around his neck, a cloak, so short that it seemed a cape, was thrown over his shoulders, on his chin he wore a beard “ à la Henri Quatre.” He had an enormous oaken cudgel in his hand, a glass stuck in the corner of his eye, and a bull-dog following at his heels. As he was sauntering complacently along the broad pavement of this St. James’s-street of St. Petersburg, the emperor’s carriage drove past, and abruptly stopping short, the emperor himself leaned out, and beckoning the beau to approach him,—

“ Pray,” said Nicholas, eyeing him with humorous curiosity, “ who in God’s name are you, and where do you come from ?”

“ May it please your Majesty, I have the honour to be your Majesty’s faithful subject, *Save Saveitch Jakovleff*.”

“ Indeed !” replied the emperor, with mock gravity ; “ we are enchanted to have the opportunity of making your acquaintance, *Save Saveitch*. Oblige us by just stepping up and taking a seat beside us.”

Jakovleff slyly let drop his cudgel, and with some misgivings took his seat.

“ But stop,” said the emperor, who had not noticed this proceeding at first, when they had driven on a little way, “ where is your stick, *Save Saveitch* ?”

“ Oh, never mind the stick, your Majesty.”

“ Oh, we must have your stick, *Save Saveitch*. Turn back,” he said to the coachman. The stick was picked up, and the emperor gave orders to drive on

straight to the palace. He alighted, and beckoned to the dandy to follow him. "Oh, no, Save Saveitch, don't take off your cloak; we must have you just as you are—hat, and stick, and cloak, and all."

The emperor led the way straight to the apartment of the empress.

"Pray, my dear," he inquired of her, "do you know who this is?"

"No," replied the empress, bursting into a fit of laughter at the sight of the extraordinary figure before her.

"Then allow me to inform you, this is our faithful subject, Save Saveitch Jakovleff. What do you think of him? is he not a pretty fellow?"

The unfortunate beau, whose feelings may be conceived, after furnishing food for some moments' merriment, was dismissed, half dead with terror and confusion; but before he departed, he was admonished that the emperor did not always punish the foolery of his subjects so leniently. Lenient, however, the punishment inflicted on this harmless ridicule proved not to have been, for the man went home, took to his bed, and fell very dangerously ill, from the consequence of the fright and mortification he had endured. We will make no comment on this transaction, for after the first smile at reproved foppery, it will furnish the reader with sufficiently grave reflections.

In another case, in the privacy of a very small circle, a young officer repeats some humorous lines he had composed, in which he facetiously called upon the emperor to favour him with an *ukase*, for some par-

ticular purpose, since ukases were promulgated on every subject, the lines terminating with—

Tout se fait par ukase, ici
C'est par ukase que l'on voyage,
C'est par ukase l'on rit.

The next morning, before he was up, he was sent for to Count Benkendorff's office. "My young friend," said the Count, "you have got a very pretty talent for writing verses, we hear. We must send you to cultivate the muses in solitude for a few years. You recited some very charming poetry last night, in which you contemplated the possibility of a journey. I announce it to you. (*Vous avez prévu un voyage. Eh bien ! je vous l'annonce.*)" The Feld Jaeger and his post waggon were waiting at the door to convey him into exile.

These are a few out of five hundred similar instances which immediately occur to us. Every day furnishes abundant proofs that it is systematically that the Emperor Nicholas is endeavouring to reduce the very shadow of any independence of spirit amongst his officers; if their moral character has therefore, from various causes, fallen wofully low, there is little chance of its being raised up now.

CHAPTER V.

MILITARY STRENGTH OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE.

ON the whole, then, we find, that the immense army of Russia, if we forget for a moment many other disadvantages, must, in case of war, thus necessarily be entrusted to officers whose courage is questionable, and whose want of probity, as a body, is flagrant. To their general ignorance it is needless to allude, because in the subaltern ranks of the most effective armies, a very limited knowledge suffices to enable those possessing it to fulfil with credit all the duties of an inferior military post; and because, as long as they possess thus much, it is quite immaterial for the good of the service, whether they are gifted with the most exalted talents.

Up to a certain military rank—that is, so long as acting as a mere screw in the great mechanism of an army—if an officer be obedient and tolerably brave, except in a very few cases these subaltern grades

would be no better filled by an Alexander the Great, a Napoleon, or a Duke of Wellington, than by the very man of whom Goldsmith says—"If bred to a shoemaker, he would only have learned to cobble, but never to make a pair of shoes." But, on the other hand, it is amongst the class of those, who by their talents and knowledge feel themselves fitted to shine beyond the sphere to which they are immediately limited, that a country must look for the future leaders of her armies; and, naturally, the smaller this class is, the less chance there is of good generals springing up from it. In Russia it is unaccountably trifling, notwithstanding the thousands of officers brought up in the cadet schools; and can only be partially explained, if we seek its causes in the indifference with which their profession is universally regarded by the officers, in the frivolity of their pursuits, and the superficial nature of all education.

The very few Russian officers who have any wish to rise in their profession, know well that there are readier and more easy means, than by taking any trouble to render themselves acquainted with its higher branches, or fitting themselves beforehand for the advancement which they are solicitous to obtain. It is not that, as in other countries, promotion is to be obtained by the influence of aristocratic interest; on the contrary, both the emperor and the grand duke seem always either to have been too fearful of giving way to any favouritism of this kind, or are desirous even here of humbling still further their fallen magnates; for an officer of high family has more difficulty in rising through the recommendation of his generals, and is

more severely punished for the most trifling breach of military decorum, than one of obscure birth.

It is true that the wealth which in Russia often accompanies rank, affords through its silver key many facilities which may lead indirectly to advancement, and cover a multitude of sins:—thus the general or colonel of a regiment is propitiated, by the complaisance of the cadets or subalterns in purchasing at enormous prices all his worn-out or unsound horses—to pass over all peccadilloes, and to testify on all occasions his approbation of their conduct. The same means render all examinations which are not passed beneath the Grand Duke Michael's own eye, a mere form; and though it is true that he personally examines every cadet and volunteer who obtains an officer's commission, it is only in their drill and riding that this severe investigation takes place; so that those who can pass muster on these points thoroughly to his satisfaction, may after all only be fit to become corporals.

From the habit the young Russians have of never crossing a saddle, except on duty, or in the riding school, their equitation is not of a very brilliant description, notwithstanding all the pains their commander takes; and formerly the most ludicrous attempts were made to deceive him at these “manège” exhibitions. Some of the cadets caused their leather breeches to be strongly glued to their saddles; others had their boots buttoned to it by a small loop, that they might not rise too unsteadily from their seat. But as it sometimes happened that the grand duke ordered them to dismount, the cheat was at last

discovered, and it has now become very difficult to take him in, for he has grown perfectly lynx-eyed in detecting all these matters. Boots, breeches, and saddle are now all examined by him, and not unfrequently he causes the candidate for epaulettes to strip before him to ascertain whether he wears the regulation soldier's shirt. If he is found guilty of wearing fine linen, he is made a private.

The examination in every species of more intellectual instruction, need not be so difficult for the examinee, who chooses to solicit indulgence in the proper way. We were acquainted with an officer, who, when desirous of passing through this ordeal, to obtain his commission in the artillery, was advised to request the examining general to favour him with a few lessons to enable him to pass. The general invited him to breakfast, gave him a bottle of champagne, and then very quietly swept up the one thousand rouble (45*l.*) note which his pupil deposited upon the table with a trembling hand, wrapped in a neat envelope. "This," said the general, when they had finished their bottle, "will do for one lesson." "And how many more," said the cadet, "does your excellency think I shall require?" "About three more," replied the general, "and you will be able to pass with distinction." "And do you not think that one lesson might possibly suffice?" "That depends on yourself," said the instructor. The young aspirant, taking the hint, inclosed three thousand roubles in a note, and consequently when the trial of his abilities came on, was said to have acquitted himself with great credit, and received his commission accordingly.

The quality which seems most to be esteemed, and most certainly to insure promotion, is that martinet spirit and buckram stiffness which are characteristic of the drill serjeant, and which we may very easily discern in most of the officers of the guard, to whom the command of battalions, or of regiments, is entrusted. And as this military pedantry, like every other species of pedantry, argues narrowness of intellect—the commanders of corps being dull men, and their subalterns indifferent to their duty—the Russian troops are far from going through the great manœuvres with the precision which might be expected, considering that no army in the world has so much field instruction.

Every year camps are formed in different parts of the empire, that at *Krasnoi Zelo*, in the vicinity of St. Petersburg, being always occupied by the guards, who usually muster about 70,000 men; and very frequently armies are collected together to manœuvre, more vast than any other power in the world can assemble; such as that of the Camp of Kalish, and of the review at Borodino, where 120,000 men and 800 pieces of cannon were present in mimic fight.*

In all their formations we find the Russian infantry both *slower* and *looser* than the British, and probably a little inferior to what the French were, in 1837, in point of speed, but preserving their order more closely. The cavalry manœuvres well, but is very easily tired. The field artillery is very rapid in its evolutions and its fire, but its target practice is strikingly inaccur-

* More men were accidentally killed and wounded in this sham battle than in all the British operations on the coast of Syria, inclusive of the storming of Acre.

rate, a disadvantage which, whenever confined to the use of round-shot, must prove quite countervailing to the speed with which the pieces are discharged.

As regards the officers of the artillery and engineer department, their number is so large, and they have such opportunities of instruction, that necessarily it must contain some brilliant men. But as it is in Russia almost as certain, and naturally much easier, to the peculiar tact of the Muscovite character, to simulate knowledge than endeavour to possess it, a man, though uniting both talent and ambition, is apt to satisfy himself with the simulation. To the dunce this national facility offers a welcome refuge.

The artillery and engineer corps of the guards, the *élite* of the whole army, may contain distinguished members, but the superior officers, and those pointed out as clever men, are often incredibly ignorant and unintelligent, although it is true that they can talk with fluency on any subject connected with their profession without compromising themselves.

Let us proceed to an illustration. The scene is a lecture-room at a university; the occasion, the delivery of the first of a series of lectures on electricity and galvanism. These lectures, since the application of galvanic agency to sub-aqueous and subterranean mines, have been principally frequented by officers of the artillery, engineers, and navy. Before the appearance of the professor, amongst other men of high military rank, a general of artillery and a colonel of engineers, both bearing the reputation of being distinguished men, take their seat upon one of the front benches. They converse with so much volubility on

the subject—on the electrotype, and on the direct application of the galvanic current as a motive power, and as a means of ignition—that many of the epauletted pupils seem to regret that they do not take the chair in the absence of the professor. At last the lecturer arrives, and commences, with the aid of various apparatus, and great black board, and its corresponding bit of chalk. After some preamble, he continues, in a learning-made-easy sort of tone,—

“ Gentlemen, before continuing on this subject, let me shew you how easily the galvanic stream—or at least, its effects and action—may be rendered visible to the naked eye. It is true, we cannot weigh it, we cannot see it, but we may readily feel its effects, and see its effects upon other bodies. You will observe, gentlemen, that I have here a common tumbler; it is filled with a liquid which is a diluted acid—water and sulphuric acid—but lemon-juice, or vinegar, or any acid in its diluted state, will answer the same purpose. Into this weak acid you see me dip two plain laminæ of different metal; they are placed upright, like two spoons in a cup of tea. In this manner you see that they produce no more visible effect than two spoons in a cup of tea would do; but directly I connect by a wire the top of these bits of metal, the galvanic current is established. You see the small gas bubbles rising up from the metal, like the bead in champagne; this is the water decomposed and converted into oxygen and hydrogen by the galvanic action.”

Here the lecturer draws the tumbler, about the size of a band-box, in chalk upon the black board, then

represents the pieces of metal, the water-line, and the bubbles of hydrogen; any child might have understood it, it was proving one and one to make two; but he apparently knew the stupidity and inattention of his auditory, for he again went through the experiment with the tumbler. He then hands it to the general to circulate it round, that his pupils may have the opportunity of more closely examining it. The general takes it up, looks at it inquisitively and approvingly, *without joining the pieces of metal*, so that no galvanic effect whatever could be produced. The colonel examines it with the same apparent critical acumen and eventual satisfaction—"It is interesting, very interesting—a beautiful illustration!" Here the professor, swallowing a laugh, shews him the point of the experiment.

Let us proceed to another illustration: the Emperor Nicholas had for some years been occupied with projects of submarine navigation. In the prosecution of this scheme his submarine committee were struck (in their researches after a motive power which would not consume air) with the accounts contained in American papers of the successful application of electro-galvanism to this purpose. Professor Jacobi, who claims the *invention*, and is perhaps entitled to the *discovery* of the electrotype, (although this is disputed with him by an ignorant copper-smith,) was applied to. After many experiments, he undertook to construct an electro-galvanic engine, or rather apparatus, of several horse power. A light boat was built for the purpose, but to propel it, it was found necessary to have the assistance of eight rowers; with this aid the boat went rather

slower than it would have done without the weight of the galvanic battery within it. Nevertheless, the scheme was reported as eminently successful by both naval and military authorities, and Jacobi shortly after received a handsome gratuity from the emperor.

Jacobi, to illustrate his contrivance, exhibited an engine, or rather a fly-wheel, to which rapid motion was given by the direct action of a very powerful battery. Let the reader imagine the minister of public instruction and several high engineering authorities examining it. The iron fly-wheel, some five feet in diameter, and of great weight, was set in rapid motion. In the full speed of its rotation the professor takes some wands of wood, accurately planed, measured, and marked ; he inserts them between the iron spokes towards the periphery of it, and of course the force of the percussion smashes and crumbles them.

The author, who was present, suggested that this was the effect, not of steady power, but of a violent blow ; that a boy with the stroke of a hammer might drive a nail into a wall which the force of a horse could not push into it. In answer, the professor takes down a volume of Tredgold, or some such authority, and makes a calculation of the weight required to break such a length and so many cubic inches of a certain wood ; then of the number of pounds a horse can lift, and thence jumps at once to the conclusion that the revolution of his wheel gives him so many horse power, "*according to your compatriot's own calculation.*"

The author first placed a piece of stick near the nave of the wheel ; the wheel could not be set in mo-

tion ; he then put his finger in the place of it, with his finger he could equally prevent the wheel from being turned. It must be remembered that the power of every horse is estimated as being equal to five men, and that this wheel was attempted to be proved to revolve with the power of several horses.

The professor bit his lip, but he was not without faith in the obtuseness of these civil and military lights of the Russian empire : he exclaimed, with the utmost assurance, “ Oh, no ! put your finger where I put the stick, and set the wheel in motion first ! ” The author respectfully declined, alleging that “ there would be all the difference between pressing a nail with a hammer and driving it in by a blow.” The professor looked around him triumphantly, and all his auditors echoed, with perfect conviction, “ To be sure ; if it has not the alleged power, why does he not have it set in motion first ? ”

The committee of submarine navigation consisted of a dozen generals and admirals, and was presided over by General Schilder, of the Engineers of the Guard. Its history, and the result of the labours of its members, would prove a sad satire on their ingenuity or knowledge. The president had already distinguished himself by building three steamers, intended to run between St. Petersburg and Peterhoff, on the Gulf of Finland ; they were in professed imitation of the rapid cigar-boats of the American inland waters. On their completion they were found to be useless, the fastest of the three not averaging two miles an hour, and being the three degrees of comparison—slow, slower, and slowest. The “ superlative” boat is said

to have given rise to a witticism from the Grand Duke Michael. A steam-boat is called in Russ, a steam-goer, or paraxod. He observed, "that the other two might be *steam-goers*, but that the third was decidedly a *parastoy*, or *steam-stand-still*, for he could not perceive that it advanced at all."

This submarine committee, intending to organize a sort of shell-fish warfare against British arrogance, held its meetings, and tried its experiments, chiefly on the Petroffsky island, on a branch of the Neva. Here rockets and torpedoes were fired under the water, and under the ice, by the galvanic wire ; old inoffensive barges were destroyed in a manner which could neither be called original, nor stigmatized as astute. The idea of submarine navigation, as old as the reign of Charles the Second, has occupied many projectors, and was much experimented on by Fulton, and by his associate Johnson, the Dick Turpin of smugglers. By joint chemical and mechanical agency, and by following the operations of nature in aquatic animals, there is no difficulty experienced, either in descending or rising in the water, or in storing a sufficient quantity of air to last many hours without taking in a fresh portion ; but there appears to have been as yet no means devised of moving against the slightest tide or current by the manual exertion of those contained within it, because the smallest submarine vessel must present a surface to the water five or six times greater than a boat of the same breadth of beam would do when partly in the atmosphere. Steam, from the immense consumption of air which the furnaces of its boilers require, is, of course, inapplicable in any way hitherto practised.

Now the committee, instead of adopting in their nautili the best form for cleaving a fluid, seemed almost bent on devising the geometrical figure which might offer the utmost resistance to the element they could not be said to *aspire* to navigate. If it was their intention to rival the Peterhoff boats of their president, they were eminently successful, for the submarines could never be got to move any way but one—the way they were carried by the current of the Neva.

A couple of years ago, the emperor, having found that the result of many years of labour amounted, when summed up, to an immense outlay, and to the pleasant pastime of sending divers down in a sort of closed bell, and letting them come up again, with the occasional variation of getting sometimes half drowned, was forced reluctantly to dissolve the committee.

As regards the use of the rocket, perhaps more complete experiments have been tried with this missile than in any other country. Two hundred pounders have been used with great effect, and some have been made weighing eight hundred pounds, and carrying three barrels of powder in the shell; but it is found, that unless fired at a great elevation, they touch the ground too soon. They are all made under the superintendence of an Englishman who has been sixteen years in this department; but notwithstanding his instructions, the whole batch made during his casual absence at Warsaw proved utterly useless. The proper construction of a rocket is, after all, like the making of gunpowder, or the brewing of beer, chiefly a matter of habit, which renders this the more surprising.

If we now turn to the class of superior officers,—the generals and commanders of armies—the brain of these vast bodies,—we shall find that no nation whose military annals have been on the whole so glorious as those of Russia, has ever produced so few. It is true, that either the strong prejudice which, since the revulsion of feeling in Peter's time, has risen in the secret mind of Russians in favour of all that is *foreign*, or else the suspicious policy of the tsars, who dreaded the influence of a successful Russian general, has ever since that epoch bestowed, in the majority of instances, every command of importance upon foreigners; yet the only *great* general that Russia ever possessed was a native—Suwarow Rymniksi; and if we select the best amongst the herd which follows at a very humble distance from him, we shall find them down to the present day all Russian names—a fact which is the more surprising, when we consider that they are found amongst the minority. From this circumstance, one might be tempted to deduce an inference highly favourable to the military genius of the nation, did not the same histories which acquaint us with it show that in the dearth of talent, of which both the Muscovites and foreigners commanding the Imperial armies gave evidence, the superiority of the former over their competitors consisted chiefly *in possessing a resolution which the latter wanted, of bringing matters to the issue of a battle.* With few exceptions,—amongst which we may cite Barclay de Tolly, not a very brilliant one,—these foreigners, since the days of the Crouys, the Gordons, and Leforts, have almost exclusively been Germans, and amongst all of them,

perhaps only Marshal Munich, the Dane, seems to have distinguished himself. They appear, in neither case, to have been skilful enough to out-maneuvre their enemy ; and it is very much the character of the German captains not willingly to hazard a battle without obtaining this vantage ground ; whereas we see the Russian leaders disentangling the knot with the sword, as in the instances of Apraxin and Koutousoff. In the recent wars, we find the Russians Yermoloff and Paskevitch, at least the best amongst the crowd, if indeed (which is doubtful) their exploits have been worthy the praise bestowed upon them.

Notwithstanding the above facts, as it has ever been the case in Russia, the greater number of all high military appointments still continue to be filled by German officers, and these are precisely of that cast of men in which the annals of her wars show Germany to have been so fruitful—men who, carried away by the national failing of generalizing and systematizing, have always considered war exactly as a game of chess, without considering that the value of the pieces played with is never twice the same, and something like the Italian condottieri of old, with their thousand rules, and subtle distinctions, who fought battle after battle against each other, which were lost or won almost without the loss of a man, because the more skilful movements of the one party had convinced the other that they were already beaten before bringing the contest to a trial, and that they consequently abandoned the field without bloodshed ; thus never taking into consideration the peculiar feelings which animate

the combatants, and which, never perhaps twice the same, so often set at defiance all these calculations.

The Germans also, though very copious thinkers, and sometimes eventually true in their judgment, are almost always too slow about it for the practical purposes of war, in which promptness of decision is such a valuable quality; and if they can boast of the greatest military man of any age, in the person of Frederick the Second of Prussia, in all their wars with foreign nations we find their captains only distinguished by their pedantry and their reverses, down to the latest times, when Blucher, the mere headlong, obstinate, and daring trooper, proved that even the opposite extreme of character was more advantageous in its results upon their military fortune.

All these defects we shall find in the foreign commanders of the Russian armies, with this difference, that as the choice of them is made amongst a class proportionately small, it is less likely to fall on men of talent than in the German states. The General Gneisenau in the Turkish, and General Toll in the Polish campaigns, appear to have shone to most advantage amongst these. The Russian armies possess a formidable auxiliary in their light cavalry, the Cossacs, the most daring and intelligent foragers and éclaireurs in the world, who take care of themselves by instinct, without taxing the foresight or the ingenuity of the general, and who, spreading on every side, strike terror into the neighbourhood, and render it almost impossible to surprise a Russian force; for if the light cavalry has been aptly compared to the *eyes of an army*, the Cossacs render the Russian

armies like those insects whose whole body is studded with eyes which are never closed in sleep. Even the determined hostility of the population of the country in which he is making war, checks not the adventurous spirit of the Cossac. Brought up amongst turbulent tribes, his vigilance never slumbers, and he never lays himself open to surprise as all other light troops do when scattered abroad, and thus can act even in the midst of a guerilla peasantry.

It is principally owing to this people that the Russians have been enabled to extend so prodigiously their dominion; it is amongst them that a tsar of Russia might speedily collect a larger and more formidable force of cavalry than the whole of *united Europe could bring together*. Hitherto, having been used merely as foragers and light troops, all regulars have affected to despise the Cossacs in an open combat, and with reason, because they had never been taught, accustomed, or intended to act as regular cavalry; and it is evident that the Russian government has not a true sense of their value, by taking such pains to form regiments of Muscovite horse, drilling men for several years before they can be taught their duty of guiding and attending to their steed, and after all this trouble, never succeeding in forming a horseman whom the untutored Cossac would not charge, wheel round, and overcome, though armed cap-à-pie, with his mere *nagaica*, or whip. Now all this, which in the formation of cavalry is what it is so difficult to teach the recruit, taken from a people whose habits are not equestrian, and which is the sole reason why, though we hear of infantry

raised, disciplined, and rendered formidable in two months, at least as many years are required to bring cavalry to the same effective state,—all this, the most difficult part of a trooper's instruction, the Cossac knows before you begin to discipline him, and knows it better than you will ever succeed in teaching it to the man who has not been, like himself, in the saddle from his youth.

Who can doubt, therefore, that the Cossac, who unites to these advantages that of personal bravery, when taught to fight according to the same rules, would prove as superior in heavy cavalry as he does to the Muscovite as a light horseman. There is no country in Europe which can possibly offer better materials for cavalry than good horses, bold riders, and brave and willing men; and certainly, all other countries combined could not furnish so many. Every Cossac is a warrior; he is ready to march if there be prospect of war, and he only requires marshalling into that order, which is no more difficult than that of infantry, and which with infantry we have seen can be accomplished in a few weeks.

The fact that all equestrian people make, almost without the aid of discipline, a light cavalry, has always caused them to be so employed; and the fact of their being so employed has given rise to the absurd prejudice in the minds of military men—which a few moments' reflection ought to dispel—that they are an unsuit material for regular cavalry. It is true, that your riding-school horsemen, having no individual confidence in themselves, may be less prone to quit their masses; but, even in masses of cavalry, so much

depends upon the spirit, which can only exist as the aggregate of individual confidence, that this must always form the main ingredient of its excellence.

Some confusion of idea has also arisen from the nominal distinctions between light and heavy cavalry. How many regiments of light and heavy cavalry, like those of light and heavy infantry, have no distinction but the name? And does any military man of experience, who knows all the absurdity of talking about “weight” in shocks that never take place, or about the impetus of masses where one rank of horses can never shove the other before it—does any such person pretend that a disciplined regiment of light cavalry ought not to be fully applicable to all the purposes of a regiment of heavy horse, besides being so for many purposes which the latter is not?

The Ukraine and the whole of Little Russia is inhabited either by a Cossac population, or such as has been so much mixed with the Cossac blood as to have become imbued with the habits, the tendency, and character of this restless race, and which amounts to upwards of six millions of souls. Besides this, we find them spreading eastward in the direction of Siberia, and far into it, settling in the plains that border every large river that intervenes upon their way, and forming tribes, half pastoral and half agricultural, and all warlike—all shewing, as their most marked expression, those traits which distinguished their sires, who were transplanted or wandered eastward from the Polish frontier. Under the name of Cossacs of the Bug, of the Don, of the Ural, of Orenburg, of Astrachan,—Cossacs of the Black Sea, and

Siberian Cossacs,—all hundreds of miles apart, and having adopted different manners and habits from the tribes which surround them, or the exigencies of circumstance, and though considering themselves as different nations, all still animated by the same warlike spirit, and utter want of attachment to any peculiar spot of soil,—they constitute a population of not less than eight hundred thousand souls, which the most authentic accounts distribute thus:—

Cossacs of the Don, about	400,000
„ of the Ural and Orenburg .	100,000
„ of the Black Sea	100,000
Siberian Cossacs	200,000
„ of the Bug and Astrachan .	4,000

Of these, every man between the age of fifteen and of fifty is a soldier, and a soldier eager for war and ready to engage in it at the other extremity of the earth, eastward or westward, or wherever he may indulge in an occupation so congenial to his disposition.

In the military organization of the empire the Cossacs are distributed into 146 regiments of 800 men each, thus keeping up a force of 126,000 cavalry, in which are, however, included five regiments of Baskirs.

The Don furnishes	56 regiments
The Black Sea	21
The Caucean frontier	12
The Danube	2
Azolf	1
Astrachan	3
The Oural	12

Orenburg	20
Siberia	12
Little Russia	2
Baskirs	5

To these must be added the organized Kirguise and other nomades, which swell to at least 135,000 the irregular cavalry perpetually under arms. This is perhaps the only portion of the military establishment of the Russian empire which is in reality maintained at its full complement, and which, in fact, might be instantaneously increased, because every able-bodied man is possessed both of the necessary instruction, the steed and arms, as well as the inclination, for a state of warfare.

We have, besides these, the military colonies, consisting chiefly of cavalry and of men of Cossac or Little-Russian origin, which, according to reports, show nearly 400,000 agricultural soldiers, though comprising many too old and too young for service.

Established, in 1821, under the immediate superintendence of General De Witt, the cavalry colonies commenced with 65,000 in 1825, and already have increased to 120,000 males. However it may have become the imperial policy to check their extension, the experiment was eminently successful. The growth of these colonies has since been stopped to such an extent that it is questionable whether they amount to anything like the number given in official documents ; but it is unquestionable that if continued according to their original plan they would frightfully have increased it. All the data exist in the War Office, to show that, judging by the average of their increase during

past years, inclusive of all accidents, if a certain number of Little Russians and Cossacs, together with the ploughs, horses, and cattle indicated, were collected according to this system, in three years these colonies might not only furnish but support 300,000 mounted horsemen, besides their reserves. There is a frightful reality in the feasibility of the scheme,—in this respect, so unlike the Russian official speculations. The government, however, has learned to dread calling such a giant into life.

If to the 135,000 Cossacs and irregulars, which may be easily increased to 200,000, we add the 85,000 regular cavalry, we shall find that if all the mechanism for moving large armies were not fortunately defective, it would be possible for a Russian Attila, who was not frightened at his own power, to pour into Europe half a million of cavalry—a spectacle the world has never witnessed.

The institution of the military colonies which took place in the reign of Alexander, shortly after the pacification, was the suggestion of his favourite Aracheief, and excited an alarm not unfounded in the neighbouring nations, though their apprehensions were quieted by the assurance that only economical and not ambitious designs had led to it. The original project is said to have been to convert the great bulk of the Russian people into one vast army, on a plan which would have made it support itself, and was feasible enough in a country possessing immense tracts of rich land, which the joint labour of a body properly directed, and the aid of requisite capital, would soon have rendered so productive as to leave a large portion

of its settlers at leisure to follow their military avocations. From the fear of arming a fresh body of Strelitzes against itself, this gigantic plan was never carried out. The military colonies, as they exist, are only the first stones of a stupendous edifice, in the erection of which its projectors paused, from the dread of being crushed beneath its weight.

The idea was no doubt derived from the success which attended the establishment of the frontier regiments of Transylvania in the Austrian dominions, according to the original plan of Prince Eugene, of Savoy. Aracheieff, minister of war to the Emperor Alexander, conceived the notion of applying it to the whole Russian population. The organization, according to this mode, of a mere border province, produced the result of not only efficiently supplying means for its defence, but a useful source of recruitment in a general war in which the Austrian empire might be engaged; to this, however, its importance was limited. As introduced by Aracheieff into the Russian empire it threatened to give a tenfold increase to the already overgrown power of its tsars. It in some measure resembled the scheme of the Lacedemonian lawgiver, who aspired to make his Spartans a nation of soldiers; only that in Russia it would have been applied to fifty millions, instead of to a few thousand individuals.

The system of the military colonies was based on the following facts and reasoning:—In the Russian empire there were then, as now, immense quantities of most fertile land, together with inhabitants to till it, but from social causes the resources of the country remained

comparatively undeveloped. The government had already drawn from it, in men and money, all that it could give in this unfavourable condition. On the principle of division of labour and of the application of joint capital, it was obvious that a smaller number of hands might ensure a greater produce, thus not only leaving a larger number of combatants at the disposal of the state, but furnishing the means of supporting them.

In demanding from its sixty millions of subjects, one million of men for the varied duties of its service, the Russian government asked for less than seventeen hundred men on every hundred thousand souls, and this was, and is, found more than the country can maintain in an efficient state. Besides which, a very large proportion of this force is necessary to preserve order, for the defence of vast frontiers, and as reserves. Now it had been practically found in Transylvania, that to maintain the efficient complement of a colonized regiment at 4800 men, independent of all reserves, a population of 100,000 individuals was amply sufficient. In some localities, even 75,000 sufficed to produce the desired result; but the former number evidently enabled the community to attain a degree of considerable material prosperity, when compared to the most favourable condition of any Russian district.

But not only would the general introduction of this system have increased the military force of the empire in the proportion of from seventeen to forty-eight, and thus not only have placed at its disposal 2,800,000 men, instead of the million which it pretends to hold devoted to the public service—not only would it have afforded ample means of maintaining them, but of

keeping the whole, or any portion, of this astounding force, *entirely disposable*, as well as in efficient order.

Of about 1,000,000 men who are supposed to eat the bread of the emperor, in the different departments of the service, it is probable that not more than between 7 and 800,000 can ever be really embodied; but supposing 800,000, we cannot calculate less than half this number to be absorbed to maintain the tranquillity, to carry on the administration of the country, to watch its frontiers, and as dépôts and reserves within it. Now the mere reserves, under the system of military colonization, would provide far more amply and completely for all these exigences, than one-half of the whole force of the empire under the ordinary military system. We thus find that, practically, the augmentation, instead of being in the proportion of 48 to 17, would be upwards of 115 to 17.

Aracheieff commenced his experiment in 1817. As the domain of the crown comprised upwards of 20,000,000 serfs, it was naturally began with these. The military colonies of infantry were planted on the banks of the Wolkoff, in the government of Novogorod the Great, the site of the old republic founded by the handful of Norman sea-kings, or pirates, who conquered the country in the early ages, and were known in the east under the general name of Varangians. The cavalry colonies were planted on the banks of the Dnieper, the Bug, and the Siguiska.

The land devoted to the establishment of a colony was portioned off into patches as large as it was supposed one plough would suffice to till—an average of

about two hundred acres. The complement of each plough consisted of a certain determined number of oxen, horses, and sheep. Wherever a serf and his family could not make this up, two families comprised one plough. A certain number of ploughs formed a company—a certain number of companies a battalion. Every plough was obliged to furnish one soldier, to be constantly under arms, besides two days' weekly labour to the regimental estate. The produce of this estate paid the expense of clothing and equipment. The whole male population was armed and disciplined, the obligation of five-and-twenty years' military service being entailed on every man, of which fifteen were spent in the regular battalions, five in the reserves, and five at the disposal of its staff in case of war. Every battalion of ploughs thus kept up a battalion of regular troops, in which each man served unceasingly for fifteen years. It had its battalion of reserves, composed of old soldiers, besides its veterans, and its growing crop of recruits. It was administered by two distinct sets of officers and staffs : one set commanding the regular battalion—the other, the reserves and the rest of the population. The lands were cleared, tilled, and manured, and the harvest got in, with military regularity, under the superintendence of their officers. The magazines of the regimental estate provided against all want of farming stock ; the regulations, and the severity with which they were enforced, secured the proper application of it. The legislation of the colony was essentially *drum-head*, everything being tried by court-martial.

In the organization of the Transylvanian regiments,

the principle alike of the most warlike of all legislators, Lyceurgus, and of the pacific St. Simonians and Socialists, the abolition of all individual property, had been amply carried out. The regiment was composed of military families, these military families sometimes comprising from fifty to seventy individuals, and, in reality, consisting of portions of many families. This family, or clan, possessed property, and could sell its surplus produce to another military family; but no individual right over any portion of it existed.

Such a community of possession might answer well as concerned a population either recently nomadic, or whose traditions were derived from this state of society; because the natural tendency of an erratic life, which must always be mainly pastoral, is towards patriarchal or clan-like institutions, which must so nearly establish them; but when applied to the sedentary Muscovite, who, slave as he has always been, has, perhaps on that account, more vivid notions of the *meum* and *tuum*, it was highly repugnant to his feelings. Whether the Russian serf be obliged to hide his few roubles from the keen eye of a rapacious overseer, or whether he can enjoy them in quiet, his principal comfort, not to say enjoyment, is still the consciousness of possessing them. It is true that he has the instinct of association, he is sensible of all the advantages of the Atel, or club, into which, where circumstances or their masters will permit them, the Russian moujiks are so fond of joining; but this is because his natural commercial bent and perspicuity have pointed out to him its protective advantages.

On the other hand, the natural averseness of the Muscovite to a military state, rendered his life exceedingly irksome to the colonist. Yet the infantry colonies all consisted of the true Muscovite or Old Russian population. Aracheieff, who was soon acquainted with this disinclination, determined to quell it, by the system of severity and terror of which he was such a partisan. The spot on which the first of these establishments was formed, the vicinity of Novogorod, was sterile and unfavourable to agriculture, which has been cited as a reason for the virtual abandonment of them. But, in fact, notwithstanding this sterility, these colonies had begun so far to flourish as to make it worth the while of their officers to profit by the recommendation of Aracheieff, and to exercise the most unlimited tyranny and peculation. The accidents of the failure of crops were met by empty magazines; hunger drove some portions of the colonists to revolt. When the rest were ordered against them, they universally rose and massacred their officers, with all the cruelty and fury of insurgent serfs. But it was found that now a handful of Cossacs did not suffice to put them down; a district had become a disciplined army.

In the steppe lands of Southern Russia, where Little Russians, Bessarabians, and refugee Bulgarians, Wallachians, and Moldavians, had been settled in cavalry colonies situated in a fertile locality, these had been partially prevented from flourishing by the rigorous spirit of Aracheieff, and the oppression of their own officers. Disaffection, as great as in the north, prevailed, although accompanied by greater prosperity, and it

was dreaded every hour that the revolt which had broken out there would spread amongst them.

In the account of the general conspiracy of the nobility, the reader may have remarked that the government of the Emperor Alexander had before this period been made acquainted with its existence, and although no connexion ever existed between the disaffected colonies and the conspirators, the serious apprehension excited by the possibility of their being used to forward the views of the secret associations, may be easily imagined. By force, and fraud, and treachery, the revolters were put down in detail; but the government was so alarmed at the issue of its plan, that from that moment the project of giving an extensive development to the military colonies seems to have been abandoned, not as impracticable, but as unsafe.

The military colonies at present in existence are principally cavalry, occupying the governments of Khar-koff and Kherson, as organized by Count de Witt, who commenced them on an improved system, in 1821. They have continued to flourish, as far as the government will allow of their extension. Besides supporting their own charges, they on several occasions furnished, from their regimental magazines, immense quantities of corn to the government, and in particular to its armies when invading Turkey. During several campaigns, their subsidies of wheat and oats are said to have exceeded 200,000 quarters.

To return to the Cossacs. The Russian empire is undoubtedly indebted to these tribes for the vast extension of its dominion, and we find that it is only

since the period at which they were driven by Polish oppression into the arms of Russia, that with the aid of these auxiliaries she has been enabled to spread, and continues spreading, her domain, seeking out and subduing those nomade hordes which formerly overrun her territory in periodic and locust-like irruptions. Of all people in the world, the Cossac alone, of any of which we have any record, seems to have united all the qualities requisite to accomplish the subjection of those vast tracts and various tribes which it has submitted to the Muscovite rule. Nature seems to have fitted him to become the conqueror of the tribes of the desert, by endowments as peculiar as those which enable the camel to traverse it. Distance and climate vanish before his wandering and adventurous spirit; the regions where the burning sun destroys all life and vegetation, or those where "the cold burns frore, and frost produces the effect of fire," have never stayed his purpose, or arrested his onward march. With a singular versatility he adopts the manners and habits of the tribes with which he comes in contact, though always retaining the strong individuality of his race; and according to the exigencies of the locality, he combines with his warlike profession the labours of the husbandman, the occupations of the fisherman, the herdsman, and the trader, and readily abandons one character to adopt the other whenever it may be required. Sedentary or erratic, according to circumstances, even his agricultural success never binds him to the soil he has rendered fruitful; his restless disposition and inclination to wander forward, will always lead him willingly to abandon the shade of the very vine he has planted.

It is not only by his indefatigable activity and his recklessly adventurous temper, that the Cossac has succeeded in overrunning one-half of Asia, and the whole of that wide extent of steppes, which, beginning at the foot of the Carpathian mountains, stretch without intermission as far as the Mongul empire; it is not only at the point of the lance that he has subdued the wild inhabitants of so large a portion of the globe, but by the pliancy of his disposition, the wonderful facility of adapting himself to the customs of these wildernesses, and the men which people them, and his ardour in trading with the fiercest hordes, and establishing a commerce of which the advantages soon lead to closer communication, but which no one but himself could ever have founded. It required a mixture of the reckless and wandering spirit of the sons of Ishmael, with the intense love of gain peculiar to the children of Israel, both of which his character exhibits, to form the warrior merchant, who could trade and defend his merchandize, and who would penetrate to effect his purpose a thousand miles away from his station, either towards hyperborean regions, or through parched and droughty plains.

Nature seems to have destined the Cossac to become the conqueror of that vast and hitherto unconquered Tartar race which always hung menacing over Eastern Europe; and he is fast fulfilling his destiny. At the time when this people, who have proved themselves the fittest in the world to cope with oriental barbarians, first sprung into existence, or rather at the period when history first calls our attention to them, we find them placed as it were in the

vanguard of European civilization, as if it had been purposely to defend it against the inroads of the rapidly increasing Muscovites, and the ruthless Tartar nations which threatened it from that quarter; just as we see the antidote growing against the plant which bears the poison, and the ichneumon inhabiting the marsh which gives harbour to the crocodile.

The Poles, however, by dint of civil and religious persecution, ended by alienating the allegiance of this people, and threw them into the hands of the Muscovite, as a tool with which he has worked out his own greatness and their undoing, who so imprudently lopped off the main limb of their strength. The Cossac may now be compared to the sheep-dog, who never feels, whilst employed in governing the flock, that he is not free. Indeed there are many of his avocations in which his occupation bears a striking similarity to that of the canine slave of the shepherd; for independently of forming a living line along the vast frontiers of the empire, he is employed to watch the nomade tribes to which the Russian government has assigned limits, which they are not to pass; and when they attempt to do so, the Cossac drives them in, as the colley does the straying sheep. Within this circle, perfect liberty is allowed them; tribes may make war upon each other, and their dissensions are even encouraged, until one party becoming some day too weak, is forced to seek Russian protection, which is eagerly afforded, but at the price of the freedom of the wild children of the steppe, who, under the escort of the Cossac lance, are probably transported a thousand versts or two, and settled in villages where they

are forced to abandon their wandering habits, or organized into Cossac-like bodies.

The Cossacs are first noticed in Polish history about the middle of the sixteenth century, as fugitive serfs from Podolia, Volhynia, and adjacent provinces, and also from Muscovy, who established themselves on the Dnieper about the cataracts, inhabiting sometimes its marshy banks, and sometimes the numerous islands which it forms, and making determined war, both by land and water, on the Turks, and on the Khan of Tartary. About 1580, we find them tributaries to Stephen, King of Poland, under the name of *Zaporavians*, or Za-porogians, "men of the cataracts." We afterwards find them united to the peasantry of the Ukraine, who had always professed the Greek faith, and were driven by the religious persecution of their Polish lords, who were of the Latin confession, to revolt against their unbearable oppression. They were joined and headed by a Polish nobleman, Bogdan Chmelinski, who had bitter wrongs of his own to avenge, and under the general appellation of Cossacs they waged a long and bloody war on the Polish republic, which on several occasions they placed in the utmost jeopardy. After the death of Bogdan, they were, however, forced to seek the protection of the tsars of Muscovy, but retained the whole of the Ukraine and Tchernigow.

From this time, although occasionally revolting, the Cossacs began to be already useful to the Muscovites, and to enter with spirit into their schemes of conquest. On the invasion of Charles XII. we find them, notwithstanding the revolt of their Hetmann

Mazeppa, whose romantic history the poem of Byron has immortalized, generally adhering to Peter, a small part only espousing the cause of their leader. Amongst this part was the *community* of the Zaporavians, an assemblage of the most daring and reckless of their number, who had resorted to the islands and marshy banks in the vicinity of the waterfalls: a favourite locality, which had been the cradle many years before of the founders of the whole Cossac nation, and who, bound by rules something resembling those of the Buccaneers, lived as fishers, fowlers, and freebooters. None of them were allowed to marry, nor were women permitted to sojourn amongst them; those which they carried off on their foraging expeditions they sold to the Turks or Tartars, and if any one of their number was found concealing a female, he was unmercifully tied to her and cast into the Dnieper. They recruited their numbers from all the wild and restless spirits of the Cossac population which surrounded them, and allowed a certain number, on conforming to their rules, to join them during the summer months, dismissing them in the winter.

This tribe had strongly fortified one of their islands, and were considered very redoubtable, from their warlike temper and their matchless skill in the use of the rifle, and their example was supposed to determine the whole Cossac people to espouse the cause in favour of which they declared themselves; and, in consequence, Charles XII., through Mazeppa, the nominal Hetmann of all the Cossacs, spared no pains to gain them over to his party. He succeeded, although this success had not the anticipated effect in

securing the adhesion of the rest, and Norberg, the chaplain of the Swedish monarch, who was present in his camp, gives us a most lively account of the visit of their chiefs to the royal quarters. After relating that the Zaporavians had, on the entreaties of the tsar, who had given weight to them by an accompanying present of 60,000 florins, declared their determination of marching against the Swedes, and how Mazeppa artfully turned their anger against Peter by pretending that he had extorted the very money which he had sent to them from some of their Cossac brethren, and changed their resolution by representing that Charles was advancing to deliver all their people from a rule which would grow more tyrannical and heavy every day,—after relating his communication with the Khan of the Tartars, who declared that he would make war on whichever side the Zaporavians chose—he gives a description of their ambassadors, who came to deliver a letter from their *Koschevoi*, or leader, into the hands of Charles, and to assure him of the co-operation of their tribe. After being graciously received, they were entertained at the “cavalier table;” but their boisterous and barbarous behaviour shocked even the seasoned ears of the soldier-court of Charles. When about to take their leave, which they were to do in a formal audience, General Rensköld, with great difficulty, obtained of these diplomatists a promise that they would *continue sober till ten o’clock in the morning*, because the Swedish monarch, who never touched anything but water from the spring, had a peculiar abhorrence of drunken people.

At length we find the Zaporavians taking the field

under their *Koschevoi*, a certain *Horrodensky*, and defeating Campbell, the Scottish general of the Russian cavalry, upon their march towards the camp of Charles, which Horrodensky and the Zaporavian leaders visited. The insignia of the Koschevoi's rank, the horse-tail, was lowered before that of Mazeppa, the Hetmann of all the Cossacs, in token of nominal submission to his authority ; but they would allow their Koschevoi, whom they had already twice deposed, to hold no private conferences, either with Mazeppa or with Count Piper, the king's minister, alleging that in these things they were all equal, and all equally interested in hearing whatever should pass between the strangers and their general. As Charles and the Hetmann were at this moment exceedingly popular with them, they expressed their enthusiasm very heartily, and were evidently “on their best behaviour;” notwithstanding which, their fierce and lawless temper displayed itself in a scene of violence, which is highly characteristic of these ruthless free-booters. After a sumptuous feast, to which Mazeppa invited them, with the excitement of the generous wines with which their host liberally supplied them, the force of their habits of accustomed rapine recurred so irresistibly, that they could not withstand the temptation of making free with the silver plate of their host, and the furniture of his dwelling, which they began to plunder. The steward of Mazeppa's household, naturally indignant at their conduct, endeavoured to rescue from them the booty they had made, and branded them in no very measured terms as robbers and brigands. These invectives, which were so palpably

merited, aroused their anger to such a pitch, that they pursued the unfortunate steward into Mazeppa's presence, and insisted that he should be given up to them. So determined were they to revenge the insult they had received, that Mazeppa, after vain endeavours to pacify them, fearful of alienating this fierce and fickle tribe at a moment at which their co-operation was so important, gave up to them the trembling steward, who instantly fell beneath the daggers of his master's ruffian guests.

After the sun of Charles's prosperity had set on the fatal field of Pultava, the Zaporavians were subdued by Peter, to whom the Cossac nation generally had remained faithful; but in the reign of his successors, this turbulent tribe, resenting some infringement on their freedom, emigrated into the Ottoman dominions, to seek the protection of the sultan, which was willingly accorded them. In the time of Catherine, they were, however, enticed to return into the Russian dominions, and settled in the vicinity of the Euxine, and principally along the banks of the Kouban, which, taking its source near the springs of the Terek, and running westward towards the Black Sea, whilst the latter flows towards the Caspian Sea, forms the western half of the natural barrier which intervenes against the inroads of the Caucasian population, hemmed betwixt the respective shores of these great lakes.

This barrier, perhaps all the Russian forces would have difficulty in defending without the aid of these Zaporavians, now settled and established under the name of *Tchornomorskie Cossacs*, and universally acknow-

ledged as the most daring and warlike of their nation, and alone fitted in some measure to cope with the Circassians, to whom only they are inferior; for these mountaineers, in the skilful use of their arms, and their reckless gallantry, have no rivals.

These Tchernomorskie Cossacs, whose numbers have increased to about 100,000, in the predatory excursions which have desolated both sides of the border, have formerly carried off and intermarried with the Circassian women, (an admixture which has much improved the beauty of the race,) many of whose customs, habits, and part of whose costume and language, they have adopted. But the semi-relationship has in nowise softened the unutterable hatred of the Tchernomorskie Cossacs and the Circassians towards each other, inflamed as it is by a long course of mutual injuries, and these fierce races carry on war to the knife, in which quarter is never given, and in which their mutual valour is sullied by every imaginable cruelty; the Circassian fighting for the freedom of his beautiful valleys, and the Tchernomorskie to extend the empire of an individual dwelling thousands of versts away, with whom he has no interests in common.

The war in the Caucasus costs Russia a vast annual expenditure of blood and treasure, but if it were not for these auxiliaries the loss would be prodigious. The Kouban is a line which must be as far as possible maintained, to prevent the utter devastation of the country beyond, by the inroads of the mountaineers, whose fleet and vigorous horses bear them vast distances with inconceivable rapidity. Even now, guarded as it is, they sometimes force the passage, and mark

their track with fire and blood, retaliating on the flat lands the injuries which the Russian columns have inflicted on their own hills and dales. But if it were not thus defended, all the Russian establishments on its northern bank would be eventually rooted out.

Here the miasma arising from the marshy ground through which the river flows is so pestiferous, that thousands and thousands of any other troops than the Cossacs would perish in these insalubrious stations, and here the constitutional peculiarity of this strange people, which renders them insensible to climate, and causes them to thrive and multiply in the arctic regions of the Siberian Jakoutes, where the food is fish and train oil—on the shores of the Caspian, where the soil is a burning dust of salt and sand—as well as amidst the corn of the Ukraine or the vineyards of the Don,—this natural hardihood in a great measure protects them against the unhealthiness of a spot which would prove fatal to all others.

Next to the Tchornomorskie, the most formidable (from their numbers) are the Cossacs of the Don, inhabiting the fertile banks of the river from which they take their name. Enticed from the Ukraine to the land they at present occupy, by the policy of the Empress Catherine, and on the strength of her promises of allowing them the full enjoyment of their ancient freedom, their constitution, which has always been perfectly democratic, had been religiously respected until the present reign. Nicholas, however, has made with success an attempt upon their valuable privileges, which it is likely he does not intend to confine to the Cossacs of the Don, though he has yet

interfered with no other of the more distant tribes. He has succeeded in utterly subverting all their rights; and yet it has been done so craftily and so cleverly as to leave this people almost insensible of the fact, which probably they will only begin to perceive when, like their own lassos flung round the neck of a wild horse, the knot begins gradually to tighten.

According to their original constitution, the Don Cossacs owed nothing but a certain military service to the Russian government, a service they cheerfully performed under the command of their own officers, who were elected by their fellow citizens. They were all divided into polks, or regiments, which took their turn of service, and when this was over, those whom they had chosen as their leaders returned without any distinction whatever into the ranks. They had, however, grown too wealthy, and were too happy in their independence, not to have been long an eyesore to despotism, and the change was commenced by establishing servitude amongst them. Russian serfs were transported into their country, and settled on estates which were conferred upon the most influential of their officers, who were thus gained over and corrupted —the more easily, because, during the period of their service, they had acquired luxurious and expensive habits. The next step was to confer on all officers, when once elected, a perpetual rank, and to render necessary the imperial approbation. The imperial prerogative at first was no more used than if it had no existence, and at the same time the autocrat gave up the profits of a fishery, and allowed a yearly sum of 2000*l.* per annum to be distributed amongst the sick,

the wounded, the widows, and the orphans. In twenty years hence, or probably in half that time, if nothing interrupts the march of events, the Cossac of the Don—at home—will be what the Muscovite is now, and he will no longer present to our view the frank and joyous countenance of the descendant of generations of conscious freemen, but we shall see him crouching beneath the yoke of all those vexatious institutions which are the portion of the Russian slave. His brethren are too far from the centre of the empire, and too indispensable yet, for even Nicholas to hazard, for a long time, subjecting them to the fate which is very shortly reserved for the children of the Don, and towards which the first great step is taken.

CHAPTER VI.

MILITARY STRENGTH OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE.

THE Cossacs of the Ural and of Orenburg, have mingled with and assumed the habits of the *Kirguise*, the most warlike of the Mogul or Tartar races, just as their brethren on the Kouban have mixed with the Circassians.

Of the nations and tribes of Tartar origin contributing an irregular contingent to the military forces of the Russian empire, the principal are the Kirguise, who furnish regularly eight regiments, some of them of eleven squadrons strong, or of 1760 men, the Nogai Tartars, and the Baskirs. Not that they can ever form an addition worthy of notice to a European army, but that to forward schemes of Asiatic conquest, where distance and the desert are likely for a long time to be the only obstacles to Russian ambition, they may prove valuable as the pioneers and vanguard of invasion. When once the Russian government has succeeded in taming them as far as the Cossac is tamed, they may be pushed forward

advantageously, because these whole nations may be moved onwards together, like those which overran the declining Roman empire,—conquering, and rendering passable the wilderness before them ; and they will probably be employed in this service with the less hesitation, from the experience which proves that it is easier to people the wastes of Siberia by the introduction of prolific colonies of Sclavonic origin, than by riveting to the soil these Nomade hordes, whose increase, as a pastoral people, never very great, appears to diminish still further whenever they are forced to settle.

The whole of these three people amount to about a million, and constitute about one-half of the Tartar population of the whole empire. The Kirguise may be counted at nearly half a million of this number. They are divided into three hordes, differing only slightly from each other, and are confined to the vast steppes which extend north of the Caspian shores, between the Ural and the Wolga. Of all the Tartar tribes, they shew less of that physical and moral inferiority which has long been yielding by degrees the Empire of Zinghis and of Tamerlane to the Children of the West. There is a portion of them still whose submission is only nominal, but, parked in between two lines of Cossacs, it is becoming every day more real. They are distinguished by their excellent horses, of which vast herds constitute their chief wealth, and by their peculiar peaked hats, the rim of which, before and behind, forms a long double point like a swallow's tail. They profess the Mussulman creed, but, like all wandering people, are indif-

ferent to it, and the Kirguise warrior, when he returns fatigued from the chase, in which he hunts the wolf with a trained and hooded eagle, does not even take the trouble of reciting his orisons ; for, with the bribe of one of his fat-tailed sheep, the priest or mollah writes the appropriate prayer upon a strip of parchment, and the devotee, sticking it at the end of his lance, plants the weapon in the sand before his tent, and leaves it to the winds which sweep over the steppe to carry his petition to the God of Mahomet.

The Kirguise would prove as formidable as any other Eastern cavalry of the plains ; but this is not the case with the Baskirs, or with the Calmucks, whose origin is purely Mongul, and which, since the sudden emigration of six hundred thousand of their tribe beyond the Russian territory in the reign of the Empress Catherine, are reduced to an insignificant number. Both the Baskirs and the Calmucks afford such degraded specimens of humanity, that the Russian peasant or soldier, with whom the foreign artisan or servant when transported to Russia indignantly refuses to eat, declines in his turn to share the repast of the Calmuck or the Baskir with as much disgust as if required to feed with a dog. There is probably nothing in nature but the jackal—which prowls about the encampment where this scene is sometimes witnessed, when the wealthy Russian officer has with him a foreign valet, and the Calmucks who attend to his tent equipage—with which this despised and filthy race would have any right to refuse to feed.

From Finland the Russians draw an excellent infantry, which, as long as not employed against the Swedes, with whom all their sympathies are enlisted,

might prove exceedingly useful. Under the Swedish rule we find the Finns in the armies of Gustavus Adolphus distinguishing themselves as his steadiest troops upon the plains of Leipsic and of Lutzen ; and his famous yellow Finnish regiments were the first troops ever clad in uniform. Of late years, amongst its Finnish regiments, the Russian government has first instituted a rifle corps, which in the Polish campaigns proved so effective that it is likely to be considerably augmented. As marksmen, these Finnish rifles are very inferior to the men of our British rifle brigade ; although Bremner, one of the two or three travellers in Russia whose book has been found worth in any way citing, was hoaxed by a ridiculous story of their bringing down birds upon the wing with the rifle ball. Their inefficiency as marksmen was partly occasioned by the defective nature of their arms. These have recently been altered under the superintendence of an Englishman patronised by Paskevitch, in consequence of the complaints made by General Ramsay, their commander, a Russian of Scottish origin.

Russian rifle corps will probably never succeed, from the individual character of the soldier, who feels lost as soon as he leaves the protection of his masses ; and on this account, the light infantry of the Russian army has always proved as bad as her light cavalry was excellent.

The skill with the rifle of the Russian peasantry of some of the northern governments has been frequently reported as peculiarly fitting them for this service ; but in reality it has no existence. It is true that the mountains of game—of Capercaillie, black-cock and

tree-grouse, or reb-chick—which are piled up, frozen, in the winter markets, are all shot with the rifle ball. The peasants rudely forge and bore these rifles themselves; unwittingly they adopt the true principle on which the rifle ought to be constructed, by making the barrel very heavy in proportion to the bore, which varies from eighty to a hundred and twenty, or, in other words, is only large enough to contain a bullet weighing the eightieth or one hundred and twentieth part of a pound. These barrels they fit into a rude stock, and fasten on it an old musket-lock, sometimes lashed on with a piece of leather, or of birch bark. These pea-rifles, like all rifles, heavy in the barrel in proportion to the bore, carry very true, but, like all very small bored rifles, they only carry true a comparatively short distance.

The moujik generally fires at objects from fifteen to five-and-twenty yards removed from him; but the traveller, when he sees him bring down the different varieties of the grouse from the tops of tall trees, (for even the black-cock, which in Scotland frequents the moor, in Russia perches on the trees,) is apt to form an exaggerated idea of his skill, without reflecting that the reb-chick, the size of a partridge, which he has brought down from the summit of a pine-tree seventy-five feet in height, was only twenty-five yards from him, a distance which, point blank, would appear ridiculously near.

Of all people, the Muscovite peasantry are least skilled in any exercise, or in the use of any sort of weapon, if we except driving and the use of the axe. From the dexterity with which the moujik handles the axe, whenever he is driven to use this pacific

instrument offensively, it becomes a most effective arm. Stumbling suddenly, in a tangled wood, on the den of the bear, he has been known at one blow to cleave its skull, and if he had the nerve and hardihood of the Spanish bull-fighter, he could easily arrest, by one stroke, the course of a furious bull in full career.

To sum up, the military force of the Russian empire, as it is said to stand at present embodied, consists of—

INFANTRY.

1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th corps, consisting each of 3 divisions, of 4 regiments each, each regiment composed of 7 battalions, 4 of which are effective, numbering 1000 men.	
Thus, 288 battalions of 72 regiments of the line in the active army	288,000 men.
Two reserve corps, composed of the 5th and 6th battalions of 72 regiments of the line, number- ing, on the peace establishment, 500 men each, 144 battalions	72,000
Depot battalions of 72 regiments	36,000
Garrison corps and sappers and miners, 60 bat- talions	60,000
Infantry of the imperial guards, 12 regiments, at 3 battalions each, and 4 battalions of sappers, miners, rifles, and veterans—40 battalions . .	40,000
Infantry of the grenadier regiments, 12 regi- ments, 4 battalions each	48,000

SPECIAL CORPS.

Infantry of the Caucasus, 12 regiments	48,000
“ of Orenburg 4 “	16,000
“ of Siberia 4 “	16,000
“ of Finland 4 “	16,000
Regiments of instruction, model corps, and cadet corps	20,000
Total of infantry on the peace establishment .	<u>624,000</u>

REGULAR CAVALRY.

24 regiments of cavalry attached to the six active corps of the line.

24 regiments of cavalry of reserve.

12 regiments of cavalry of the guards.

12 regiments of cavalry of the grenadier corps.

2 regiments—Caucasian dragoons and model regiments.

These 74 regiments; at 9 squadrons each, at 160 men per squadron, give us 1440 men per regiment, and a consequent cavalry force of . . . 103,680 men.

ARTILLERY AND ENGINEER CORPS.

Reported to employ 55,000

The field artillery comprises—

Flying artillery, 50 batteries, or 400 guns—viz.

6 in the guard and grenadier corps.

12 in the 6 armies of the line.

12 in the reserve cavalry.

10 attached to the local battalions.

10 of Don Cossacs and Asiatic governments.

Field artillery, 165 batteries, or 1320 guns—viz.

90 attached to the line.

27 to the corps of reserve.

48 to the frontier armies of the Caucasus, Siberia, and Finland.

IRREGULAR HORSE.

140 regiments of Cossacs	} 116,800
6 regiments of Baskirs, at 800 men per regiment	
8 regiments of Kirguise, at 1600 men per regiment, auxiliaries, Turcomans, Kuzzil-bashes, &c.	20,000

Irregular cavalry 136,800

THE MILITARY COLONIES.

The military colonies were reported, in 1839, to consist of 360,000 males, divided into seven classes, of which four are armed, mounted, and equipped, as recruits, soldiers, or veterans. Their real force, as elsewhere stated, is uncertain; but there is reason to believe that it is not less than in 1836, in which it comprised 20 regiments of cavalry. About 12,000 males furnish a cavalry regiment; its active force composed of men embodied for fifteen years, forms a regular regiment of 1200 men; its mounted reserves and veterans amount to 3000 more. We have thus 4200 men per regiment 84,000 men.

As it stands on paper, the military force of the Russian empire is therefore somewhat as follows:—

624,000 infantry.

103,000 regular cavalry.

135,000 irregular ditto.

55,000 artillery and engineers.

130,000 miscellaneous force, comprising regiments of military colonies, gendarmerie, district companies, horse and foot, custom-house patrols, soldiers' children, &c.

Total, 1,057,000 men: supposed to be armed, disciplined, and organized, on the peace establishment.

To these, on the first signal of war, must be added 500 men to each of the 5th and 6th, or reserve battalions of the 72 regiments of the line, or 72,000 men; but these are only designated and liable, and yet undisciplined.

These statements are only approximative to those officially given by the war-office, which itself is in the

dark as to the real number of men it has under arms, besides being solicitous to conceal what it does know with certainty.

The opinion of an officer long employed in this department supposed the force in reality under arms to amount, in round numbers, to

450,000 infantry.

85,000 regular cavalry.

50,000 artillery and engineers.

100,000 irregular cavalry.

100,000 military colonies and miscellaneous force.

Total, 785,000, including all reserves, veterans, and invalids.*

It is, of course, a matter of impossibility, and it may be added, of little importance, to ascertain the accuracy of these conflicting statements. It is of little importance to consider anything but the official organization of this army, because, although the fraud of its administration may reduce its numbers in time of peace, the framework exists, and is, at least, kept in working order, and everywhere the commanders of regiments keep themselves vigilantly prepared to fill up the gaps in their ranks, on the first rumour of war, to the full compliment of men and horses. The immense establishment with which the government, at all events, is saddled, far from adding to its strength, renders it, on the contrary, by exhausting the resources of the country, only weaker against the day of trial. If it had only one hundred thousand men under arms,

* Another equally credible authority still further reduces them by supposing the whole force of the empire not to exceed 750,000 armed and disciplined men, including the marine force.

instead of a million, it would be more formidable, because its coffers would be better filled. The maintenance of a force disproportionately large in a state may be compared to the overstraining of a bow, by keeping it perpetually strung. There are, it is true, many feeble continental states, whose independence can only be secured at such a sacrifice, because, if taken unprepared, they might be swallowed up by the first sudden waves of a political storm. With such states, nationality and independence may be the policy of their princes, but becomes the folly of the nation, whose true interest must lie in a federative union with some similarly situated people.

Of all countries, Russia, isolated by the immense distances from her centre to her frontier, least requires to keep up a large army, if her policy were unambitious, or even if her ambition were not impatient. Though one tithe of the force which at present burthened her would amply suffice for all purposes of defence, the very distance to be traversed to reach her would prove some protection to her neighbours, and thus, although ten or twenty years of such invigorating peace would assure to her the certainty of prodigiously increased strength, by ceasing to overawe her neighbours, she would lose that present influence derived from the terror she inspires, together with all those immediate fruits of her policy to which so much of her future power and prosperity is sacrificed.

This is the natural result of the predominance of an individual over a national interest. Perhaps on the whole this may be fortunate, if not for the nation, at least for humanity. A thoroughly autocratic

government would have otherwise too many advantages over those of free states ; the policy of a democratic or constitutional government, influenced by the spirit of party, can scarcely ever be calculated to meet a remote contingency. A tsar brought up in maxims of traditional policy, and able to follow it out, may continue, as, in some respects, the Russian sovereigns have done, to walk in the footsteps marked out by the great Peter. It is difficult to say, if we reflect upon the subject, what monstrous improbabilities such unanimity of aim and purpose, if universal, might not in the course of years accomplish ; but fortunately even a Russian cabinet, or a Russian tsar, seldom for any lengthened period act as they might act to secure the greatest ulterior advantages, when these advantages prove too remote.

It has been more than once repeated in the preceding pages, that the Russian policy is governed not by the interest of a nation, or even a portion of a nation, but by that of a family, and therefore it can never be expected that the national interest should be attended to, where not identified with it. But even where these interests are identified, it does not always follow that they are attended to. There are the personal feelings of the autocrat, the gratification of his individual ambition, to interfere with them. He is tempted to be impatient and premature, because the life of the man is limited, and he cannot resist the lure of present success and aggrandizement, although at the expense of greater and more certain advantages, which might only accrue to his family in another generation.

Thus the extraordinary and oppressive outlay which is occasioned by the maintenance of the colossal military force of Russia, is not calculated to advance in the best manner either the interests of the country, or of the house of Romanoff, whether we view them to consist in the improvement of the empire, or in its extension, or in both. This really exhausting and weakening show of strength is kept up to influence and overawe its neighbours. Backed by it, the Russian policy makes some immediate progress and conquests, which satisfy the ambition of the emperor, and he may reconcile the unequal sacrifice of the future to the present, by the reflection that he is watchful, and ready to profit by the events which the chapter of accidents may throw in his way.

It is stated by the advocates of the imperial policy, in ex enuation of the monstrous force which drains the strength of the country,—firstly, that on account of the vast extent of the Russian empire, unless it maintained a complete army on each frontier it could exercise no political influence in Europe ; and, secondly, that the cost of the soldier is so trifling in Russia, as to be only half that of the Prussian, and one fifth of that of the English soldier.

The first argument has been already answered, by the attempt to shew that at such a sacrifice it is not the real interest, even of Russian ambition, to influence or overawe its neighbours. As regards the second, it must be remembered that although the cost of the soldier in Russia averages, per annum, only about $5l.$, in Prussia $10l.$, in France $15l.$, and in England $25l.$; the soldier of Prussia and of France is a defen-

sive, and therefore may be considered a necessary instrument; the destination of the Russian soldier is offensive, he is therefore a superfluity. It may be true that one English foot soldier costs nearly as much as five Russian. But if five or six Russians are maintained for one, the positive outlay is still greater: comparatively, Russia can six times less afford it.

If, in the estimation taken of European soldiers, we are to calculate the cost of labour, and not the rate of wages, more work is done for a given price by the English soldier than by any in the world. Russia most strongly exemplifies the paradoxical truth which so many continental states more or less demonstrate —namely, how *dear the low priced soldier may be.*

The real strength of Russia, if, “turning her swords into ploughshares,” she would fill her coffers, whenever roused to action, would lie in twenty millions of Muscovite peasants, from whom she would draw any number required of such soldiers as we have described; as it is, she wants both officers to command them and funds to set large armies in motion, and, if she possessed the funds, a class to whom she could intrust the proper application of them. This class she has yet to form, because it does not exist within her dominions. The means which must be taken to form it, would require a change in the spirit which renders her government so justly odious to civilized Europe, and at the same time it is a query if they would not necessarily lead to her dismemberment. Her strength would lie in half a million of cavaliers, whom she might form into an overwhelming mass of excellent

cavalry,—were not these, for the same reasons, more difficult to move than her infantry.

In short, if Russia had one tithe of the wealth, or if she could dispose of the services of such trust-worthy servants as the government of England can command, the most attentive meditation on the subject could discover no human obstacle which could eventually arrest the universal spread of her dominion. But as she cannot do so, the strength of this gigantic body, whose nerves want, and must continue wanting, vigour to set in motion that vast muscular power which it is fearful to contemplate whilst the giant is in repose, is in reality very limited, and she can only become formidable by the fears of Europe, its apathy, disunion, and the effect of her Machiavelian policy working skilfully upon these. Her actual military strength has, in point of fact, diminished ; for it is questionable, in the opinion of those who have studied it, whether she could now send forth an army as powerful (the author does not mean in point of numbers) as that which overran the north of Italy half a century ago.

If we now retrace as briefly as possible the military history of Russia, we shall find the confirmation of many assertions which may have appeared novel and startling in the foregoing pages. Before the reign of Peter we find the Muscovite people giving evidence, through a long course of centuries, of being a race not very martially inclined. They appear only to have owed their national existence to their numbers, and the bond of a religion differing from that of all their neighbours, which bound them together ; for they

appear never to have been able to defend it otherwise than by a passive and inert resistance, and a tenacity of life which endured longer than the aggressions of their enemies. We find their country constantly overrun by handfulls of Poles and Swedes, or by invasions of Tartars.

Previously to that epoch we find the Strelitzes, the flower of their army, cruel and turbulent, but never brave. This body, which rendered itself so formidable to the tsars, and played so often the part of the Praetorian guards of Rome, of the Mamelukes of Egypt, and of the Turkish janissaries, was, however, very different from them in its constitution, its pay being nominal, (five shillings per annum,) but having the monopoly of commercial privileges. They were equally terrible to their sovereigns and the people. Every page of Russian history is full of their seditions, and the arsenals of St. Petersburg and Moscow still contain the ears armed with seythes, like those of the ancient Britons, with which they were wont to clear the streets of the populace. At Narva they fled, with the rest of the army, 80,000 strong, posted behind retrenchments, and protected by one hundred pieces of cannon, before the attack of 8000 Swedes. When they afterwards revolted against Peter, they made a feeble resistance against the handful of regulars of General Gordon, though fighting for their very lives.

As long as anything depended on individual courage, we see the Russian troops cutting a very sorry figure. But the scene soon changes; with the introduction of European discipline a new era commences for the Russian arms. At Pultava, although it is true the

Muscovites were three times the numbers of their adversaries, that they were intrenched, and supported by 140 pieces of cannon, against an enemy who had none ; though their forts were carried ; though their cavalry was routed ; we see the *masses of the Russian infantry* acting for the first time, and deciding the victory ; which, although won against a worn-out and inferior army, and a leader carried to battle on a brandard, was not the less a glorious one, when we consider that the army defeated was the Swedish, and its leader Charles the Twelfth.

From this time forward, we begin to find the Russian armies playing an important part in Europe. A few years after, under the Danish Marshal Munich, we find them already placing the crown of Poland on the head of Augustus. But although their discipline rendered them formidable in Europe, the campaign of Munich against the Turks and Tartars shews that no personal valour animated his troops. He found so many falling sick to avoid encountering the dangers of the Southern Steppes, that he resorted to the most barbarous means to strike terror into the breasts of these truants. We read of his causing soldiers who had fallen ill to be *buried alive* in the front of his army, and of his chaining general officers to the guns upon the march. At the storming of Ochacow we find him obliged to turn his cannon against his own troops, to make them enter the breach. Yet these were the very troops whose disciplined and steady masses nothing in Poland could oppose.

In the next reign, in 1757 and 1758, the Russian armies, first under Apraxin, and then under Fermer

and Soltikoff, are opposed to those of Frederick the Second of Prussia; a man who nearly a hundred years ago had brought the military art in all its branches almost to what it is at the present day, and who first knew really the use of artillery in the field; and we find the greatest general of his age always baffled or defeated by the steadiness of the Muscovites, whose leaders neither knew how to manœuvre during the battle, nor to take advantage of victory afterwards; always carefully imitating, (as the Russian generals have done so often since,) the disposition of Peter at Pultava, without any regard to the peculiarities of the field on which they fought, and never making one movement which was worthy of the monarch against whom they fought, or which did not display their ignorance or timidity, excepting that by which Soltikoff effected his junction with the Austrian generals, Laudon and Haddick. Where all the skill was on one side, the success on the other,—a success which did not vary under three successive generals,—the fact speaks volumes for the excellence of the Russian armies; and yet, under Munich, they had shewn that individual valour had a very small share in this excellence.

In the reign of Catherine, one of her armies of 17,000 men, headed by Romantzow, defeated a prodigious force of Turks and Tartars; and about this time arose a leader for her troops, whose genius, comprehending at once their peculiar character, enabled him to make the utmost of it—Suwarrow, whom posterity has learned to regard as a mixture of the soldier, the monster, and the buffoon. Brought up in the career of arms from his youth, and endowed

with that degree of unerring sagacity and inflexibility of resolution which cannot fail to lead to greatness; and well aware, from his long military experience of what is most required in war; he conceived the idea of working on the religious fanaticism and the superstition of the Russian soldier. He found that hitherto his most valuable qualities were fortitude and obedience, and a steadiness which was the result of fearing more to disobey his superiors than the danger which surrounded him. Suwarow succeeded in infusing into him a more lively principle of action, in inspiring him with a belief in the sanctity of his cause, which led with many to a contempt of death, which fanaticism is as likely to give rise to in the timid as in the bold; and in animating all with a superstitious confidence in himself, as the man called to conquer, and chosen by the Almighty will to lead them to victory. He attracted the attention of the army by innumerable eccentricities and buffooneries; and to become a conqueror, he consented to be regarded by his soldiers as half an idiot; but an idiot inspired by Heaven to lead its chosen people against the Turkish infidel, and the impious republican of France, who had denied his God. To all his most skilful movements he affected to give an air of chance, or rather of fatality; for he foresaw that, whatever his success, if attributed to its real cause, the soldier would never have had the same confidence in the infallibility of his military genius as in the infallibility of Heaven, which was supposed to guide him. On a cold winter's day, this general has been known, after giving the order to march, by imitating the

crowing of the cock, to mount on the bare back of a horse, with no other clothing but his shirt, and to lead his troops against the enemy. For years he had never carried watch or money about his person ; when he slept beneath a roof, it was on straw, and with all the windows open ; while drilling the troops, he dined on a crust of their black bread ; and the field-marshall of imperial armies was seen for whole days teaching his recruits their exercise, in his shirt sleeves, as if he had no duty more important to attend to. He was the Junius Brutus—not of freedom, but of ambition.

If Suwarrow made his warriors by turns tremble at his severity, and laugh at his buffoonery, it was evident that he also knew how to make them fight. Under his command, the two most dreadful assaults took place which modern history records,—those of Ismail and of the suburb of Praga ; and the same army which twenty years before could only be forced by batteries of cannon in their rear, to assault the feeble walls of Ochacow, is seen carrying at the point of the bayonet fortifications containing armies within almost as powerful as those attacking them from without, and at an expense of life which renders them unparalleled in history. In Poland, in Italy, and in Switzerland, during his wars, the Russian soldiers shewed an individual gallantry which they had never before been known to display ; they never surrendered, though surrounded, but died embracing the image of their saint, which was attached in an amulet to their necks. In these men, the republicans met with adversaries animated with an enthusiasm equal to their own, and

whose leader was endowed with a degree of boldness, of prudence, and a consummate skill, which turned the balance in their favour, and led them from victory to victory, until the defeat of the detached army of Khorsakof obliged Suwarrow to make that remarkable retreat before Massena which crowned his military reputation, and left his veterans the right to boast—as we have heard some of them do—that Suwarrow was never either *cold, afraid, or defeated*.

Suwarrow's career was, on the whole, so brilliant and so successful, that one cannot but regret that his extraordinary abilities should not have been devoted to a nobler cause. After his Turkish campaigns, he conquered Poland, although defended by the most able of her patriots—Kosciusko—the friend and companion in arms of Washington,—the man who, with six thousand Poles, withstood the assault of the whole Russian army on one occasion, and whose talents would probably have insured the independence of his country, had he not been opposed by a genius which, although the genius of rapine and conquest, was still more mighty than his own. At the moment that the Prussians had been forced to raise the siege of Warsaw, when fortune was beginning to favour the Polish arms, and the approaching winter would shortly have rendered all the roads impassable to the invading armies,—after a most obstinate struggle, we find the army of the Polish hero defeated, and himself made prisoner upon the field, losing with his own liberty the liberty of Poland.

In his subsequent campaigns in Italy, Suwarrow had to contend with the most successful troops in

Europe, commanded by the most skilful generals of their time. In a series of hard-fought battles against Moreau and Maedonald, he defeated and drove them before him,—not by dint of superior numbers or Austrian co-operation, as the French historians would disingenuously insinuate; for the reverse was often the case—that is to say, that, including the Austrians, he was in most instances inferior in force to the republicans, and that the Austrians, discouraged by incessant defeat, were despised both by their allies and their enemies. At Novi, in a sanguinary battle, he defeated the young and hopeful general of the republic, Joubert, who never quitted that fatal field. Weakened by a long succession of bloody combats, in which he had fought his way always victorious, he crossed the Alps, to effect in Switzerland a junction with the reinforcing army which Khorsakof had led from Russia, and with the aid of which he proposed to carry the war upon the territory of the republic. But Khorsakof proved the Asdrubal of the Muscovite Hannibal ; for, instead of bringing him the addition he had expected to his strength, he arrived in his camp as a fugitive, leading after him the wretched wreck of the defeat of Zurich.

This battle, in which the difference of the Russian leaders was throughout apparent, shewed also strikingly the peculiar spirit of the Russian soldier of that date. Broken up, and divided into small groups, they were mostly cut down without surrendering, and muttering their prayers when isolated, defended themselves till the last gasp. After the masterly retreat Suwarow made, when checked by this disaster, which

it never lay in his power to have controlled, he was recalled, and died in disgrace, after nearly half a century of uninterrupted successes.

Suwarow, instead of being the rough, untutored, and semi-barbarous soldier, which he did everything to make himself appear, or the monster of cruelty which the popular tradition of Western Europe represents him, was a man of liberal education, of subtle and sagacious mind, and whose persevering cunning induced him to play all his life, before the public, the singular part which he had thought proper to act. The habits of the character he had assumed had grown upon him: he had so long feigned the buffoon, the punster, and the man acting by impulse, that even all his communications with his sovereigns bore the impress of his grotesque originality; and Catherine and her court found in the captor of Ismael and of Praga, and in the conqueror of Poland, an obscene jester and a guard-house wit; until, casting aside this garment of folly, in the council he proved himself the eloquent politician, and the far-seeing statesman, as well as the sagacious soldier, and the man of execution. When campaigning in Italy, Suwarow, who was supposed to be as ignorant as his soldiers, was opening a correspondence with the Vendean insurgents in the west of France, to whom he wrote with his own hand, in the French language; and he owed not a little of his success in Italy to his policy.

That Suwarow was, like other great captains, heedless of bloodshed in the field, and reckless of human life, is undeniable; but he never, throughout his career, committed any act of more wanton cruelty than any

other of the generals of his time, whose conduct posterity has never thought of branding with this vice. It is true, a prodigious massacre took place at the storming of Ismael ; and on a similar occasion his troops put mercilessly to the sword ten thousand of the inhabitants and of the defenders of the suburbs of Warsaw. But this is one of the dreadful laws of war, which, when a place is taken by assault, the victorious soldiers seldom fail enforcing, and which many years after we find the Duke of Wellington unable to prevent his men from carrying into execution in all its most sanguinary horrors at the taking of St. Sebastian, against the friendly Spanish population within it. He is reproached with quietly taking a bath whilst the massacre was going on in the streets of Praga, and with having, whilst the Turkish city was paying the same fearful penalty, penned to the Empress Catherine an account of his success, in the well-known laconic epistle, consisting of two doggrel rhymes, which translate literally—

Glory to God, and glory unto you!
The fort is taken, and I am in it—too!

But these acts prove only indifference in Suwarow to the suffering around him—an indifference which must be pretty general amongst those who mingle in such scenes, but argues no wanton delight in it. His address to the empress, which Byron cites as so blasphemous, is no more so than the Te Deums and thanksgivings by which the Almighty is so impiously insulted, after every successful scene of murder and butchery, by nations far more civilized, and which

profess to be the enlightened followers of the mild doctrines of that Christ who ordered Peter to put up the sword of aggression, and who commanded his disciples, when they received a buffet on one cheek, to turn the other meekly towards their enemy. When the deputies from Warsaw came to Suwarrow, whilst the sack of the suburb was proceeding, having obtained the terms of surrender which they proposed for the city—viz., that the lives and property of its inhabitants should be spared—they were hurriedly departing, when Suwarrow called them back: “ You have forgotten,” he said, “ to stipulate an amnesty for the past ; I grant it you.”

In the course of his campaigns in Poland, Suwarrow performed several generous acts, such as sending his own surgeon into a fort he was besieging, to attend to the commander, and curing a wounded officer of the hostile army in his own camp, and then giving him his liberty. That he held too cheaply human life to have spared it, where he could forward the execution of his projects, can be no more doubted of him than of most of the generals of his epoch ; but we have in vain searched his history to find any acts which would shew the innate barbarity with which his conduct has been stigmatized ; and we have fallen on a few actions, scattered through the pages of that turbulent life, which rather tend to prove the contrary.

After Suwarrow, we perceive the Russian armies more numerous on every field of battle, but far degenerated from what they had been under his command. At Austerlitz, under Koutousoff, who commits innu-

merable blunders, during the battle, though eighty thousand strong, they are signally defeated. If their obstinacy rendered the battle much longer undecided than those of Wagram or of Jena, and if it was gained by the evident superiority of Napoleon's genius, the Russian soldiers no longer shewed the same individual recklessness and enthusiasm which in the previous campaigns so animated them to fight to the last ; for, if we do not perceive them throwing down their arms by brigades and divisions, according to the pusillanimous example of their German allies, still nineteen thousand Russians surrender to the victor on the field.

After the utter defeat and dispersion of the Prussians at Jena and Auerstadt, the Russian armies which had advanced to their assistance are driven before the French at Czarnow, Mohrungen, Pultusk, and Golymin, but never signally beaten ; at Eylau, a drawn battle is the result of a sanguinary engagement ; and in the following spring, with great loss, and after a hotly-contested fight, the armies of Napoleon again conquer the Russians at Friedland. In Turkey, a Russian army, under Bragation, is defeated by the Turkish vizir, with a loss of ten thousand men. In the next great engagement, the Russians force the Turkish camp at Schoumla. In the memorable invasion of the Muscovite empire by Napoleon, we see nothing but indecision in the generals of her armies ; and with the exception in a few of the movements of Doctouroff and Bragation, a descendant of the kings of Georgia, we look in vain for any bold or clever combination.

At last, however, means were found to arouse the

religious fanaticism of the peasantry of the army. Koutousoff, the vanquished of Austerlitz, but one of the national party, and a man who was wisely an advocate for taking advantage of the fervid enthusiasm existing in the ranks of the soldiery by leading them to battle, was appointed to the command. The result was the battle of Borodino, the most obstinate and sanguinary of any which took place during all the wars of the last century; and it was rendered so by the fanatical excitement of the Russian troops, and of the newly-embodied peasantry marching in their first fight with the resolution of those who seek for martyrdom against opponents who were represented as the desecrators of their churches, and the enemies of their creed. This spirit, aroused by the artful policy of government, and confirmed by the sight of their own villages smoking around the track of the invaders, could at this period only have been awakened under similar circumstances; it rendered the raw recruit more formidable in that memorable contest than the old veteran, because he had drank more deeply of the patriotic and superstitious inspiration. If the efforts of the Russian army were not crowned with success, we must remember that they fought against the most select and imposing force which the French conqueror had ever collected together, and that he purchased his victory so dearly, that like that of Pyrrhus against the Romans, it was palpable that another such must have undone him.

This was the last field very glorious to the Russian arms. When the tide of war turned, and flowed back from the ruins of Moscow to the walls of Paris, in the

innumerable combats which led to this revulsion, the French armies, discouraged and overmatched by overwhelming numbers, proved indubitably that they would easily have triumphed singly over any of the continental allies, whose union rendered them too powerful for their shattered strength. The Russian troops, though still the most formidable of the coalition, were no longer the same as in the reign of Catherine and Paul, or else the armies of Napoleon's declining empire must have been superior to those of the young republic; which latter is a position that no one who has examined the subject will venture to assume.

The pages of Danilefsky, the late aid-de-camp of the Emperor Alexander, and the historian of his campaigns, furnish us a graphic, modest, and strikingly impartial account of this interesting war—an example of impartiality one would little expect a Russian general to set to military historians, and which it is a pity that he has not adhered to in all that relates to the emperor, his benefactor, on whose conduct his gratitude showers incessantly enthusiastic encomiums; although it must be added that this adulation of a man who is now only dust and ashes, if it shews that he has allowed his personal feelings to warp his private judgment, has at least none of the meanness of servility, and probably is bestowed in all the sincerity of truth, because the author is now in a kind of honourable disgrace with the present court, to which these lavish praises on his late sovereign have contributed.

We next find the Russians engaged in the Turkish war of 1828. They cross the frontier with 163,000

men. During the course of this campaign, the Turks shew on every occasion how their spirit, which animated them even in their last wars, has died away; they scarcely make one bold attempt in the field against their invaders; they appear to trust for their defence to rudely fortified towns, pestilence, climate, and that Providence which the Islamites seem of late years to forget, vouchsafes to assist only those who will attempt to help themselves. Before the small irregularly fortified town of Brailow, we find, for many weeks, all the efforts of the Russian army failing to reduce it; under the eye of the Grand Duke Michael, they endeavour to storm its walls, they are beaten back, and the garrison at last capitulates. The Emperor Nicholas commanded in person his army, which meets the Turkish forces near Boulanlouk; but all its efforts can only force them to retire to the circumvallation of their camp. Here the Russians do not venture to attack them. Varna is besieged for nine weeks, and Youssouf, who commands the fort, only gives it up to Russian gold; he retires into Russia; he receives a pension from the emperor; and it is only long after the peace that the Porte is obliged, at the demand of his victor, to receive back the traitor.

Let us contrast this with the campaigns of Suwarrow and Romantzow, who never united one-fourth of these forces in the field, against Turkish armies more warlike and more numerous; yet Suwarrow is seen storming the strong, well-garrisoned, and desperately defended Ismaël, when, in 1828, the army of Nicholas cannot carry the feeble walls of Brailow, neither can it succeed in defeating, in an open field, those very Turks whom Romantzow attacked in their own intrenched camp,

when with his small army he defeated the vizier, with 120,000 men.

The war proceeded as it had began ; the Russians repulsed the Turks at Tchorlau and at Schoumla, without being able to defeat them, at a prodigious loss of men, and without obtaining one single advantage. The inanity of their adversaries still allows them to advance. The next campaign opens with the Russians, under Diebitch, and the commander of the Turkish army, Reschid Pacha, takes the field with only 30,000 regulars, and some 60,000 irregulars, consisting of undisciplined and ill-armed vagabonds of every description. The decay of the power of the Ottoman empire, and her enfeebled condition, require no comment, when we find that this was all the force her utmost efforts could bring together in such an exigency. Near Devno, at Yeni Bazar, the demoralized Ottoman army easily gives way. At Kountefcha they make a more spirited resistance; they are defeated, but the turn of a straw would have decided the affair in their favour, to the destruction of the Giaours. Diebitch crosses the Balkan, and advances on Adrianople, which he occupies, and the panic of the Turks induces them to sue for peace, at the very moment when the effect of fatigues and disease, produced partly by the unfitness of the Russian soldiers to contend with these disadvantages, and partly by the incurable vice of the administration of the army, had so far enfeebled the invaders, that their *position had become highly critical*. The successes of Paskevitch in Asia, owing to his own activity and talent, and the ineffectual measures taken to oppose his advance, by striking terror into the

councils of the Porte, there is every reason to believe, alone changed into a triumph the disasters which awaited Diebitch Zabalkansky (Crosser of the Balkan). Of 40,000 men who crossed the Balkan with Diebitch, a third were lying sick a few weeks after. Of the troops drawn from the interior of Russia, and marched towards the Turkish frontier, 120,000 had melted away upon the road; of those who entered the Turkish territory, in Europe and Asia, during the two campaigns, 150,000 perished from fatigue and pestilence, and 25,000 by the sword.

The Polish revolution, in 1830, next led to the invasion of Poland by an army of 130,000 Russians under Diebitch Zabalkansky. At this time the predilection which Nicholas has always evinced for the Germans was so strong, that three-fourths of the chiefs of his forces, including Diebitch their commander, were Germans, and the names of Pahlen, Toll, Geissmar, Sacken, Rudiger, Rosen, and many more, attested a partiality highly offensive to the Russians. The Poles, who were never able to muster above 30,000 regulars altogether, or more than 50,000 men, including every species of auxiliaries, upon one field, fought with characteristic gallantry; at Gobie and Okouniew they retired, after a desperate resistance, before an immense numerical superiority. The battle of Wawre lasted two days; after a sanguinary combat both armies retained their positions, though the Russians had 70,000 men upon the field against 45,000 of their adversaries.

The Russian army was now increased to 200,000 men, besides reserve corps, which placed these effec-

tively at the disposal of Diebitch. At Seroczyn, Geismar was defeated by Dwernicki, and at the battle of Grochow, victory seemed at first to declare for the Russians; for a moment it was supposed that Diebitch would have taken possession of Praga, the suburb of the capital, but after a desperate struggle, he was repulsed and forced to retire. Geismar and Rosen were defeated by Skrzynecki before Warsaw with considerable loss, and again at Kostrzyn, and at Inganié. After many such indecisive affairs, we find the Poles defeated at Ostrolenka, and obliged to retreat on Warsaw; but, notwithstanding, Diebitch could effect nothing decisive, till death, either by poison or from natural causes, removed him from the scene of strife, and Paskevitch, the favourite of the Muscovite party, took the command.

The Poles, who had lost the flower of their army in successive battles, who were disunited amongst themselves, and without confidence in their leaders, after the battle of Warsaw, were forced to yield to the overwhelming numbers of the Russian army, and the boldness and skill displayed by its new leader. Unhappy Poland was again erased from the list of independent nations—her children reduced to slavery, except those few whose miserable exile still excites the compassion, as their conduct excited the admiration, of the world. But what, let us ask, would these modern Russian armies, which notwithstanding all these advantages had so much difficulty in subduing the Poles, have done, had their numbers been reduced to those of Suwarow's forces, or had they had a Kosciusko to contend with?

From the retrospection of the military annals of this ambitious power, amidst the accounts of fearful waste of human life, we may thus deduce this consoling fact, that the armies of Russia are no longer what they were, and that if they are still to be dreaded, they have grown no stronger as they have increased in size, but rather the reverse, like a venomous plant in the close air of a hot-house, where its sudden growth has only weakened the amount of its poison.

CHAPTER VII.

THE NAVY OF RUSSIA.

THE naval power of Russia, in itself unimportant, has some claims on the interest of a British reader, from the evidence which its very regulations, and a contemplation of the general policy of the Russian cabinet, afford us, that its government entertains the intention of seriously employing it, for the first time, against that of Great Britain.

If we consider the present relative condition of the maritime power and resources of all nations, and the vast changes which the introduction of steam navigation has effected in the naval art, we are impressed, 1stly, with the conviction that the superiority of England's power upon the seas over all the nations of the world has never been so great as at the present time; 2ndly, with that of the change which has taken place in the relative importance of naval supremacy, of which the effects, formerly limited, now entail the speedy and utter destruction of the adversary forced

to acknowledge it. Up to the last wars a conquered navy, though conquered, remained still formidable—still occupying the powerful fleets of its victorious antagonist to watch it for years in the harbour in which it had taken refuge, and though vanquished seldom entirely crushed, or even rendered harmless. The author believes it, in fact, to be the generally received opinion of those untrammelled by prejudices, who have carefully investigated the subject, that in the present state of the arts of navigation and destruction, whichever power asserts its incontrovertible superiority at sea, will, in a brief space, be not only supreme, but alone, and leave, in a few months, no hostile flag in rivalry on any of the waters of the ocean.

Steam, the use of hollow shot, and the perfection daily attained in concentrating the fire of broadsides, have rendered utterly insecure those fort-protected harbours in which the vanquished fleet found certain refuge, but in which they are now in no more security than the rabbit in its burrow from the inroad of the ferret. What wind or current can prevent the pursuer from steaming rapidly up, or being towed up by his innumerable steamer sea-horses? What land defences cannot, at the present day, be silenced or crumbled by the thunder of ships' batteries, when once brought to bear upon them? And this is to say nothing of the vast additional capabilities of steam mechanism to purposes merely destructive, when coupled with the substitution of iron for oak—iron which, stronger than oak, may be made in honey-combed compartments more buoyant than cork—

means yet undeveloped, from the fact of their greater applicability to the arts of war than to those of peace.

The past history of nations furnishes us with examples, where the less powerful or least successful of two adverse navies has proved, in the long run, even more advantageous than its victorious rival to the interests of the nation to which it belonged ; but their future history will have no such anomalies to record, for, from the present time, it is evident that any nation struggling with a great maritime power to which it is widely inferior, will find its navy not comparatively, but *utterly useless*. This fact, as well as that of the hopeless inferiority of any of the most powerful foreign nations in a naval struggle with the sea-might of Great Britain, is forcibly impressed on the master minds, and what we must venture to call the “directing intelligences” of these countries, although they may not always care to admit these convictions.

Without losing sight of the superior excellence of Danish, Dutch, and Swedish seamen over any other excepting our own, we may assume that there are only three other nations which, from the magnitude of their armaments, or the extent of their resources, are usually considered as *maritime powers*, however little they may be entitled to the epithet of Maritime States — France, Russia, and the United States.

It will be in the recollection of most of our readers, when war with the United States was last canvassed in England, and trumpeted forth with hot eagerness in the former country, how France, with which we were on terms of greater amity and cordiality than we had been for centuries (and towards which all animo-

sities and prejudices in our own population had long subsided,) rose as one man, uniting all her parties to join in the insensate cry, “that the hour of war with England and retribution against her was arrived.” This feeling was not alone the blind hatred of the ignorant, whose passions had been casually or artfully inflamed, but was shared by the mass of her statesmen, her orators, and generally of her talent, and took its rise with them from the conviction that in the event of war between Great Britain and the unaided States of North America, in the latter a presumptive ally must be destroyed, whose strength, united to that of France, might, in the hour of need, have enabled her to cope with that of Great Britain on the ocean.

Since even the preceding pages have been in the press, a pamphlet has appeared by the Prince de Joinville, which may be considered as fresh evidence of the preponderance of this insane war-party. He imagines the event of war with England, points out the necessity of increasing the steam navy of France, and dwells on the injuries it may inflict upon Great Britain. He commences—

“Taking therefore a state of war as the base of my reasoning, I shall pick out a case which will elucidate my thoughts; and I will suppose France obliged to defend herself against the most powerful of maritime powers—that is, against England. Having stated this, and proceeding according to this plan, but always reasoning in the abstract, and by way of hypothesis, I now enter into my subject.

“Who can doubt,” continues our author, “but that with a steam navy strongly organized, we have the

means of inflicting on our enemies' coasts losses and sufferings unknown to a nation which has never felt the miseries that war brings in its train? And at the close of these miseries England would suffer from another evil to which she is equally a stranger—that of lost confidence. The riches accumulated on her coasts, and in her ports, would have ceased to be placed in security."

Supposing him to have acted (as he has ostensibly done) against the wishes of his father, the Prince de Joinville is too well informed, or, at least, too well advised, to have thrown himself into the arms of any party which was not a powerful one; but it is more than probable that the influence which Louis Philippe exercises over his family would never have allowed, unless he had approved, the publication of this rallying cry from any of its members? Thoroughly acquainted as he has shewn himself with the best interests of his country, it is not meant to be insinuated that Louis Philippe is an advocate for war with England—far from it; perhaps no man in his situation could have been willing—no man able to do more to prevent it;—but this able politician is determined to ride the gathering storm whenever he shall not be able to allay it. If he dreads that the war-party may obtain the ascendancy, it is better for the interests of his house (and it may be added, that it will probably be none the worse for the interests of humanity) that some branch of his own family should endeavour to direct its fury, and, at least, thus divert the popular fury from sweeping it away.

An idea analogous to that entertained by a powerful

party in France, it can hardly be doubted, also animates the policy of the Russian cabinet ; and, at least, France and Russia consider both themselves and the United States, as far as regards their maritime power, like the divided rods of the lictor in the Roman allegory, which united, they hope, may baffle the strength of England, but which separately she may snap asunder at her pleasure. If the hope of successfully measuring even the united naval strength of these powers against that of Great Britain be, as we believe it, fallacious, we must admit that the more just the appreciation of her strength by them, the more imperiously their policy will dictate the expediency, whenever one of them is engaged with the Leviathan sea power of England, of not neglecting an opportunity of assailing it, which will never occur again so favourably when one of them is destroyed. Between following, in the present state of maritime affairs, this line of conduct, whenever the prejudice and ignorance of a national majority in France, or the United States, may force the statesmen of these countries into a war, and that of abandoning all idea of cultivating navies before the vast ascendancy of England, we must confess that no alternative is reasonable.

England must, therefore, look forward to the probability, in assailing any of these three nations, to being assailed by all of them, and involved in a struggle which will decide the empire of the watery world. With regard to its results—we have, on the one hand, France with her immense inferiority of seamen ; we have the United States, our rebellious

firstborn, the flesh of our flesh and blood of our blood, nearest to us in resources, superior to us in energy, *but almost without a native sailor*, and little likely for half a century to possess any but such as they now employ—men seduced by high wages from our own flag, and whose services—a matter of purchase—our superior capital would always enable us, when worth while, to purchase back by outbidding their employers.*

These sturdy republicans—comparatively without a *sea steamer* or a native seaman—are yet the most formidable of our antagonists, by reason of the facilities the numerous works employed to construct her countless lake and river boats and locomotives afford for building steam-boats.

We have Russia, with her fleets numerically large, but whose deplorable weakness and contemptible condition it is our purpose to describe.

On the other hand, we have Great Britain, with treble the amount of sailors (not men-of-war's men) of these three nations combined; a land which could put to sea, if required, four times the number of steamers of all the world combined, and who, if her people chose, alone of all the world could find the funds to equip such gigantic armaments.

* All acquainted with the subject are aware that the comparatively high remuneration afforded in the United States to all manual labour on land prevents any native American from serving as a man before the mast; nearly all American sailors are therefore mates, officers, or shareholders. They are equally aware that although their fresh-water steam-boats are so numerous, their sea boats may be reckoned by tens.

Confident as any comparison of our naval resources, if even we compare them with those of the united world, must leave us of our strength, it should not blind us to the probabilities of its being assailed. The fortunate discovery of steam to a land of inexhaustible coal, and iron, and industry, and a proud pre-eminence to start with in this new career, must give her, by the natural course of things, the undivided empire of the waves; where she has been the proud arbitress, she must become the sole and absolute mistress. But it is not to be expected that the rest of the world will let their share of the ocean's empire, which they see daily escaping from them, be usurped without one last blow to retain it. It cannot be expected that they will bow to the inevitable fate of which the future offers the prospect, whilst their sanguine hopes may still see in their united energy a last chance of averting it.

We who feel in England that we have made even greater progress in the universal appreciation of human rights, and, consequently, in cosmopolitan feeling, than we have in the positive and utilitarian sciences, cannot but regret that France, the Athens of our modern Rome, with which our real interests, once opposed, in the future, like two diverging lines, can never come in contact, should force on us a fruitless war, bootless to herself and injurious to us in common with humanity, by arousing fresh enmities, and checking that civilization and enlightenment to the progress of which the union of these nations is so essential, and to which the genius, the talent, and the learning of her children so powerfully contribute. We may

regret, but we cannot be surprised at, such an eventuality. We may lament that war may arise from the conceit and arrogance of American mobs, intoxicated by the adulations of those flatterers to which the plenitude of power gives rise in a democracy the same as in a despotism, and from whom it has an equal tendency to conceal unpalatable truths, and acting the more readily on a semi-educated nation, where an ignorant man is as scarce as a well-educated one. Education, as we have too often experienced, acts sometimes in the inverse ratio of those medicines which, taken in large quantities, are poisonous ; education being poisonous only in the smaller doses, medicinal in the large.

Let us not, however, be understood as guilty of the sacrilege of advancing an argument against the spread of knowledge ; for it is obvious that the small dose must be taken before the larger one, of which we must all acknowledge the efficacy and merit. We may regret that war may arise, which, without benefiting humanity, will, for so many years, retard the prosperity of a young and thriving people. But we must acknowledge that predispositions to it exist in the envy, vanity, and ignorance of its democracy, no less than in the wounded pride of the French people, to whom we, the conquerors in a Titanic struggle which afforded them an ample harvest of glory, extend the hand of fellowship, willing as such to bury in oblivion injuries which, as the conquered, we might still as surely and acutely feel.

This feeling it has not been the lightest task of the statesmen of these nations to restrain ; but it is unfor-

tunately obvious that the bold and unscrupulous politician, when a favourable opportunity presents itself, influenced by the considerations into which we have entered, will only have to rouse and give the rein to them when the fitting moment is arrived.

With regard to Russia, which, like a vast inanimate body, has not a breath of feeling to animate it, excepting that which, galvanic-like, its government inspires, it is naturally more difficult to gather indications of its future conduct ; and we are led to place an emphasis on signs which, in a free country, would be unworthy of consideration. For instance, the jealous despotism of Russia advances aliens and foreigners, without credit, kin, or influence in the country, to all offices of responsibility, in preference to her native subjects. Russia appreciates the services of British adventurers in every branch of her civil and military administration, excepting the naval, for which their peculiar adaptation is obvious. From this career, which is open to all other foreigners, of late years they have been strictly excluded. We cannot, therefore, doubt that Russia,—who, finding in British power the great obstacle to her aggrandizement at half the points of the compass, has, in the conceit of her cabinet, swollen her natural enmity into rivalry,—has not been the last of those who have understood the moral of the allegory of the licitor's rods. Whilst we, therefore, appreciate and acknowledge the colossal resources of England's maritime power, and the certainty, as far as human calculation can avail, not only of her unshakeable security, but of her eventual triumph against all and any external foes, we see in them no security

that her power will not be once more assailed ; and on this account we think that there are things which an English public neglect, which, independently of the technical interest they afford, an English public should study,—we mean the real amount of the nation's strength when it chooses to exert it, and the strength or weakness of those who, before becoming brethren, will be yet arrayed against it as enemies and rivals.

It is far from the verge of improbability that we may yet see a Russian navy, with its fifty thousand sailors, arrayed against us, amongst other foes, startling, if not alarming, our countrymen ; and it is, therefore, well that they should learn what value to put upon that thing of “shreds and patches,” woven into the scarecrow giant's form, which, seen from a distance, indistinct and dim, looks awful—but, closely viewed, becomes merely ludicrous to the beholder. It is, however, difficult to give an account of the Russian navy, any more than of any of the other national institutions of this country, without reverting to the man who was the founder of them all, and within the narrow circle of whose biography the history of the most brilliant period of their existence is contained.

When Peter the First, who, savage and barbarian as he was, so well deserved the name of Great, stood on the islands of the Neva's Delta, the newly-conquered soil of Ingria, still within reach of the hostile Swedish cannon, and resolved to build there a city and a fleet, possessing then no outlet to the Great Northern Sea but the one river whose marshy banks and islets he occupied, and exposed to the aggression

of a redoubtable enemy, in whose very teeth it would be necessary to complete his undertaking, there was a boldness in the conception which success has justified. When, a few years after, he made his triumphal entry into the new capital which had risen up from the morass—palaces and dwellings having sprung up where only the bull-rush raised its head, and the acclamations of a vast population greeting him on the spot where only the cry of the sea-mew and the voice of the marsh-frog fell formerly upon his ear—history tells us that it was on the occasion of a naval victory, obtained over the Swedes with the very fleet of which a few years before he only contemplated the construction. Towards the accomplishment of this design he had neither a single artisan to construct, a sailor to man, or a port to harbour the ships, which were still trees in the forest. When we remember these things we must confess that the annals of the past offer no parallel to the boldness of the idea or the success of its execution, except in the solitary instance of the rise of the Roman naval power, in the face of the Carthaginian supremacy. Indiscriminately as the wisdom and talent of this man have been praised in all his actions, by the enthusiasm of his admirers,—for in Russia whole canals are pointed out as having been dug, whole vessels as having been constructed, by the sole labour of his hands,—and overrated as his merits have been, the real grandeur, hardihood, and skill of his efforts to create a maritime power defy the panegyrics of his warmest eulogists to exaggerate.

The genius of Peter was essentially nautical, and

whatever may be related of his early aversion to the water, through his after-life he gave ample evidence that it was his natural element, his marked predilection for everything concerning it proving instinctive of the peculiar tendency of his talent in that direction. Setting aside all the fables of contemporary flattery, and of the adulation of posterity, which attribute to him the personal execution of Herculean labours, and a skill as universally comprehensive as it was marvellous, we may distinctly gather that he was really one of the boldest and cleverest seamen of his time, and acquainted, in the minutest details, with all the collateral branches of his profession relating to the construction of fleets,—an advantage which few men, if any, have ever combined in the same degree, and which in his situation, perhaps, alone enabled him to perform what he did. Peter—at once the despotic sovereign, the shipwright, the sailor, and the pilot—succeeded in building an excellent fleet, which his liberality gained over a due proportion of foreign officers and seamen to man, whilst his discrimination and knowledge of the subject allowed him to distinguish the exact ability of those he employed. He himself commanded: skilful and bold as an admiral, he was at the same time the supreme arbiter of reward and punishment. Thus, with a fleet which he had just created, he defeated the navy of a warlike nation, whose flag had been already formidable on the waters a thousand years before.

It must, however, be admitted that the Swedes, who as soldiers have performed the most remarkable exploits of any nation whatsoever, both in point of

talent and bravery, at sea have distinguished themselves more by reckless gallantry than by skill; and if surpassed by none in valour, they have certainly held a nautical rank inferior to the English, the Dutch, and the Danes. Peter rendered his fleet decidedly superior to that of Sweden, and from his contests with it we may take the measure of the naval power which he had the merit of thus calling suddenly into existence, to occupy a very prominent station in the European scale. Far from keeping the promise of its early and auspicious years, the infancy of the Russian navy proved the most brilliant period of its existence. Since the days of Peter it has never shewn itself so formidable as under his command; and in recent times it has so far degenerated as to be one of the very worst in Europe. Although it consists of fifty sail of the line, and though these have fifty thousand armed men to work them, if it were necessary to hold two-thirds of the number in commission, so small would be the proportion of even tolerable seamen on board each ship, that they would be about as ill-managed as the Chinese war-junks. Independent of this, two-thirds of the vessels constructed in the Baltic are too rotten to put to sea. But even if this were remedied, the deficiency of proper crews cannot be so.

It was, no doubt, the idea of Peter, when he founded the Russian navy, that it would be supported by a commercial marine, which he might naturally suppose would flourish with such an extent of coast as he appropriated to Russia on the shores of the Gulf of Finland, where every material for ship-build-

ing existed in abundance, and where an extensive trade would soon have furnished ample occupation for a merchant fleet, if early measures had been taken to afford it sufficient protection against foreign competition. But the successors of Peter, who were no sailors themselves, could never be convinced that it is beyond the power of a tsar to make a sailor by ukase; and therefore, entirely neglecting their merchant service, which was the only school for them, they never thought of removing the social obstacles which insuperably opposed its prosperity, and contented themselves with building fine ships, sending soldiers to man them, and hiring the services of foreign officers to command their fleets.

The obstacle we allude to, which prevents, and has always prevented, the Russian from adopting a seafaring life, if, indeed, it offered sufficient inducements to remove the prejudices natural to a nation of landsmen, is simply the fact of his servitude. Almost every Russian of the labouring class is, and always has been, a slave, whom his master will not trust abroad, and who without his permission cannot leave the country; and of late years, since the effect of this state of things has been too clearly perceived, the jealousy of all foreign intercourse which has sprung up, and which dreads "the march of opinion," more than the inefficiency of the fleet, has prevented any thoughts of remedying the evil. In the whole of the Baltic there is, therefore, no such thing known as a Russian sailor serving on board a merchantman; the crews of the few vessels engaged in commerce being composed exclusively of Finns, Germans, Danes, and

Swedes. It is true there is a law which obliges every vessel sailing under Russian colours to have a Russian captain. But, whether the ship belong to a Russian, or, as is generally the case, to a foreign owner, a peasant, who does not, perhaps, know the head from the stern of the ship, is engaged as nominal captain, receiving a salary of thirty shillings a month; and as soon as the vessel goes out of port he is sent down to sleep in the fore-cabin, resigning the command to a Finn or a foreigner, to whom he very often acts as cook.

The sailors for the Russian navy are, therefore, recruited in the same manner as the soldiers for the army, from the class of agricultural peasants. Obliged in the Baltic, by the ice, to remain utterly inactive for half the year, and in the Black Sea for several months, on account of its periodical storminess, they are destined to act half as sailors and half as soldiers, and, perfectly military in their organization, habits and uniform, are disciplined to the use of the musket and the infantry evolutions, much in the same manner as our own marines. They are formed into equipages, which represent regiments or battalions, and into companies. They are dressed in stiff military coats, or great coats, very tight at the collar and waist, and this seaman-like costume is completed by boots, and a heavy glossy leather chako, which may serve as a fire-bucket, of which it has much the appearance.

Of the 50,000 sailors employed in the navy, 30,000 are stationed on the Baltic, and 20,000 on the Black Sea. Those of the Baltic fleets, composed principally of the refuse of the army recruits, are as miserable in

appearance as they are lubberly. Generally at sea only a small portion of the seven months during which the navigation is open, the greater number of them never thoroughly get over their sea-sickness ; and, on account of the expense of sending vessels on any foreign station—where the pay increases to more than treble, besides the merciless plundering of the officers,—they are kept cruising in the brackish water of the Gulf of Finland, between Cronstadt and Revel, where they can never, on a clear day, lose sight of land. In fine or moderate weather, considering all the disadvantages under which they labour, they manage to work their ships tolerably ; because, with all their ignorance and awkwardness, strict order is preserved. As soon as rough weather comes on, the officers, losing all confidence, resign the command of the ship to a few of the older sailors on board ; for the little knowledge that is possessed by a ship's company is usually to be found amongst its crew ; and exchanging the stern brutality of their manner for a sudden affability, they loose the rein to all discipline, and every one begins to talk and advise together, who is not obliged, by the confusion of his stomach, to hold his tongue. The want of dexterity in manœuvring a ship, the want of silence when fighting her, and the want of active courage to board an enemy's vessel, or to repel the attack of his boarders, constitute all the evils requisite to ensure the capture of a vessel by one of far inferior size ; yet these are evils to which every Russian ship in the Baltic fleet will be subject on the day of trial, with the exception of, perhaps, one or two, the crews of which

are a collection of all their choicest seamen and officers, chosen whenever a Russian man-of-war is sent abroad.

Those who have had the opportunity of closely examining Russian vessels on a foreign station, seldom imbibe any very exalted ideas of their efficiency; but they are generally unconscious of the fact, that it is the very pick of the whole navy which is ostentatiously selected to give foreigners as favourable an idea as possible of the condition of their fleets, when they have been led to scrutinize them severely.

Captain Craufurd, the author of a pamphlet on the Russian navy, seems to have suspected, with a seaman's shrewdness, that the corvette Levitza, placed at his disposal, was manned by a picked crew, when he says—“I am glad to console my own professional feelings and my confirmed opinion of our superiority in naval matters over all other nations, by thinking that this vessel was selected to embark me in, on account of her superior state of discipline and effectiveness in every way.” But he does not seem to have fathomed that she was manned by a crew selected from the whole navy, and that furthermore the whole navy could scarcely have furnished such another. He further says—“The Lioness (Levitza) shifted her main topsail yard in fifteen minutes.” But here again the difference between the Levitza and the rest of the fleet must have struck him, for he continues—“I do not mean to say that all the ships could have done it.” It must always be borne in view that this gallant officer writes in the spirit of what is vulgarly called “a croaker,” and yet he says—

"The next morning, the weather being still very bad, the signal was made for the fleet to repair to Cronstadt. A little after noon, the weather becoming finer, some manœuvres were performed ; and the ships being in two lines, the weather was ordered to attack the rear of the lee line, to double upon the ships composing it, one ship attacking to windward and the second to leeward. The head of the column attacked was then ordered to wear, and run down to the support of its rear. I cannot say that the ships performed this manœuvre well. Few of them took the trouble to make more sail to get speedily into action, none of them fought close, and their fire was slow and badly sustained. * * * * Their ships are rather short and heavy looking, and are certainly dull sailors, especially the three-deckers."

A portion of the sailors of the Baltic fleet form the marine guards, and are on that account chosen men ; and also it contains a considerable number of Jews, who, in Russia, are not exempted from military service ; and it is remarked, that they make some of the best sailors in the navy, being diligent, quick, and intelligent. The observation has frequently been made that the Hebrews, whom both Napoleon and the Emperor Nicholas have tried to force to fight, have never been brought to stand in the field ; but on ship-board they generally behave with determined courage. Does not this shew that it is the want of taking the remotest interest in the quarrel, for which he is forced to endanger his life, which makes the Israelite seize every opportunity of placing it in security ; since, when he finds that he cannot run away, he behaves

with as much presence of mind and courage as the best of his neighbours? Even from the land forces, the Jews have been gradually draughted into the fleet, as the emperor is, as we have already seen, by no means partial to them. Whilst many of them were still in the guards, one of this persecuted race was placed as sentinel on one of the posts which surround the winter palace. It happened to be the anniversary of our Saviour's resurrection, a festivity which Russians of all ranks, from the emperor to the moujik, observe by kissing every one they meet upon the cheek, and saying "Brother! Christ is arisen." The tsar, on quitting his palace, according to custom, thus embraced the sentry at the gate, and uttered the usual exclamation; but the Jew, instead of making the accustomed reply, answered stoutly, "It is false."

The food of the Russian sailor at home is much the same as that of the soldier. When on a foreign station he is much better fed, as well as better paid; but the long fasts which he religiously observes, and the sour rye biscuit, which is a rusk made from the common bread, seldom allow him, even in this case, to improve much in appearance. With regard to the naval officers—brought up as they are in cadet schools, which are half the year afloat on board of Lilliputian vessels of war, manned by the studenst, (although no school is like the broad ocean,) it is difficult to understand how it is possible that they should be so grossly ignorant as they prove themselves, if it were not for their avowed disgust and indifference to everything regarding nautical life. It is a very common thing to hear the young officers declare, that in case

of war, rather than go to sea, they would exchange into the cavalry; and even at present, these exchanges are not unfrequent, as in Russia the rank a man holds in one department of the science, is understood to fit him to fill a corresponding station in the branch most dissimilar to the one in which he has begun his career.

We confess, that not having had the opportunity of seeing the Russian officers at sea, we should have had difficulty in giving credit to the accounts we had received from so many sources, of their utter want of seamanship, had we not had the opportunity of witnessing the awkwardness of some of those considered the smartest amongst the rising generation of embryo admirals, to whom the command of the government steamers in the river Neva is given. Although the stream is broad, and no more obstructed than the Thames at Purfleet, they scarcely ever make an excursion without running foul of some craft or another,—which they always do with impunity, because, in every case, the blame is laid on the injured party, who, if he do not choose to hold his tongue, will be made to smart for it. We never knew but one instance where the government vessels had come in collision with anything, where they were not proved to have been blameless—viz., that of an officer who ran foul of the parapet of the English quay in broad daylight, and knocked away two of the enormous stones with the bowsprit of his steamer. Five days previous he had run down a brig *at anchor*; but the brig was somehow proved to have been in fault, and so would the

parapet of the quay, had it not been imperial property.

After the police and the courts of law, the grossest peculation exists in the navy, though we are bound to say, that in all departments the extent to which it is carried seems exactly to fit the opportunity afforded. No Russian vessels ever go out into the Baltic without losing their anchors, and parting their cables, and the blessing of a moderate storm always furnishes a long account of stores and guns thrown overboard, which, nevertheless, have seldom been entrusted to Father Neptune. When the Russian fleet, in Alexander's reign, was kept as hostage in England, it is well known that every rope and sail, and cable, was publicly sold in detail by its officers. We had always formerly imagined, as perhaps our readers, who may be acquainted with this circumstance, do now, that the consideration of England's having to refit the ships, which their officers were fast reducing to naked hulls and bare poles, had given rise to this conduct; but experience soon convinced us that it is the common custom of the Russian navy, which is carried on to a considerable extent, even under the very eyes of the emperor; but the dangerous prevalence of which, directly a vessel or a fleet sails out of their own waters, it is impossible to check by any severity, since all classes connive at its continuance. If it would be a rare occurrence to see a Russian fleet sold wholesale by its admiral, as the Turkish has been, every part of a Russian vessel of war, except the masts and hull, may generally be purchased in detail.

We could indeed fill a volume with the accounts of monstrous peculations in this department; a deeply rooted evil, against which emperors and ministers make occasional efforts, by examples of severity, which are as much thrown away as the angry warring of the traveller's hand against the swarms of mosquitoes which buzz upon the Neva's banks.

The naval officers, as well as the sailors, wear mustachios; the latter are also encumbered with cartridge-boxes and short heavy Roman swords, which must both be very convenient to scramble about the rigging with! It is not long since the officers also wore spurs; but this custom was abandoned about the same time that it was in Sweden, immediately after Nelson's attack on Copenhagen. The Swedish admiral being sent over to that capital to make the excuses of his sovereign to the King of Denmark, for not having sent him the timely assistance which policy had held back, the mob of Copenhagen, which was considerably excited, followed him in the street, and noticing his spurs, cried out, "There goes the admiral, with the Swedish fleet at his heels!"

The Russian navy was formerly principally commanded by foreign officers, chiefly Englishmen and Dutchmen. Peter the Great appears to have been the only distinguished Muscovite admiral—as on land Suwarrow has proved the only remarkable soldier. Some of the Englishmen in her service have distinguished themselves by that daring gallantry which has given them the empire of the ocean. Amongst these we may cite as the most remarkable, the renegade Paul Jones, and Admiral Elphinstone, who both

served under the Russian flag in Catherine's reign, during which Count Orloff's expedition to the Morea may be remembered, in which he aroused the Greeks to rebellion, and basely abandoned them—a fault, or a *maladresse*, whose consequences have clogged the march of Russian policy down to the present day, by obstinately living in the memory of the Greek population, and limiting the confidence they might otherwise have felt in their co-religionaries.

After his battle in the Bay of Tchesmè, where the destruction of the two admirals' ships was followed by the conflagration of the whole Turkish fleet engaged, Elphinstone proposed the daring plan of sailing direct for Constantinople, and by a bold stroke taking possession of, or at least destroying, the city of the sultan. Orloff rejected the project as impracticable, and Elphinstone, departing alone, forced the passage of the Dardanelles, thirty years before the feat was performed by Duckworth's squadron, and landing within sight of the capital, ate his repast on shore, and safely re-passed the Straits, thus practically demonstrating how feasible had been the proposition. The fiery Scot—for Elphinstone, as well as Paul Jones, was from the land of cakes, and proved a remarkable exception to the calm and prudent temper which is ascribed to his countrymen—disgusted with the mismanagement of an expedition, during the course of which fortune had left the very existence of the Turkish empire at the mercy of the invaders, had they known how to profit by it, in one of the fits of passion to which he was subject, took the tiller of his vessel, and run it upon a rock. The waves, however, seemed unwilling

to devour the man who had so fearlessly courted their embraces; he was saved, though his ship perished. He arrived in St. Petersburg; his services had been so brilliant—his censure on the conduct of the expedition was so undeniable—that it was not judged proper to bring him to a court-martial; and the influence of the favourite, and the dread of continuing to employ a man who gave way to such insane ebullitions of temper, occasioned his being left unnoticed and unrewarded, until his resignation was tendered, and gladly accepted. Paul Jones, at the request of England, was also dismissed, but with handsome presents.

Of late years, however, the Russian government seems to think that it is high time, after a century and a half, that its fleet should be able to furnish Russian admirals to command it, and few foreigners have been recently advanced to the exalted station in her marine which formerly was almost exclusively occupied by them; and even for a considerable time past Englishmen have not been admitted into the naval service at all, a fact which, as we have observed, furnishes an indication of the use Russia some day contemplates making of her fleet; since innumerable English names, formerly upon her Navy List—and even now on the superannuated part of it—attest that it is not for want of appreciation of their peculiar adaptation for that department of the service. We are aware that the contrary is usually believed of that navy, from the circumstance of one's hearing in every direction of English and foreign admirals actively employed—Gregg, on the Black Sea—Ricord, in the Mediterranean—Heyden, the Dutchman, command-

ing the Russian fleet at Navarino—Crown, Hamilton, Ogilvy, and at least a dozen more. But Gregg and Ricord, especially the former, the most distinguished men in the service, were born in Russia; the others are all exceedingly old men, originally English midshipmen and cabin-boys of merchant ships, who entered the service in the reign of Catherine, and belong to a period antecedent to the policy now pursued; and from their extreme age, they are dying off so fast, that in a few years probably none will remain.

We are far from censuring Russia in trying to render her navy independent, after the example she had, on the declaration of war with England, in Alexander's reign, when his English officers resigned their swords. But this sedulous exclusion of Englishmen—and only of Englishmen—not from the service generally, but only from the naval part of it, shews very plainly that the government anticipate an eventual collision with that country only.

The Black Sea fleet is in a much more efficient condition than that of the Baltic; the seamen have more practice, and amongst the crews are mingled many of the maritime inhabitants of its shores, as well as Little Russians and Cossacs. Still the same vice exists with regard to its officers; and being further from the central power, it is still less restrained than in the Baltic. The *Tchornomorskie* Cossacs, our old friends of the Dnieper, as well as guarding the line of the Kouban, furnish a contingent for the arsenal service; and their personal hardihood renders them formidable in gun-boats and galleys, about which they are principally employed. In character, in fierce-

ness, and in the purposes to which they are applicable, they are not unlike the Malay pirates.

In the Baltic, the naval establishments consist of the dockyards of Auchta, on the right bank of the Neva, or rather of one of its branches, situated a little above St. Petersburg; of the Admiralty, situated on that noble river, in the city of St. Petersburg itself; and of the docks and arsenals attached to it, though the English quay intervenes between them. Here ships of the line are built, though large vessels can never pass over the bar at the mouth of the river with their guns and stores, and even without them only by the help of canals. The spacious harbour of Cronstadt—the principal sea-port and the first naval station of the empire—fortified with all the ingenuity of art, and rendered as strong as art, unassisted by nature, can make such a place, occupies, on a low marshy island, the mouth of the gulf into which the Neva empties itself, and brings five hundred pieces of cannon to bear from the detached forts which rise from the sea on the one side, and the works of the place which command, from the other, the narrow entrance.

The island on which Cronstadt is situated occupies the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, some twenty miles from St. Petersburg, which is partly built upon the Delta of the Neva, which empties itself into it. Four mouths lead through its islands into St. Petersburg; though the southernmost of these channels, the deepest, only averages seven feet water, and as it is a tideless sea, only influenced by westerly winds, when these are prevalent sometimes attains eight and

a half. The arm of the Gulf, to which the entrance is partially blocked up by the island of Cronstadt, averages eight miles in width, but sands extending north and south from the opposite shores leave only two passages; that to the north of the island, averaging two fathoms water, but dangerous from sunken rocks; that to the south, exceedingly narrow, between four and five fathoms in depth, but passing between the fortifications of the place on one side, and the batteries of Cronstadt raised on the opposite sands upon the other.

At the promontorial extremity of the island of Cronstadt, embedded in the sand on its extreme west, rises the lighthouse of Tolboken, eighty-eight feet in height. The merchant harbour, which is independent of the man-of-war haven, is perhaps as spacious as that of Ramsgate, and it charges no port dues.

The next great station is Revel, in which is the second division of the Baltic fleet; it is also fortified, and contains docks, arsenals, and dockyards.

Perhaps next in importance on the southern shore of the Gulf of Finland is Baltisport, because the earliest open to navigation, which is here sometimes only impeded for a few weeks by the ice.

Along the coast of Finland, and consequently on the northern shores of the gulf, besides the fortress of Gustavo-vern, on the promontory of Hango, and the strong fortress on the chief island of the Aland archipelago, within a few miles of the Swedish coast, there is also in the possession of Russia the harbour of Sveaborg, the Gibraltar of the north, and the sea-

port of Helsingfors, the capital of Finland. The harbour is formed by eight rocky islands, all strongly fortified, the embrasures being carved in the native rock, and covered with greensward. These forts are, the Long, the Black, the Wolf, the Little East-black, the Great East-black, and the Lighthouse islands, the Gustavus-sword, on which is situated the citadel, and the redoubt-island.

A few years ago, Sveaborg might have been deemed theoretically almost impregnable. It was surrendered, almost without resistance, to the army of Barclay de Tolly. It is now probable that, practically, it would be deemed that its forts could not stand the battering of concentrated broadsides and hollow shot. To a Swedish force, the solid winter sheeting of ice, with its two feet covering of snow, would form an excellent material for lines of approach.

To the Admiralty of St. Petersburg are attached the iron-works of Colpenas, besides several similar establishments of minor importance. On the Black Sea, the principal harbour and naval station is Sebastopol, on the peninsula of Crimea—a place of natural as well as artificial strength. The admiralty was even recently at Nicolaiew, but either has been, or is about to be, entirely removed to the former place, where all the requisite offices had been long in course of construction.

In the year 1839, the last account which we have before us, and in which no important variation has taken place, the united fleet of the Russian empire consisted of—

SHIPS OF THE LINE.

5 ships of 100 guns and upwards ; and 2 upon the stocks	7
18 from 80 to 100 guns ; 5 upon the stocks	23
20 from 70 to 80 guns	20

FRIGATES.

4 of 60 guns	4
20 from 36 to 50 guns ; 1 upon the stocks	21
Other vessels, corvettes, brigs, and schooners	40
Total 115 vessels, mounting upwards of 7500 guns.	

The sailors of the Baltic fleet were reckoned at 30,800 men ; the sailors of the Black Sea at 19,800, making a total number of 50,600. The fleets are distributed much in the relative proportion of the sailors between the southern and northern waters, excepting that in the Black Sea they have a larger number of small craft.

On the Baltic stations the Russians have about fifteen sea steamers, of which two, the Bogatir, built at Colpenas, and the Kamschatka, constructed in America, are steam-frigates ; but as, in case of war, the government will not hesitate to appropriate all steamers whatever, we must calculate also those belonging to private individuals, and thus the collective amount may probably exceed fifty. Though all are very indifferent craft, they are all fit for sea, none (excepting a very fast Thames boat used to convey the court servants, cooks, fiddlers, musicians, and sometimes their masters, to the imperial residence of Peterhoff, upon the Gulf of Finland,) having been merely built for river navigation. The greater num-

ber of these have been built either at the private works of Beird, or at Ochta, and the engines constructed at Colpenas. The Bogatir is not, as far as regards her engines, a despicable specimen. There are few of the others of which as much can be said.

On the Black Sea, the government steamers are seventeen in number, several of two hundred and sixty, and two hundred and forty horse power. They are all of English manufacture, and are much in request, to relieve the garrisons and transport troops along the coast of Circassia and Georgia. Four very large steamers also arrived two years ago from England. From the circumstance of the steamers being all English, they are on the whole better than those in the Baltic; but there are few private steam-vessels, so that perhaps five-and-twenty would be as many as government could command the use of. They have not attempted to build any here. It is remarkable that both in the Baltic and the Black Sea nothing is used but Newcastle coal, as wood is much dearer even on the stations of the former, and from its bulk prevents a vessel from carrying sufficient fuel to enable it to leave the coast.

The pay of the Russian navy is, in English money, about as follows :—

A General-Admiral	£540	per annum.
An Admiral	225	"
A Vice-Admiral	180	"
A Rear-Admiral	135	"

IN THE MARINE GUARDS.

A First-class Captain	100	"
A Captain	80	"
A Lieutenant	63	"

IN THE REST OF THE NAVY.

A First-class Captain	£80 per annum.
A Captain	68 ,,
A Lieutenant	50 ,,
A Midshipman	38 ,,

The pay of a general-admiral is rather more than what an English blacksmith receives at Colpens ; the pay of a full admiral is exactly the salary of the shopmen in the English magazine in St. Petersburg ; and a lieutenant receives what it is customary to give to a valet in that city.

The navy, like the Georgian and Caucasian army, is a sort of refuge for the destitute, and therefore contains few officers who have property of their own ; nevertheless, many of those who are known not to possess any may be seen commonly drinking their champagne at 12*s.* per bottle.

It is a remarkable fact, that as soon as a Russian vessel is in commission, she is already rapidly beginning to rot ; and this tendency is so remarkable, that fully two-thirds of the vessels composing the Baltic fleet are unsound. The navy and the shipwrights are fond of attributing this to some peculiar quality of the water of the Baltic, which, if it exist, must indeed be very peculiar, since it only acts on such vessels as are the property of Government. It is also attributed to the bad quality of the wood. This, as far as concerns the oak, may have some foundation. It is undeniable that the Russian oak is very inferior in quality, like that of Canada and of all cold countries, in which its growth, confined to a few months of the year, and fostered by great heat and humidity, is too rapid.

But the main cause probably lies in the green timber which the government builders employ, and charge on their books, or take from the contractors, as fully seasoned.

All the stores and appointments of the Russian vessels of war are excellent in quality. Their sails and cordage are the best in the world. The decks and rigging are all in the nicest order; nevertheless, the fastidious eye of a seaman sees at a glance that the latter was never set up by a sailor, the twist of the ropes never having been attended to; his taste is offended by an ostentatious display of brass — the common sin of most foreign navies; and if he penetrate below, he will find that all the dirt that has been so carefully cleared from the deck, seems to have taken refuge beneath it. The immense mass of rubbish which the sailors are allowed to collect, is only exceeded by the furniture of the officers' cabins.

As in Russia generally furnished rooms for hire are unknown, every officer has his own furniture. Those in the navy, when they go on board in the summer, therefore take with them the whole stock which filled their winter apartments on shore. We have seen a midshipman embarking with a host of chests, two sofas, and a pianoforte, besides his “*batterie de cuisine*,” of kettles, frying-pans, and tea-urn, and the picture of his saint.

Finland alone, of all the Russian dominions, furnishes her with good sailors; but they are far from numerous, notwithstanding the vast extent of her coast, and being much averse to the naval service, Russia dares not yet resort to any very arbitrary measures to force them into it.

Taking all things into consideration, we do not seriously believe that the Russian fleet, in the event of war with England, would offer more effectual resistance to anything like an equal British force, than the Chinese junks have done; and we could quote opinions of great weight in this matter, to show that, if the strength with which Cronstadt is fortified would render the undertaking arduous, a fleet may be destroyed within the shelter of its harbour, and the passage forced, at a determined maximum of loss on the part of the British fleet, with as much certainty as military engineers can calculate on the reduction of one of the artificial forts of the French and Belgian line, within a given space of time.

An experienced mariner, one of that numerous tribe of Smiths and Johnsons, of whom Lord Byron speaks in his *Don Juan*, who have ever since Peter's days sought advancement and wealth in the service of Russia, and who had served on board the Portuguese and Turkish fleets, assured us, that it would be difficult for him to point out any nation whose vessels of war, in equal force, would not overmatch the Russian.

The Russian navy, therefore, in the hands of her diplomatists, has proved more useful than ever it would have done in those of her admirals; and the fleets, so formidable at a distance, so ineffective when closely examined, remind us strongly of the wooden cannon which King Edward III. used to impose upon the garrison of Calais when he besieged that stoutly defended city. Nevertheless, we should never forget that Calais *did surrender* to these guns, all wooden as they were.

CHAPTER VIII.

FINLAND.

THE only reasonable hope which Russia might entertain—if it were not for the all-pervading venality which corrupts all energy and power—would be in the prospect of eventually manning her fleets with her Finnish subjects, the only portion of the population of her vast empire containing sailors, which it might furnish to the amount of some twenty thousand. The only direction in which the Rusian fleet, exclusive of its moral effect, is likely to exercise any immediate influence on the liberties and interests of the west of Europe, is towards Sweden. But, at the same time, both from Finland and from Sweden may arise the greatest dangers to the Russian empire, and the most effective curb to the ambition of her cabinet, and at all events, for many years to come, they lie as ready instruments to the hand of Great Britain, to accomplish for her two-thirds of the work whenever she may determine on turning them to account. The value of a

navy, like that of a military force, is always relative ; there are political situations where a single disciplined battalion is of more importance than tens of regiments in another ; and without some knowledge of the state of Finland and Sweden, it is difficult for us to appreciate the value of the marine of Russia in her Baltic harbours.

Let us, then, in a few words, examine the maritime condition of the independent kingdom of Sweden ; and next, the character and disposition of the inhabitants of the now Russian Grand Duchy of Finland.

Sweden has always, on account of her extensive coast and vast inland navigation, furnished, as she does now, bold and skilful sailors ; albeit, their history is more crowded with accounts of desperate and daring achievements than successes. Were she a wealthy country, like England or Holland, or even Belgium, with this main requisite she would soon possess navies ; but being peculiarly poor and destitute of material resources, it would be almost as difficult for her to fit out efficient fleets within a given space of time, as for those nations who have no sailors to man them. Although the necessity of a strong naval force, and hatred and apprehension of Russia, are strongly impressed on every man in constitutional Sweden, strange to say, she continues, as she has been doing for years, talking and debating on the subject, and advancing nothing.

Not that any Swede denies that she should have a navy ; but in their partisanship in favour of what they call a great or little navy, statesmen, politicians, and electors are divided into two camps. " Let us have ships of the line and frigates, as we had for-

merly ; let us commission those rotting in the docks, and build new ones," say those who advocate " the great navy system." " We cannot afford," observe their adversaries " to keep more than five or six ships in commission, and we have more ships built than we can employ; such a fleet would be impotent, both for purposes of aggression and defence, and therefore let us content ourselves with a large fleet of gun-boats, which, favoured by the peculiar nature of our coast, will perfectly answer all purposes of defence."

Meanwhile, however, the maritime power of Sweden is limited to a flotilla of gun-boats, or row-galleys, mounted with a large gun—to a fleet of the best constructed vessels in the world, built on the scientific plans of the English Chapman—the most perfect of shipwrights—who, exiled from his own country by the want of appreciation of his talents, found in the encouragement of penurious Sweden a home, a fortune, and a barony. But this fleet is decaying in idleness, in the harbour of Carlsberona, and the kingdom of Sweden has only one single frigate in commission. Her naval officers seek daily for service in the English merchant navy, to learn how to manage something larger than the row-boats of their country.

With regard to Finland—the only nursery for sailors in the Russian empire—torn by fraud and treachery from the parent state of Sweden, to the mutual regret of the Finnish and Swedish people, it was at first appeased by promises of a constitution from the Emperor Alexander, who seized it without the shadow of a claim, excepting that of force—then treated it with gentleness. It is now fast sinking into one of the *many*

Polands which groan beneath the Russian despotism, but one whose sufferings and claims on our sympathy have been unheeded, in that system of philanthropy which has no attention or pity to bestow on any but what a French writer untranslatable terms "*grandes infortunes.*"

There is, however, no portion of the Russian empire more worthy of our attention, in the event of a collision, not only for the reasons we have named, but because this vast province extends up to the gates of St. Petersburg; because its population is anti-Russian; because all its wealth, cities, fortifications, roads, and lines of communications, lie parallel with a coast which extends many hundreds of miles; and because here a limb of the Russian power may be cut through in innumerable places, like the body of a snake, and the very existence of its northern capital menaced, or its prosperity compromised, by efforts comparatively trifling. Finland, or Fenland (Suomi, as in the language of its inhabitants it is called), is remarkable both for its extent, the picturesque character of its wild scenery, and its peculiar and primitive population. The Finns are probably the aboriginal inhabitants of the northern part of Europe, driven to its most inhospitable extremities by the irruptions of Teutons, Goths, Scandinavians, and Sclavonians. Tacitus and Strabo and Ptolemy all speak of the Fenni, the Zuomi, and Phini.

Many branches of the venerable Finnish tree have been dissevered and scattered wide from the parent stem; and although these offshoots—divided into small or insignificant tribes—have retained much of

their nationality, it has only been preserved entire by that portion of this ancient family, which is recorded to have been already in possession of Finland before the birth of Christ. Towards the extreme north, where the human race, like the productions of the vegetable kingdom, becomes stunted in its growth, the Finns have degenerated into Laplanders, a people whose language (a dialect of the Finnish) attests a common origin. The Permaks and Mordvinians towards Siberia, the Esthonian of the southern shore of the gulf of Finland, and a portion of the population of Hungary, still speak a dialect of the language of their Finnish ancestors. This language, soft, rich, figurative, and resembling no other known tongue, has led to the discovery of other of these dispersed branches, scattered far from each other, all inconsiderable in numbers, and none having the importance of the pure Finnish race, which constitutes alone a people of more than a million and a half, whilst the other twenty-seven tribes of Finnish descent do not collectively number two millions.

The Finnish people, which has always been remarkable for the courage, patience, and intelligence of its individual members, and for the exemplary harmony which has united them, singularly enough appears to have remained stationary, without shewing in the annals of its history one solitary phase of a more brilliant existence, as during the same period we may retrace in the past of every surrounding people. During two thousand years that it is recorded to have been in possession of the vast extent of mountains, forests, rocks, and lakes, to which it has given the

name of Finland, we can find no account of the Finns having ever endeavoured to overrun their neighbours, or extend their territory. This want of national ambition and enterprise is difficult to account for in a brave and hardy people, if we do not seek for a solution in the individual character of the Finns of the present day, which one may presume, like their language, to have altered little from that of their fore-fathers. Courageous, enduring, but simple and honest, they are essentially a *contented* people.

Although long incorporated with the Swedish crown, its government of this country was so mild, the privileges it accorded so extensive, that this union was only productive of attachment and regard towards Sweden; and when forcibly separated from their adoptive mother, the Finns proved as faithful as the subjects of her native provinces, and have continued to entertain towards her feelings of filial affection. Whoever will take the trouble to peruse the campaigns of Gustavus Adolphus, at the glorious commencement of the Thirty Years' War, will find the Finnish regiments considered as the most trusty in his army — the Finnish sailors some of the most active of his fleet. Whoever now traverses Finland will find, in the eagerness with which its inhabitants cling to Swedish institutions, manners, and usages, and in their veneration for the Swedish name, ample evidence of their predilection for a nation, which, abandoned as they have been by her, they are still taught from their childhood to look up to, and the most glorious recollections of whose history they have learned to associate with their own.

The Swedish language may be said to have become almost a national tongue in Finland, spoken as it is by all the higher and middle classes, of which a large portion is of Swedish descent, and generally understood in the towns, along the high roads, and by the better order of farmers. Twenty miles from St. Petersburg, and consequently more than seven hundred miles from the frontiers of Sweden, the Swedish is more generally spoken in the villages than the Russian language, though this territory has been in the possession of the Russians for a hundred and forty years, and though thousands of the Finns come as sledge-drivers to earn, during the winter months, a few roubles in the great city. If it were not for this intercourse, to which their poverty obliges them, it is doubtful whether, even in the immediate vicinity of the capital of Russia, (which formerly stood on Finnish ground,) a single peasant would be found to learn the language of his masters, although this language differs from his own no more than the Swedish, of which, useless as it is to him, he takes a pride in speaking a few words, if he can master no more.

Both the Russian and Swedish tongues differ radically from his own. The national language of the Finn, however, is one of more than Italian softness; and whether the poetical temperament of his race has acted on the language, or the adaptation of the language to poetical expression upon his taste, poetry has always been and is still the ruling passion of his people. Recent researches in their literature have brought to light not only innumerable ballads and heroic chants of exalted merit, but the ancient epic

poem of the *Kallevalla*—now translated into Swedish, and raised by the enthusiasm of commentators above the Latin *Aeneid*, although bearing, at least in its construction, more resemblance to the *Odyssey*. The Finnish versification, singularly enough, consists of an alliteration, each word, or each verb, substantive, and adjective of a line commencing with the same letter.

Finland is still governed by the Swedish laws; its modern published literature is entirely Swedish; and until very lately the studies of those destined for the bar or the pulpit were gone through in the same language.

This country, the whole of which, together with the islands of the gulf of Bothnia, is now in possession of Russia, may be computed to cover an area of about 120,000 square miles, with a population of 1,400,000 souls. Its inhabitants entertain a marked antipathy to the Russians; but this aversion had until lately not been occasioned by the harshness of their treatment by the Russian government, whose policy has been to conciliate the population of the newly acquired principality, but has rather arisen from their attachment to Sweden, and a traditional feeling of hostility to the Muscovites, who formerly cruelly ravaged their territory on many occasions; the Cossacs, in the reign of Peter the Great, having even devastated the country as far as Vasa on the Gulf of Bothnia, the western extremity of Finland.

Few of our readers are probably ignorant that Finland was forcibly seized by the Emperor Alexander in 1808, when, suddenly declaring war on Sweden, on the pretext of forcing her to join the coalition

against England, he marched his armies into this portion of her territory, and in the course of the same year annexed these provinces by ukase to his own empire.

An interesting history of this war was recently published in Stockholm by Colonel Montgomery, which brings to light many curious facts relative to this transaction, and shews the profound duplicity and treachery of the Russian emperor. He cites the authority of a nobleman who was then Swedish ambassador at the court of St. Petersburg, to prove the amity and good understanding on which the cabinets of Stockholm and St. Petersburg had previously been, and to shew how the former was lulled into security by the assurances of Alexander, who, whilst his troops were invading Finland, declared to his diplomatist, with tears in his eyes, that he was forced by circumstances, (i. e., the fear of Napoleon,) to act as he did, but pledged himself *not to retain a single village of Finland*. The inadequate Swedish force then occupying this vast territory behaved with characteristic gallantry; but left without stores, provisions, and reinforcements, and betrayed by its own commanders, the country was wrested from it. The treachery of the Swedish leaders, who belonged to its proverbially corrupt and turbulent nobility, was attributable, in some instances, to the direct influence of Russian gold, in others to their feeling of personal hostility to the reigning monarch, which they sought to gratify at the expense of their country; and they succeeded in doing so, losing Finland, and making

the national irritation consequent on this loss the means of his dethronement.

In this war the Finns, by the active part they took in it, shewed that they considered themselves as integrally a part of the kingdom of Sweden; a sentiment which has outlived all the efforts made by their new masters to conciliate them. These efforts were proportionate to the value of an acquisition of which the tenure would have been so uncertain if the national hatred had been aroused, and an acquisition which to Russia was of such vast importance, giving her, as it did, such an immense extent of coast along the Gulfs of Bothnia and Finland, and inclosing the latter thus entirely within subject shores. The commercial capabilities of this country, and its numerous and hardy seamen, combined to render peculiarly valuable to Russia this new territory, the conquest of which carried her frontier almost to the gates of Stockholm.

Previous to this conquest, Finland had been governed by its own fundamental laws, and enjoyed the benefit of a representative government, which, however incomplete, sufficed for a people contented with so much political liberty as insured their civil freedom. The Emperor Alexander, after the cession of the conquered territory, guaranteed to the Finns the integrity of their fundamental laws and constitution, in a proclamation dated the 27th of March, 1810. This assurance, which, on his accession, was repeated by the Emperor Nicholas, proved, however, as illusory as the constitution given by the former to Poland; for since 1809 no Finnish diet has ever been assembled. On

the other hand, Finland was carefully exempted from the taxes and vexations which render the Russian rule so harsh to its own subjects. The ports of Finland may have been considered as free, so trifling were the duties on all imports, and the country suffered comparatively little from police tyranny and exactions. This policy was still, until very recently, pursued by the Emperor Nicholas ; but, in addition to it, he resolved to gain over the aristocracy of Finland, by inducing them, by every means, to enter his service ; and whilst he employed them in other parts of the empire, rewarded them with the utmost munificence. He thus taught the higher and middle classes to look forward to Russia, and to separate in feeling from the rest of their countrymen.

Alarmed at the Swedish spirit which had outlived so many years of separation, and which in case of war was so dangerous to the security of these provinces, he appears to have conceived the idea of invoking a national Finnish spirit to neutralize it, fully aware that the isolated nationality of Finland would grow feeble in comparison with its attachment to the adjacent kingdom. The cultivation of the Finnish language and the old Finnish poetry was warmly encouraged, as well as all recurrence to the dim and remote recollections of its independent history, and in all its modern literature one can discern that those who write in the spirit of the government are careful to separate the Swedish from the Finnish ; those who are not prepared to do so, on account of the severe censorship, do not write at all.

Though the deprivation of their representative form

of government was severely felt by such of the higher and middle classes as were not seduced by the imperial liberality, the mildness and gentleness of the Russian rule, so different from its harsh and oppressive character within the precincts of Russia Proper, or, in fact, wherever its dominion was firmly established, tended nevertheless to soothe the Finnish people, and to conduce, together with the long peace, to a high degree of material prosperity. No part of the imperial dominions is, as compared with its former state, in a more flourishing condition than the grand duchy of Finland; and it may still further be asserted, that since Russia has taken possession of it, it has been until lately a happy country. Its trade has increased, its cities have been enlarged, its soil has been better cultivated, the higher classes have grown wealthy in the Russian service, the middling affluent by commerce.

But it must be remembered that these results have been produced precisely because Russia has governed this country in a manner diametrically opposite to the system pursued in every other part of the empire, which she never fails to introduce wherever she thinks her power sufficiently consolidated. Unhappily for Finland the Russian government seems to think this period arrived; a great increase of duties has taken place, the study of the Russian language is enforced, the tyrannical police is becoming every day more oppressive, utter silence is enjoined on the press, freedom of speech is banished, and it is fast sinking into a ukase-governed satrapy. Either success or the natural impatience of his temper has in this instance, (skilful politician as he has shewn himself on other

occasions,) caused the Emperor Nicholas to mar his own policy, and these first false steps have indisposed already the great bulk of the people, and done what such unremitting efforts had been made to prevent.

The Finns, who have always been a free, though not an independent people, are not likely tamely to submit to this treatment; the terrors which they entertained on their first conquest, and which the moderation of Russia during thirty years had almost lulled to sleep, have been again aroused, and more than aroused, for they are being justified. That fidelity, the national boast of the Finns, which, unlike most other national self-attributes, is not an imaginary characteristic, and which arose from the grateful recollection of benefits received, might in a few more years of lenient government have been gradually transferred from Sweden to Russia. If the moral and religious differences between the Finn and the Muscovite would never have allowed the former any sympathy with the latter, he might still, unambitious as he is of national independence, have become faithfully attached to a government which allowed him the exercise of all the rights of which he was desirous, and which protected him in the enjoyment of them. This feeling is now out of the question, and the Finnish people, too feeble to offer any resistance, may endure without a murmur the tyranny of Russia; but in the event of a war, the whole of their country may be easily roused against her, and a naval power might readily make use both of the feeling which pervades the inhabitants of this vast province, and of the

national temper of Sweden, (which is marked by an intense and increasing irritation on the subject of the cession of these provinces to Russia,) to effect the recovery of them ; and in the prosecution of this scheme they may count on finding the partiality and hope with which the Finns regarded Sweden for so many years, and which lived through the prosperous period of their separation from it, undiminished in their adversity.

Finland, with its lakes, rocks, and forests, extends almost up to St. Petersburg. The richest part of it, with all its strongholds and lines of military communication, stretches along the coast, and therefore a hostile power, whose naval supremacy was undisputed, could, by a descent on any part of it, interrupt the circulation of the Russian force along these lines, and facilitate the re-occupation of the whole country by a Swedish army, to favour which the great mass of the population would at once rise up. All the natural objects which this country offers to the progress of an invader, and which would be much greater if it were not so poor, would, in the event of an invasion of Finland, be turned against the Russians, from the fact of the unfriendly feeling she has excited amongst its population. The Finnish nobility, which it is true have generally been gained over to the Russian interest, might partly adhere to it; but all other classes would delight in any prospect of freeing themselves from the Russian yoke; and, amongst the middle classes, those who have the most influence over the peasantry, the Lutheran clergy, will always perpetuate

this hostile feeling, and when the opportune moment is arrived, will join in any demonstration of it.

Finland, therefore, which in certain cases adds so much to the power of Russia, and which, if she could depend upon its population, would prove so important as a maritime possession, would, in case of war with Great Britain, (the only nation which can possibly undertake an aggressive warfare against her,) become an ulcerated limb of her vast body, and prove along her northern frontier the same thorn in her side which Poland does towards her centre, and the Caucasian provinces on the southern extremity of her empire.

Finland is an exceedingly poor country, chequered with lakes and inland waters; the soil is either sandy, or covered with broken rocks of red granite in those parts which are not wholly stony. The barrenness of the ground seems to have discouraged the agriculturist, and the sterility of his fields, joined to their negligent cultivation, is everywhere apparent in the slovenly tillage and the miserable crops of rye. A few districts of bog land which admit of draining, and which have found cultivators with sufficient capital and enterprise to undertake it in the village clergymen, form occasional exceptions to this uninviting picture. Some parts of the country are covered with large forests of the white and red fir. It is traversed in every direction by streams and rivers, on many of which the timber exported is floated down to the sea, but which form cascades and waterfalls amongst the rocks, and are thus rendered unnavigable. The falls of Imatra are, perhaps, the finest in Europe, and

if the mass of water poured down is less than at those of the Trollhätten, in Sweden, they are far more beautiful than the latter.

The whole southern coast of Finland is divided from the open sea by an archipelago of thousands of island rocks, of various dimensions, some wooded, and some inhabited by fishermen, whose occupation upon the inland waters also furnishes the population with a large share of its subsistence. Many parts of Finland are very picturesque, though the eye becomes soon tired of the monotony of red granite rocks and dark fir woods, unrelieved by the more sublime or softer features of the landscape. This is, however, not universally the case ; for, even in following the coast of the Gulf of Finland, which may be accounted the richest and most densely peopled part of the country, and in which the principal towns are situated, large tracts present the most desolate aspect imaginable ; and, as we advance towards St. Petersburg, the last two hundred miles of the road show us only the bare rock or sandy surface, and low stony hills, on which the trees, which seem scarcely able to suck sufficient nourishment from the soil to maintain vitality, are thinly scattered.

The western part of Finland is the least barren, and has more of a Swedish appearance. The towns, which are built of brick or stone, are neat and cleanly ; but Abo, the most populous, contains only 13,000 inhabitants, and Helsingfors, the most flourishing and the handsomest in Finland, little more than 10,000. The latter city contains some fine modern buildings, and a large unfinished cathedral, the architecture of which

does not do justice to the fine and abundant material employed in its construction, and which strikes the spectator as being placed to crown the summit of a stupendous flight of steps, which lead up to it from the great square.

The greater part of the inhabitants of the towns are of Swedish descent, or of mixed Swedish and Finnish blood; and, wherever this is the case, they present to our view a handsome and vigorous-looking race. We cannot say as much for the pure Finn. High cheek-bones, elongated features, pointed chin, and a spare, thin figure, generally characterize his make; his eyes are of a light grey or blue, his hair and skin of the same sandy hue, and his beard, which he allows to grow, generally consists of a few hairs, thinly scattered on his chin—reminding us strikingly of the trees and bushes so sparingly sprinkled over the barren ground in so many parts of his country. His costume is the sheep-skin, with the wool turned inwards, and a peculiar wolf-skin cap, in winter; in summer, a coarse gray homespun woollen stuff, and a round felt hat with broad buckle.

The peasantry inhabit cottages built of logs, and which are either isolated or collected together in villages. Although stone is everywhere in abundance, only the church is usually built of it, and sometimes the pastor's house. The former is roofed with small pieces of wood, cut like tiles, and smeared with tar. The steeple and belfry rise up separately in the church-yard, and always in the vicinity of the church itself is a sort of caravanserai, in which the congregation, who come immense distances to their place of worship,

put up their horses and sledges. The Finnish peasants are not always the proprietors of the cottage or land they occupy, but often hold it from the landlord by a peculiar tenure, which obliges them, instead of paying rent in money or in kind, to devote to his service so many days' labour of man and horse during the year.

In character the Finn is brave, honest, patient, and frugal, but somewhat indolent. His natural probity is still further increased by his attachment to his faith, which is the Lutheran, and he is exceedingly valuable as a subject to a warlike government, from the peculiarity which distinguishes him, of being applicable to any branch of the service. Accustomed to boating on the sea or on his lakes, and to the care of the horse, in which he takes great pride, he is equally fit for the infantry, cavalry, or navy.

The clergy, who go through their studies in the Finnish, Swedish, and German languages, are commonly well-educated men, contented with their moderate stipends. The simplicity of their lives, and their attention to their duties, secure them the attachment and veneration of their flock, who habitually seek their advice in all domestic affairs, and resort to their arbitration in all cases of litigation.

If we except the inhabitants of a few Finnish villages within the government of St. Petersburg, which, having fallen within the pale of the Russian empire at a very early period, were reduced to servage, it is surprising how little the constant contact with Russia and Russians has altered the Finnish character, even in those free villages which are situated in the vicinity

of the metropolis, and which draw their subsistence from it, by sending thither their fish and dairy produce. The nobility of Finland also unfortunately proves an exception to this rule. Selected for offices of trust by the Russian government, with the double view of gaining them over to its interests, and securing the services of public servants whose probity rendered them valuable in the vast sink of the Russian administration, so far from operating favourably on its corruption, they have become themselves perverted and corrupted.

For many years past, a considerable contraband trade with St. Petersburg has been carried on by the Finns, all foreign articles being only subject to a nominal duty in Finland, and to a very heavy one in passing the border of Russia Proper. It is principally carried on in sledges across the Gulf of Finland, and the small and active horses bred in the country, which are harnessed to them by the smugglers, are very fast trotters, and are sometimes purchased at high prices for this purpose.

As long as the Russian rule continued mild and indulgent in Finland, its inhabitants seem not to have felt very acutely the virtual suppression of the representative form of government, so solemnly guaranteed to them, both by the last and by the present emperor. As the grip of the tsar tightened on their provinces, they became, however, more fully sensible of the injustice committed towards them, and of the importance of those rights which the autocrat faithlessly withheld, and when beginning to writhe under the oppression, became sensitively alive to the value of the means of relief which had been ravished from

them. The severity of the secret police soon rendered it, however, dangerous to canvass the subject of these wrongs, which the Finns are now driven to brood over in silence.

A pamphlet has been recently published in Stockholm, by an exiled Finn, who was obliged to fly the country for having taken up the subject. It gives a full account of the claims of Finland to a constitutional form of government, and one may judge from the mild tone of expostulation in which the author writes now that he is hopelessly exiled from his native land, and beyond the reach of Russia, how gentle must have been his remonstrances when still within the precincts of the Russian empire, and when still restrained by hope and fear. This pamphlet is also remarkable from the fact that its publication in Prussia has been forbidden by the Prussian censorship, without the suppression of so many passages as would have rendered it absurd to publish the work at all. The exceeding moderation which pervades its pages would render it not very difficult to point out many political writings of which the Prussian censorship has allowed the publication, though more hostile to its own government than the pamphlets in question are to that of Russia;—thus offering a curious illustration of the influence which the cabinet of St. Petersburg exercises over that of Berlin, and of which the Prussian league for the exclusion of British manufactured goods proves a much more serious example. This pernicious influence of Russia has been extended to Sweden and to Denmark. It is difficult to define or account for it without a brief description of the political situation of

these countries, with which, on account of the limited interest inspired by most of the second-rate states in England, some of our readers may prove unacquainted.

The late King of Sweden, Bernadotte, born in Gascony, and said to have been originally a smuggler, is known to have risen from the ranks to the command of the republican armies. His military talent, his eloquence, and the fact of his having been for a moment dreaded by Napoleon as a rival, more than even his subsequent fortunes, stamp him as the second of the galaxy of remarkable men brought forward by the French revolution. When called to fill the place of heir to the Swedish throne, then occupied by the infamous Charles XIII., and invested with this character as a child of the French republic, to the exclusion of the heirs of the deposed and legitimate sovereign of Sweden, he really exercised all the rights of royalty. The turbulence of the people he came to govern, and which he was destined in the ordinary course of events soon to reign over, did not suggest any very favourable anticipation of the security of the dynasty he hoped to found. At the same time the jealousy of Napoleon, and the fear of the allies, isolating him from France, obliged him to seek the friendship of Alexander, and to resort to other means of security against the fickleness of his future subjects.

On the cession of Finland to Russia, for which as an equivalent Norway was given to Sweden, the Swedes accuse Bernadotte of having in two ways betrayed their interests—firstly, in having sacrificed the claim of Sweden to the payment of that part of

the national debt, of which the burden came to the share of Finland; and secondly, in giving to Norway a constitution which rendered her so perfectly independent of Sweden, that the latter country derived no benefit from the union. Sweden is a constitutional monarchy, in which all legislative enactments of the four estates which compose the diet—viz., the houses of nobles, clergy, burghers, and peasants—may at all times be negatived by the crown. Norway is, in point of fact, a republic with an hereditary president styled king; for if a bill pass thrice the Storthing of this country, (in which nobility is unknown,) it becomes law the third time, although the king should oppose it.

Norway has its separate national administration and army, in neither of which any Swede is admitted to hold office. Thus, instead of becoming an equivalent for lost Finland, Bernadotte, then crown-prince, rendered Norway only a refuge for his own family, in the event of any political storm which might drive him from Sweden,—counting on the gratitude of the Norwegians, and on the fact of one king being as good to them as another under their peculiar form of government.

Though Bernadotte thought proper to behave with such liberality towards Norway, in Sweden he pursued a very different line of conduct, and early opposed himself to the liberal movement,—a policy which is said to have been dictated as a condition of the friendship of Russia, in securing the perpetuation of the sovereignty of Sweden in his family, which the claims of the heir of the deposed King of Sweden might

have endangered. Although Charles XIV. conferred many benefits on the country he was called to rule, he offended his subjects by arrogating to himself the credit of many more, and by his undisguised suspicion of them. This want of confidence, for a man who had seen so much of the fickleness of a people in the revolutionary history of France, in which he played so conspicuous a part, and who probably remembered the assassination of Gustavus, and the deposition of the brother of his predecessor, was no doubt increased by the utter ignorance, in which he strangely continued to the day of his death, of the language of the people he reigned over. It was a common jest of the opposition, to make him wonder “that he should have been so many years in Sweden, and that the Swedes should not have learned to understand him yet!” In the true spirit of the Gascon, he inscribed his name on every public work he finished or even repaired, and reminded his subjects so constantly, in every speech he made, of the good he had done them, that he was rebuked by the following parable : “A peasant gave the parson a pound of butter. ‘Am I not a good fellow?’ he exclaimed. ‘To be sure you are,’ quoth the parson. But the next Sunday, and every time he met him, the clodhopper strutted up to the priest, pluming himself on his gift, and inquiring, with conscious satisfaction, ‘Was not I a fine fellow, to give you that pound of butter?’ The parson, bored to death, sent him back his present, wishing him and his gift where it is the duty of parsons to prevent their congregations from going.”

Bernadotte had thus, by a few points of ridicule, and an unwarrantable and ill-disguised mistrust, linked to many great qualities, succeeded in rendering himself very unjustly unpopular, as was demonstrated by the state of the Swedish press, for out of about a score of daily papers, all, excepting two, were in the opposition at the time of his decease. The government of the state was in fact only carried on because the house of nobles is conservative, and the house of clergy influenced by the extensive church patronage at the disposal of the crown. The house of burghers and of peasants both advocate sweeping changes, which the contrast afforded by the prosperity of Norway and the stagnant trade of Sweden, must probably eventually cause to be adopted.

The nobility of Sweden is generally poor and corrupt; the clergy maintain a high character, but are dependent on the crown; the burghers, though opposed to the former in politics, are more corrupt than the nobles; but the peasants—the hope of Sweden, already the wealthiest of these bodies, and constituting a peculiar class, to which we know of no other exactly analogous in any other country—bid fair to become the predominating one in the state.

The mistrust with which Bernadotte seems always to have viewed his subjects, had apparently been of late years still further increased by this political struggle, and had induced him to throw himself into the arms of Russia. Of the ascendancy of the Russian influence in Stockholm, daily proofs were given, to the undisguised disgust of his subjects, amongst whom all

ranks, with the exception of a small portion of the nobility, bear the strongest antipathy to anything Russian.

Let us cite such evidences of the subservience to Russia of the Swedish cabinet as immediately occur to recollection. In 1825, when several Swedish vessels full of armed men, were illegally sold to the South American States by the Swedish government, to serve against Spain—a friendly power, whose ambassador was present at every palace fête—the latter could obtain no redress, and the notes of all diplomats were disregarded, till Count Suchlelen, the Russian minister, took the affair in hand, on which the whole scheme was abandoned.

The second instance we shall cite is, the visit of the Crown Prince Oscar, the present sovereign, to St. Petersburg, notwithstanding the strong national prejudice which regarded this step as the homage of a vassal to the suzerain, and which indignantly contrasted it with the last visit to Russia of a Swedish prince, when the daring Gustavus III. went to surprise the Empress Catherine in her capital, and, betrayed by his brother, the late king, still made his retreat through the Russian fleet.

The baptism of the son of Oscar by the name of Nicholas, was, in this excited state of public feeling, another grievance; but the Swedish deputation sent to St. Petersburg, to be present at the uncovering of the monument raised to the memory of the Emperor Alexander, the spoliator of Finland, outraged it beyond all measure.

During the Polish revolution, the Swedish state

gazette was eager to give the Russian bulletins of their successes; and availing itself of the alien laws, which are much the same as they formerly were in England, the government has never allowed a Polish refugee to remain four and twenty hours on the soil of Sweden — a breach of hospitality of which no other constitutional government has been guilty.

It is not so much such acts as these, as the commission of them at the expense of that popularity which must be so valuable to a sovereign in the position of the King of Sweden, which speaks for the influence of the cabinet of St. Petersburg at the court of Stockholm, and for the assiduity with which the favour of the tsar is courted. The Emperor Nicholas requited the feeling thus evinced towards him, by personally visiting Bernadotte ; he arrived unannounced, on board the vessel which brought the grand-duke his son on the same errand.

About this time some popular disturbances having taken place, occasioned by the condemnation and imprisonment of a popular writer named Crusenstolpe, the Emperor Nicholas immediately despatched a messenger to Stockholm, offering to send 10,000 men of his guards to assist the king in overawing his subjects, and to occupy the capital. The steamers destined to convey them were kept in readiness, but this proffered aid was prudently declined by the Swedish monarch, who probably considered the vicinity of the Russians in the island of Aland, on which they are completing a vast and exceedingly strong fortress, and which is within three hours' sail of the Swedish coast, as already a neighbourhood too dangerously close. It was

probably the policy of Bernadotte to find a *juste milieu* between the perilous friendship of Russia and the turbulence of his own subjects; a game at which Russia could not fail to win; the disagreement between sovereign and people being the very state of things which Russian ambition has always endeavoured to bring about amongst her neighbours, in the prosecution of that maxim of *divide et impera*, which her conduct shews her so well to have understood.

The present King of Sweden, notwithstanding his submission when crown prince to the influence of Russia, which, perhaps, his imperious father may have dictated, ascended the throne with the advantages of popularity; he was at least a Swede in his manners, language, and habits; and beloved for his personal amiability and benevolence,—of which the reader may find ample confirmation in the able and elaborate work he published on criminal punishments.

Denmark, which, as well as Norway and Sweden, is inhabited by a Scandinavian population, is now in a condition which promises before long to change the whole face of the north. Governed by an absolute prince, its present monarch, in his earlier years gave promise of exceeding liberality of sentiment, and his subjects long confidently expected the boon of a constitution, which is still denied them—as is universally believed in the north, at the instigation of Russia, which has guaranteed the continuance of the Sound Dues, only on the condition that the King of Denmark shall yield nothing to the popular wishes. The heir apparent of the throne of Denmark, on account of his personal character, will probably never ascend it; but

should he do so, it is well known that the royal house, of which he will thus be the last representative, must become extinct with him. The grand duchy of Holstein then returns to the German confederation, and Denmark must either elect a German prince,* or, reduced to its own limits, sink from a second into a third-rate state.

The great bulk of the nation, however, who long ardently for a constitutional form of government, and who are as well fitted for it as any people in Europe, have within the last few years become fully sensible of the folly of that family feud which has divided the Scandinavian nations, and of the hatred fostered by centuries of rivalry between the Swedes and Danes, people whose origin is the same, and whose very language is so similar that they can more easily understand each other than a north of England man can understand one from the southern counties.

Both the Danish and Swedish nations begin to perceive the mutual benefit of a union of these countries, which, Norway being included in the coalition, would thus unite the whole of the Scandinavian people, constituting a powerful state which might assume an independent position in Europe. A few years ago, when first this arrangement was suggested, it was looked upon as chimerical by the majority of those who first heard of it, and was only whispered about as men whisper things of treasonable import, by those who canvassed the subject. The prejudice and antipathy existing between the two

* The Prince of Hesse, long intended by the Emperor Nicholas as his son-in-law, but whose succession is now questionable.

people alone appeared an insuperable bar to the furtherance of their national interests in this manner. A Swede could hardly walk in the streets of Copenhagen, or a Dane in those of a Swedish town, without being liable to insult. But with an unprecedented rapidity this deeply-rankling hatred has been rooted up, and so marked is the revulsion of feeling which has taken place, that the Swede in Denmark, and the Dane in Sweden, is received with marks of popularity.

The Scandinavian union is not only confidently talked of, but publicly alluded to, even under the absolute, though mild government of Denmark. The close intercourse of the two countries has been chiefly fostered by the universities, and within the last two years their members have visited each other, as many as a hundred crossing the sea from one single university to visit another. At these meetings the union of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, has been publicly given as a toast, a scene which has been renewed only a few months since.

In Sweden, unpopular as the late king was, there existed no general wish to overturn his dynasty among the great majority, but there is every tendency to curtail the power of the crown to the measure of that which it enjoys in Norway; and in the event of the union of the three states, it is almost inevitable that such semi-republican form of government will be adopted. The prospect of reigning over the whole Scandinavian people, on these conditions, was not therefore so enticing for Bernadotte, who, once violent as an ultra-republican, as his former speeches shew him to have been, had become as monarch impe-

rious in his endeavours to maintain his royal prerogative.

It is universally expected that the death of the King of Denmark will, under these circumstances, be the signal for important changes, which may eventually terminate in the foundation of another European power in the Scandinavian confederation. Much must naturally depend on the light in which this is viewed by England, which, it is hoped, too powerful to be jealous, if her real interests are not misunderstood, will see with satisfaction a combination which must prove a fatal check to Russian ambition in the north of Europe. This popular tendency, which the sagacity of Russian politicians has probably divined long before it became so palpable as to attract public attention, may furnish us with the key of Russia's policy towards Sweden and Denmark, and explain the cause of their hostility to the popular interest in the latter country; for the Russian cabinet differs from that of other absolute states in not being in the remotest degree affected by any political sympathies. Thus the Austrian cabinet, for example's sake, sides everywhere with conservative interests, of whatever description they may be; but Russia in one instance is intriguing in favour of the popular, and in another of the absolute party; thus, in Wallachia, instigating the constitutional party, whilst in England the accession of a conservative ministry is considered by her as a *contres*mps, because the Whig administration was known partly to have obtained office by promises of economy and peace, and was naturally considered as unwilling to enter on any European war of serious

magnitude, which, however necessary it might be to British interests, and however advantageous it might eventually become to them, would probably at its commencement have driven from power those who had obtained it partially under the pledge of avoiding to the nation all the danger and inconveniences of any important collision.

For many years to come, the state of feeling in Finland, and the hatred excited in the breasts of the Swedish people, by the treachery of Alexander, and the aggressions of Russia, will bear with them the retribution due to the oppression and unprincipled ambition by which they have been occasioned, and will place Russia, in the event of war with this country, at the mercy of any British ministry sufficiently powerful and courageous to undertake it with requisite energy. Finland, abhorring Russia, still looks affectionately and longingly towards Sweden. The great bulk of the Swedish people, irreconcileable in their hatred towards Russia, place their hopes on England, and burn to recover their lost territory. The force of Russia, in Finland, is peculiarly accessible to a hostile and superior fleet. The Swedish people, if a British fleet afforded its aid, whatever might be the wishes of their government, would make any sacrifices to recover Finland, and wipe away the stain under which this martial nation still considers its honour to be smarting. Finland would rise to a man, with the double hope of throwing off the Russian yoke, and becoming reunited to the country to which it affords a strange and romantic example of fidelity and affection. Do not all these circumstances

tend to render the present condition of Finland, and of the adjacent Scandinavian countries, worthy of more interest than their affairs have hitherto inspired in the British public; and ought we to be as indifferent to them as to the feuds and internal squabbles of the South American republics, which may be taken as about the measure of that which their condition has hitherto excited.

CHAPTER IX.

REFLECTIONS ON THE COMMERCE, MANUFACTURES,
AND MINES OF RUSSIA.

THE successors of Peter the Great, who have all affected to follow closely in his footsteps, afford in their conduct a remarkable example of that inherent perversity which *pessimists* attribute to human nature; for though they have virtually departed from his policy on many occasions where there would have been wisdom in keeping in his track, they have seldom abandoned any path on which he had led the way towards injustice or towards error. Of all the manifold schemes of which he left the execution to those who should ascend the throne of the tsars after him, none has been more perseveringly carried on than the fallacious one of rendering Russia a manufacturing country before her agricultural resources were developed, and before even those which had been already brought out were rendered available by the establishment of proper means of communication; and this

not only to the neglect, but to the positive injury of its agricultural interests.

One is tempted to smile at the shallow policy which appears at first sight unable to understand its most obvious interests, or to perceive that just as the minute division and variety of labour conduce to the wealth and comfort of each individual member of society, so nations may find their advantage in following exclusively the vocation which their peculiar circumstances point out, and one cannot in the first instance but wonder at the conduct of a cabinet which, to attain its favourite object, has for a long series of years wasted efforts and lavished sums which, otherwise applied, would have sufficed to raise the country to a high pitch of agricultural prosperity.

A prodigious extent of the territories of European Russia is wonderfully fertile. Its produce is such that there must always be an increasing demand for abroad, and partially of a nature sufficiently various and useful to enable the country to thrive and prosper on it, if driven to consume it at home. Corn, tallow, hemp, hides, wool, and wine, her staple articles, she might easily produce, in ten-fold abundance, and so cheap as to undersell all the world. These articles, which are all necessaries, have, in an international point of view, these great advantages over produce exclusively luxurious in its kind, such as sugars, teas, wines, silks; namely, that foreign countries, when accustomed to receive their supply of such things from a certain market, *cannot* abandon it as they *might* one for mere matters of luxury. On the other hand, if they *could do so*, a nation with such articles left on her hands

would never be poor, as it might be with mountains of silks or pyramids of sugars, if it possessed nothing else.

The produce of Russia is therefore as excellent in its kind as it might be vast in its extent. The fertility of its soil, however, requires cultivation, but if it is unlike that of those lands which bring forth their wealth so spontaneously as almost to make man forgetful of the curse which dooms him to gain his bread by the sweat of his brow, it is no less great. It is a fertility which can only be rendered available by the devotion of labour to it, and of capital which allows the judicious and effective concentration and application of labour, which, when desultory and uncombined, may be only wasted.

In this respect the immense tracts of rich land which everywhere invite the arm of the cultivator have been lamentably neglected. Surely this is not the country to establish manufactories in, since every manufactory, in such a state of things, must withdraw labour from its most legitimate and useful channel, and still further thereby diminish its amount, already so inadequate.

As well establish them in our own infant colonies, where the rich soil is yet uncleared, undrained and uncultivated—as well employ the Negroes, on the sugar plantations, in spinning the cottons which they wear. The reason which would render this absurd, because the population may be obviously so much more lucrative and advantageously employed, applies with equal force to the Russian empire. Its rulers, after persevering for a century in their traditional policy, have

succeeded in converting half a million of its population into artisans, but experience teaches them, that after all their fostering care, and notwithstanding all the sacrifices entailed on the country and daily burthening it to maintain their emulative and protective system, which has hatched its manufacturing establishments into abortive life, every man of this half million might be more profitably employed in cultivating the ground immediately around his manufactory than in working in it.

With the single exception of that department of the government establishment at Alexandrovsky, devoted to the fabrication of playing cards, there is not perhaps a manufactory in the empire to which this observation will not, as a matter of immediate loss or profit, literally apply. What would therefore be the case if the protecting duties were removed? Those who have governed the Russian empire, apparently determined that it should be a world within itself, have been desirous that it should produce and manufacture everything, from the gold dug from the mine, and the steam-engine which pumps the water out of it, down to kid gloves and cotton nightcaps.

Ever since the reign of Peter, the government has been unremitting in its exertions, by precept, by example, and by extraordinary encouragement, to establish every species of manufacture within its dominions, and it has succeeded in so far diffusing the spirit which animates it amongst its subjects, that, neglecting the soil, its capitalists have devoted all their means to the establishment of foundries, iron-works, or factories, or the working of mines scarcely less barren in the profits of their produce than their looms. In con-

sequence of this state of things, two hundred and thirteen manufactories established before the death of Peter the Great have increased to about five thousand, and that near five hundred thousand workmen are employed about them. But so artificial is this apparent prosperity, the result of a long and pertinaciously followed plan, that not only it would immediately decay unless supported by continued protection, but even additional prohibitory duties become every day necessary to prevent it from fading away. We may trace the unceasing solicitude of the Russian government in this respect through every succeeding reign, increasing year by year until the present period.

One may imagine that Peter's ignorance of political economy may have led him to believe that the same arts which conducted to the prosperity of the Low Countries might be advantageous to Russia, from neglect of the fact that in the Low Countries there were twice as many hands as were required to till every acre, whilst in his own country there are many hundred times more acres of fertile land than there were hands to till them. One may imagine his successors either blindly following the path he had chalked out, or animated by that vanity which makes the owner of an estate go to double the expense to produce inferior fruit on his ground than what he could have purchased it for. Like the Emperor Alexander, who, for the sake of having as fine writing paper manufactured within his own dominions as he had seen in London, squandered millions on his imperial paper works at Peterhoff, which, spent to make roads or bring land into proper cultivation, would have suf-

ficed to ensure the wealth of several governments, and have created value on which a mere per centage would have kept his whole empire in the finest English paper. As it is, notwithstanding all these sacrifices, and the eulogies of Kohl, it is very bad and very dear, as the author in writing these pages on the best paper of the imperial manufactory can testify.

Until recent years, it is probable that those at the helm of state, still blind to their error, were awaiting the result of their long and persevering encouragement of the manufacturing interest. But it is impossible to believe that experience has not made manifest now that a manufacturing population has been fostered to the extent of half a million in Russia, that it is turning so much labour not only into a useless, but a detrimental channel. Beyond the old Muscovite manufactory of sheeting, cordage, the famous Russia leather—prepared with the birch tar—and soap—all simple in their nature, and dating from the middle ages, there is no one article sufficiently good or cheap to obtain any sale except under the shelter of excessive duties on those produced abroad.

The population is therefore condemned to use every article manufactured in the country, both inferior in quality, and to pay a greater price for it. To attain this result, this half million of hands have been drawn away from the soil, which would have yielded such profitable returns; and still worse, the capital which would have set the half million hands, and many times this number, to profitable employment, has been wasted in establishments which never vigorously thrive, and would all be given up, if the aforesaid prohibitory

duties and impediments were not periodically increased to bolster them up.

Other nations have indeed pursued a somewhat similar commercial policy, either with the idea of conciliating a great interest, or with the view of employing a redundant population; but Russia had both that interest to create, and has been drawing away the peasant from the rich land which cries out for labour, to make him an artisan, and this to the detriment of unquestionably the most important interest in Russia—that of the produce of her soil.

All these are facts, of which, particularly since the attention of the Emperor Nicholas has been turned to these matters, he is fully sensible. He is aware that the interests of the producers of these exports, which have risen as high as twelve millions sterling, per annum—exports which might in the future have doubled and doubled again—were being sacrificed by the protective duties established to shelter the sickly manufactories, duties which, excluding the imports from foreign countries, were likely to make those foreign countries limit or retrench, instead of increasing, their consumption of Russian produce. But, knowing this, the Emperor Nicholas does not relieve, but, on the contrary, still further sacrifices his agriculturists, by the imposition of fresh duties.

This anti-Russian policy, originating in the hostility of the possessor of Russia to Great Britain, is chiefly intended to affect the latter country. Every article of British manufacture or produce which can possibly be done without, is either saddled with duties which only the love of high-priced things inherent in the

Russian consumers, will induce them to pay at all, or else are utterly prohibited.

Great Britain, on the average, has long taken, chiefly in tallow, hemp, flax, and hides, one half, in value, of the whole exports of the Russian empire to all the other nations of the world. In 1841, Great Britain is still admitted by the official accounts, to have directly taken Russian produce to the amount of five millions and a half sterling. The same year, Russia imported to the value of only 1,600,000*l.* of articles of British produce or manufacture, of which, in round numbers, 1,100,000*l.* was for cotton twist and yarn, and another 100,000*l.* for coal, unwrought tin, iron, and lead.

The effect of the duties and prohibitions directed against articles of British produce and manufacture, has been gradually and steadily to diminish them. In 1837, they had sunk to two millions sterling; in 1839, to 1,776,000*l.*; and in 1840 and 1841, to 1,600,000*l.*

The Russian tariff has only been calculated to operate thus with regard to Great Britain. Of the other half of the Russian exports taken by the rest of the world, the chief consumers are in the Hanseatic towns, France, Prussia, and the United States. The value of the imports from these countries, in every instance exceeds the Russian exports to them; in that of the United States and the Hanseatic towns, three and fourfold.

In supposing the Russian cabinet to have been animated by feelings, of the existence of which we see everywhere the strongest corroborative evidence, we account at once for the apparent discrepancy in its

conduct, which has been in many instances so pre-eminently distinguished by sagacity, that we are often tempted, whilst contemplating its policy, to pause and admire the means by which it has worked out so many of its ambitious designs.

That policy which would be anomalous and absurd in the mere Russian, autocrat though he might be, so that he were the autocrat contented with his actual possessions, and therefore only desirous of increasing to the utmost the wealth and prosperity of that fifth part of the terrestrial globe, which his dominions overspread, assumes a very different aspect when we consider it as the policy of the Romanoff indulging in dreams of universal sovereignty, and who chiefly looks on the prosperity of his present empire, not as in itself the end, but only as the means, by which his views may be forwarded. We may readily understand that, prompted by such motives, he should easily be induced to substitute for these means others conduced more immediately to the end he wishes to attain, even at the sacrifice of collateral interests, for such the interests of his empire, in such an hypothesis, become to him. This is the spirit which actually dictates the policy, and, consequently, the commercial policy of the Russian cabinet; but though, when viewed in this light, it ceases to be absurd, it is yet questionable whether it be very sound, even as regards the furtherance of the object, which one cannot reasonably, after due examination, doubt it to have in view—the extension of the authority of the tsars over Asia. The influence of Russia, in central Asia, has been principally owing to her commercial

intercourse with the people which inhabit it. Through the medium of her Cossacs and Tartar Cossacs she has opened a trade with tribes and nations the most difficult of access, accustoming them to luxuries which habit renders necessaries, and to a close communication, by means of which she gains over, tames and subjects many, and spreads the fame of her power and her influence widely amongst the rest. She began this trade in the reign of Peter, the sovereign who bequeathed to his successors the admonition "to remember that the trade with the Indies led to the sovereignty of the world;" and having then scarcely any manufactories of her own, she commenced it with British manufactured goods. Aware, however, that in the prosecution of her designs a collision with Great Britain must eventually take place, and distinct traces of preparation for such an event are discernible in every department of the administration, she is said to dread that if depending on England for her supply, that country might sacrifice the momentary interests of her commerce to those of her policy as soon as the ambitious views of her rival became too obvious for concealment, and by refusing to supply her with the necessary articles, interrupt and break up the Russian trade in the east, and disturb her influence at a moment unpropitiously early. By rendering herself independent of England for these articles, she not only avoids the possibility of such a contingency, but she deals, as it were, a back-handed blow at her rival, because she *shuts her out of an extensive market.* Accordingly, if we examine attentively the recent commercial legislation of Russia, we

look in vain for measures beneficial to the interests of that country, but we find them all injurious in their spirit to those of Great Britain; and this is natural, because it was hostility to a rival which animated the imperial legislator, and not solicitude for the prosperity of his own people, in direct opposition to which he has framed his regulations. To attain this double object of rendering the eastern trade of Russia independent of England, and of excluding her from it, the whole export trade of Russia to the west has been manifestly endangered and wittingly sacrificed. When we consider that this trade averaged ten millions sterling, and that the avowed revenue of the Russian empire scarcely exceeded seventeen, by the magnitude of the sacrifice we may form an adequate idea of the magnitude of the designs to which its needy cabinet makes the sacrifice.

In common with many Russians, whose words and opinions we have been quoting, we cannot but consider the expediency of this policy as questionable, regarding even the results immediately wished to be obtained; because the chances of any measure of far-reaching legislative foresight in her foreign relations, being ever adopted by a constitutional country like England, in opposition to the immediate interests of her manufacturing population, are too remote, and too impracticable, to have been worth sacrificing to them any considerable portion of the development of the resources of a country like Russia, whose prosperity is already retarded by the exhausting weight of the overgrown establishments it maintains. If Russia had continued to draw from England the goods which she

sells, or might sell, to Asia, though, in reality, by an interruption of this commerce, a rich country, like England, must suffer less than a poor one, like Russia, yet such an interruption, from the peculiar nature of the forms of government of the two countries, could never be resorted to by a British cabinet; and as long as the Russian government did not close its markets, friendly or hostile, Great Britain would continue to supply them. Constitutional systems, if they tend to give more rapid growth to the power of a state, always limit the disponibility of it. The despot may do all that the state he governs can do—the constitutional minister only what the nation he presides over can be coaxed or persuaded into doing. A constitutional country may sometimes be brought to do what its immediate interests demand, but seldom, where any sacrifice is required, to act to-day for the morrow. The councils of a despot, as far as their penetration can pierce the veil of futurity, may prepare for its remotest contingencies; they may sow seeds, as the Russian cabinet has done, destined only to produce their fruit after a long series of years, and patiently await the harvest.

Nevertheless, the extraordinary efforts which Russia has made to establish manufactories within her own dominions have been on the whole so unsuccessful, that it would appear of late years that some doubt has arisen in the minds of her politicians, as to whether they will, with all fostering care, afford a sufficient supply. The belief that every species of industry would, from many social and political causes, flourish more readily in Germany than in Russia, appears

to have induced the determination to resort to the industry of Germany, should that of Russia fail in supplying the Asiatic market, and consequent treaties and arrangements have been entered into with the states of Germany.

The commercial union of three-fourths of these states, known under the name of Zoll-verein, owes its direct origin to the influence and unceasing efforts of Prussian policy. Commenced, indeed, in 1818, when the first treaty was signed with the petty principality of Schwartzburg Sonderhausen, it has of very late years taken its full extension. The system of the Zoll-verein was inspired by very distinct views, which have no necessary connexion, though forming part of the same plan; they are often confounded together. The first regarded the interior administration, and had the laudable object of throwing, for all commercial purposes, all the states of Germany into one. A common custom-house surrounded the whole union, and this barrier once passed, the whole of its interior was as free for the circulation of goods as the interior of France or England to its own subjects. Previously to this, one petty state prohibited what another allowed, and the interior trade and manufactures were cramped and harassed, as we may imagine those of England would be, if every county were an independent state, and had a custom-house on its border.

The second object of the Zoll-verein, conceived in a spirit of hostility to England, was nearly that of Napoleon's famous continental league, to exclude every article of British manufacture or produce which

could possibly be done without, from every part of its territory.

The instigation of Russia and its promises, are said to have been mainly instrumental in inspiring the strenuous and increasing efforts of Prussia to increase the development of this association, and to infuse into it an anti-British spirit. The Russian cabinet having daily convinced itself during several years, of the futility of its attempts to make a manufacturing country, is said to have held out the promise of hereafter throwing open the oriental market to Germany, as soon as the exclusion of British produce should have led the states of its Zoll-verein to manufacture all that Great Britain formerly supplied them with, and all that the increasing demands of Central Asia, and of the Russian empire, may require. A bold, but competent authority, thus characterizes the motive idea of both cabinets—that of St. Petersburg, “which loses no opportunity of aggrandizement, finds in Great Britain its chief obstacle, and feels a consequent hostility towards it. By the exclusion of all British produce from a large portion of the continent, it strikes at Great Britain, not only in the safest way, but in the only way in which it can hurt her. By the same policy, whenever the population and capital of Germany shall have been turned into a manufacturing channel, Russia, holding the keys of a vast market, will create an interest in the country which will powerfully second that which the fear of liberal institutions and her alliances with petty princely houses have already given her.”

As regards the ambitious hope entertained by the

Russian cabinet, of extending its territorial possessions in Germany, or the dominions of German states, those who may be disposed to agree with the views of the author, may still consider that it would hardly extend to the military kingdom of Prussia—Prussia, where every man is *attempted* to be made a soldier, and whose trumpet and drum may be said to have echoed, ever since she has been at peace, from one end of Europe to the other, as a century ago her Frederick made it echo in time of war. But there is much reason to believe that Russia does not estimate the stability of her neighbour sufficiently high to preclude that hope, and, at least, amongst the small class of ambitious officers and courtly placemen whom the imperial policy has been able to inspire with any enthusiasm of foreign conquest; when they style themselves the modern Romans, they always confidently talk of planting within a few years the double headed eagle of the Romanoffs in Constantinople, and in the capital of Prussia. Now it must be remembered that these are all men who have the fear of Count Benkendorff's office before their eyes, and who would rather not admit, with a third party present, that the Emperor Paul met with an untimely end.

The great naval authority of the empire—the descendant and namesake of the favourite of Peter the Great—may probably remember, when he peruses these pages, observing to his officers, after dinner on the deck of the boat in which he was steaming to Stettin, too unguardedly, no doubt, for one who has so much his master's ear,—“ We shall some day send a Russian viceroy this road to Berlin.”

Perhaps of all European countries, the real condition of Prussia is most mistaken in England, and mistaken in the most hopeless way, because not only unknown, but misconceived and misrepresented. The kingdom of Prussia is the most artificial, and the least likely to preserve its nationality of any state of Europe. The administration of Frederick the First, the extraordinary genius of Frederick the Second, a policy unparalleled in its continuous prudence, and a singular good fortune, have made Prussia what she is; but she is far from being what she is vulgarly supposed to be.

The chief intercourse betwixt England and Prussia is with the Rhenish provinces: these provinces, formerly French, long for a constitution; they are still governed by French laws. It has even been recently judged unsafe to introduce the Prussian code; they are partially Roman catholics, and the government dreads their throwing themselves on the first outbreak into the arms of France. Under these circumstances, these fertile and valuable Rhenish provinces are treated, like spoiled children, with a conciliatory lenity, which in nowise resembles the administration of Old or Eastern Prussia. On the other hand, the sagacious policy of the government buys up nearly all the liberal talent within and without its dominions, and the venality of its talent is one of the most discouraging features in the future prospects of Germany. These writers are encouraged to attack and stigmatize in an ultra-liberal tone the free institutions of constitutional countries, with the condition of indiscriminately lauding the government and administration of Prussia.

Englishmen naturally concluding that what is so lavishly praised by these fastidious and democratic literati, must be all that they represent it. Through the same medium has been derived the vulgar idea of the Prussian strength, resources, and nationality, which has almost magnified Prussia into a first-rate power. In point of fact, it is true that almost everything that a long succession of skilful government could do, has been done by the Prussian cabinet to consolidate the state, and furthermore, the real interest of the population of its dominions has been wisely and sagaciously attended to wherever it was not necessary to sacrifice it to the security of the government, and of the kingdom into which these dominions have been artificially formed; but these sacrifices have been constantly required. In spite of them, the Prussian monarchy, made up of shreds and patches, after the thirty years' storm which followed the invasion of the great Gustavus, unlike almost every other, even of the feeblest European monarchies, is likely to be swallowed in the first general and important conflict.

The dominions of Prussia are very poor—the event of war would utterly ruin its credit; the affection of its few wealthy provinces is questionable, and its history has always proved what its military geography and statistics point out, that the loss of two important battles is the loss of the whole monarchy. The wars of Frederick the Great tend rather to confirm than weaken this assertion; his peculiar genius, almost unparalleled in history, was a rare accident, naturally not to be counted on in a future contingency; but if another Frederick should arise, he would not find any

superiority in the modern armies of Prussia over those of its neighbours, such as his own armies possessed ; and further, he would find very different adversaries to contend with. With all these advantages, Prussia was lost over and over again by Frederick, and redeemed not alone by his own extraordinary genius—but it must be added, without any disparagement of it—by the fortunate combination of the errors and dissensions of his enemies.

Even Frederick obtained no unbalanced advantage over a Russian army ; since his death, no one instance can be found, in a multitudinous host of combats, of any Prussian force, without a vast numerical superiority, or unaided by foreign allies, ever prevailing, upon a fair field, against the arm of France.

Perhaps, from the higher departments of the war office, down to the army tailors, art has done all it can for the Prussian army, but in the essentials of its war-like material it has proved itself always inferior to that of the Russian and the French. When the fate of the Prussian kingdom, therefore, depends upon a battle or two, its cabinet may be excused in not looking forward to their issue with precisely the same confidence as the rampart-scorning Spartans of old. The consciousness that the fate of this extensive monarchy is balanced like a vast weight held in precarious equilibrium, has inspired both the acquisitiveness of its own cabinet and that of Russia—of Russia, because this vulnerability of the Prussian kingdom leads it to hope that it will thus be enabled eventually to supplant it, and to realize, in the north, one part of its ambitious dream of embracing the Baltic, as it has been pro-

gressing in the south, to embrace with subject shores the Black Sea.

The instinct of self-preservation leads the Prussian cabinet to endeavour to extend its influence and dominion in Germany, so that it may eventually rest on a more unshakeable and stable basis. Prussia is not unlike one of the tall firs that grow in the sand of her eastern provinces to a gigantic size, without a root that penetrates beyond the first few superficial inches of the soil. She is now endeavouring to strike these roots deep into it, not to be overturned by the first tempest; but in effecting this, there are the following rivalries and dangers to be immediately considered. In the first place, her ascendancy over the German states has to be disputed, inch by inch, with Austria; in the next, her Rhenish provinces, longing for a constitution, lie temptingly near to France. On the other hand, the neighbourhood of Russia rises menacingly in the vista of the future; but the acquisition of an extended interest and influence in Germany is an immediate want; the inundation of liberalism, an hourly menacing danger; and the perils to be apprehended from the ambition of Russia, still so distant that they may be averted. Russia holds out the hand of assistance and fellowship, and Prussia seizes it to attain immediate objects, trusting to be able, by means of the countenance and strength it imparts to her, to be able to ward off the future dangers of this alliance.

This union in the “*arriere pensée*” of both cabinets, like so many political arrangements, may be, as concerns distant eventualities, of a “diamond-cut-diamond”

character ; but as regards all its first objects, it is perfectly sincere, and its first-born has been the famous anti-British Zoll-verein.

The defensively ambitious policy of the Prussian cabinet would be laudable if the interests of the Prussian monarchy were those of the population of its dominions ; but they are not so. These true interests would lie, as well as those of the whole German people, in a federative or absolute fusion, and to this a constitution would rapidly lead them. United, this vast country might in security disband three-fourths of the vast armies that now drain its resources to uphold fictitious nationalities, which are the mere disguise of family interests. Assuredly, the unhappy Prussian officer—after years of service, looking wistfully at the cup of coffee, or the glass of sour wine, his miserable pittance will not allow him to afford, or obliged himself to wash out his only shirt—would be better employed, both for himself and his country, in some useful pursuit, than in wasting his time in the performance of barren military duties.

The consciousness that the result of a representative form of government in the German states would tend to their fusion, is the reason why the Prussian cabinet chooses rather to risk its most valuable provinces than to introduce it, and—equally unpalatable to the rulers of the other states of Germany—the constitutions they have pretended to establish have been mere parodies on the free institutions of England, Holland, Belgium, France, and the Peninsula. But the Prussian government, unlike the Emperor Nicholas, who does not conceal his hatred to their existence, artfully induces

the belief that it is not averse to representative systems, but only doubtful as to whether its people is yet ripe for them, and anxious to prepare it for their reception.

"After all," one hears in England, "the Prussian government is reasonable, since it only professes to hold temporarily back, without refusing this boon to its people, and it actively progresses in preparing them for it by directing all its energies to the diffusion of education." But it should be observed that as education will spread, the government, by taking it into its own hands, diminishes its dangers; that education is of many kinds, and that the kind so ostentatiously disseminated in Prussia, is so also in Russia, and has been so since the days of Peter. Many Russians have acquired knowledge in languages and in sciences —have become learned in medicine, in architecture, in botany, and in conchology, without having imbibed one additional notion of the political rights and duties of a member of society,—consequently without one iota of political education. This sort of education, which Russia also permits, is, indeed, disseminated in Prussia, but of the facilities afforded in the pursuit of any kind of political knowledge, which alone can tend to constitute the education which is to prepare a people for sharing in its own government, the reader may judge by turning to the Prussian censorship, which excludes from the Prussian dominions the *Times* newspaper, and which refused to allow the publication, in Berlin, of a pamphlet subjoined in the appendix, in which a Finn respectfully memorializes the Emperor Nicholas upon, rather than reproaches him with, his having withheld from his native principality the constitution

which his brother promised, and which he swore, in his coronation oath, to grant.

The reader must also be reminded that the severest libel laws, in this, utterly differ from a censorship—that great wrongs will, in the former case, force their way into notice by inducing the sufferers to brave them; but a censorship prevents their ever being published by withholding its written sanction, which is an indispensable preliminary thereunto. When Englishmen become better acquainted with Prussia, they will judge that its monarch would have shewn more liberality in laying on one side that great extinguisher of all enlightenment, than in subscribing to send out a bishop to Jerusalem.

It is further worthy of observation, that although there really may be danger with certain nations, and in certain stages of society, in letting them walk alone, the population of Germany, and especially of Prussia, would be the least likely to abuse popular power by giving way to any licence or excess. With the exception of the vagaries of the German's student-years, which are inspired by his Rhenish or his beer, or the occasional excitement of the mob of large towns against the Jews, no people in Europe is so quiet, orderly, inoffensive, and submissive to authority—none more humane or more industrious. The shoals of settlers it annually sends forth to the United States, notwithstanding the sudden transition from virtually absolute government to democracy, notoriously become the most peaceful citizens of the adoptive home. In fact, what the German character requires appears to be, some infusion of that turbulent and energetic spirit which seems to have entirely left the Germanic people

with the emigration of the Helvetians, Franks, Batavians, and Saxons, unless some portion of it still lingers in the mountains of the Tyrol.

The interests of Russia, when from a manufacturer she is obliged to become a dealer, would naturally be to purchase a good article cheap, instead of the dear and bad one, which Germany must furnish ; but the interest of Nicholas is, in the first place, to injure a rival, and to place himself as much as possible out of its power. The policy of the Romanoff here interferes with that of the Russian. The increase of duties on all English produce—to such an extent as to amount to almost total prohibition, and to cause three-fourths of the ships employed in the North Russian trade either to go out in ballast or laden with coals—has induced British merchants to seek in other countries for those articles which they formerly took principally from Russia. The exports to England, instead of augmenting, as with the vast increase of population they ought to have done, have been gradually diminishing. As every year Russia takes less from England, England will naturally seek to draw the Russian produce she consumes from other markets. When once the trade is destroyed, and other markets have been created or opened to the speculator, it is very unlikely that this trade will ever be turned back to its former channel, and thus ten or twelve millions of raw surplus produce, which the country once exported, will be left upon its hands. It is to be remarked that, although the chief produce of Russia consists of necessities, the hides and hemp and tallow she exports are superfluous necessities, which, by remaining in the

country will in no way contribute to its material enjoyment. Though it may be true that the varied produce of the Russian empire is calculated to satisfy all the necessities of its population, it should never be forgotten that its surplus, if not exchanged for foreign luxuries—an almost illimitable surplus too—must be wasted. Neither hides, tallow, nor hemp, when in superabundant quantity, can, when there is no longer a foreign market, be converted into any other form which might minister to native wants. Hemp is grown in lands which can be converted to very little other purpose; tallow and hides are furnished by the cattle of the steppes and such as are bred on the wild pasturage land, on which, if cattle were not bred, nothing would be produced in lieu of it. When, therefore, England, the chief market for all these articles, ceases to draw from Russia what she can find more advantageously elsewhere, if obliged to pay for them in cash, the latter country will thus naturally be impoverished by ten or twelve millions sterling annually. With regard to the imports, which were only likely to be long afterwards affected by the diminution of the former—that is, when the consumers, who were principally the owners of export articles, became pinched from a want of market for their produce, and thus unable to buy the accustomed imports which increase of duty had rendered more costly, whilst their means to purchase had lessened—these had also diminished by fifty millions of roubles. The revenues of the crown, it is true, remained the same, because, if the duties had been even doubled, though the imports diminished even by half, it is clear that the former would still remain the same; but when

the imports fall still lower, which they will when the diminishing exports impoverish the consumers, whilst the article consumed has grown dearer, this will no longer be the case. Though the duties be doubled, when the imports diminish to a quarter, the revenue collected from them will no longer be the same ; if the duty be still further increased on a scale to meet this depression, the imports will cease altogether.

In pursuance of a policy which it now probably contemplates changing at no remote period—in all but its anti-British tendency, which, indeed, inspired it with life—the government has set the example for manufacturing enterprise, by erecting and maintaining various manufactories on a scale of colossal magnitude and at the sacrifice of prodigious sums. It has only within a recent period paused, without yet retrograding, in this course.

It was imagined that the prosperity of these establishments, founded and continued under circumstances peculiarly favourable, would prove to the government both an important source of profit, and a tempting example to the rest of the nation. It might originally have been reasonably supposed by the projectors of this plan, that, in the former respect at least, their anticipations could not fail to have been realized. The crown always possessed many millions of serfs, or slaves, the personal property of the emperor, a number which has increased to upwards of twenty millions. The labour of these individuals, the crown could command at the very lowest rate of remuneration,—namely, that which sufficed to purchase the coarsest articles of food and raiment. It enjoyed also, natur-

ally, the advantage of being able to devote to such speculations any requisite amount of capital. The peculiar position of the Russian government, as slave-master of so large a portion of the population, when once the idea was adopted, of rendering the country a manufacturing one, made it also absolutely necessary that it should become their task-master in the new direction which it wished to see given to labour, since this class constituted two-fifths of the Slavonic population. As a source of profit, the experiment has signally failed; and if the great landowners have been induced by the policy of government to follow its example, they have little more reason to congratulate themselves on its results.

The corruption pervading every department of government, and diseasing society, is here distinctly visible, paralysing and rendering barren the effects of power, in whichever direction they tend. Crown manufactories have been instituted on a scale of grandeur and magnificence, and conducted with military regularity. There is every reason why they should flourish, uniting the advantages of a vast capital, a constant demand for their produce, and the lowest wages in the world for labour. Erroneous as may have been the idea of encouraging such establishments, at an expense and a sacrifice which must prove so exhausting, it is still difficult to understand that such sacrifices having been once made, they should not flourish under so many favourable circumstances—like plants which ought to thrive in a soil expensively prepared, which they are certain to impoverish. But they have not even thriven.

Millions have been expended—thousands of slaves toil on them, repaid by the mere necessities of subsistence, and yet, so far from proving a source of emolument, they remain a heavy burthen to the government, which they do not even suffice to supply with the articles it immediately requires. If all the government manufactories were to-morrow to be swallowed up by an earthquake,—notwithstanding the immense capital which would then be literally sunk, although not more irretrievably than it now is, and notwithstanding the consequent loss of the interest which this capital ought to bring in, and which ought to be deducted from the price of this produce, in comparing it with the price of foreign manufactured articles,—the government could purchase every manufactured article consumed in its service, at a rate positively far cheaper than it can now manufacture for. It is true these vast and splendid establishments present a very imposing aspect to the eye of the stranger, who, in his simplicity, places implicit reliance in the assertion of the government agents, or in their official reports—reports which are either made up of *ex parte* statements, or of direct and unblushing falsehoods, but all calculated to lead to the most favourable impressions of their thriving condition. It is on the authority of similar documents that it is argued that the whole manufacturing system of Russia is flourishing and expanding.

We may thus see in the note-book of the traveller, that he visited vast establishments for the working of iron, the construction of the mechanism of steam-engines, the fabrication of cloths, cottons, and every

description of stuffs; of hardware, of porcelain, of glass, of carpets, of paper, and, in short, of every imaginable article to which human industry and ingenuity can be profitably devoted. One vast manufactory is under the command of a chief, who bears the rank, and wears the uniform of general, and who has under him colonels, majors, and captains, as overseers; for in Russia the mania of military rank prevails so far, that even the lamplighters are in uniform, which, it must be confessed, is, in general, equally sullied by the colonel and the general. The workmen are all crown serfs, forced to habits of industrious regularity, and maintained at an expense of five shillings per month. Foreign artisans, engaged at high salaries, direct their labour, which is assisted by the most perfect machinery and tools with which, regardless of expense, the liberality of government has provided them. The vast iron foundry at Peter Zavodsky; the works at Toula, at Colpenas, where the largest steam-engines are constructed; and the establishment at Alexandroffsky, more extensive and as miscellaneous in its nature as the celebrated Soho; are vaunted as monuments of wisdom and good management.

All these are facts which the traveller gathers on a hasty and superficial view, and which, put together in connexion with the official statements, lead to conclusions perfectly erroneous. On a closer examination, we find that none of these vast government works, though they are more extensive than any similar establishments in England, have yet been able to construct an iron steam-boat, or a rolled rail for a

railway ; and we discover that they are all maintained at a great pecuniary sacrifice. At the same time, so little progress has been made in the arts of manufacture, that, excepting the plate glass and the fine porcelain which are exclusively made for the use of the court, every imaginable article is inferior in quality to those of foreign workmanship, or, in the few instances where they may rival them in quality, are far more elevated in price.

With regard to these model establishments, we will enter into a few of the details of their organization and conduct, which are the more important, because the causes of their failure apply, in a great measure, to those belonging to private individuals.

The government iron works in the vicinity of St. Petersburg, which we will immediately advert to, furnish us with a striking exemplification of these. They are conducted by Englishmen, the generals Clarke and Wilson, men of humble origin, like most of their countrymen in the Russian service, and thoroughly naturalized, either by birth in Russia, or by long residence in their adopted country, to all its habits and customs, but yet cited for their *comparative integrity* in the administration of their departments. These establishments are exceedingly extensive, especially that of Colpenas, situated on the left bank of the Neva, a little above St. Petersburg, on a spot on which vast buildings have been erected, and furnished with all those complicated machines which British ingenuity has devised, as well as with the most powerful of those gigantic tools which modern invention has used to fashion huge and ponderous masses of iron,

which formerly the artisan had no means of working or of handling, and which were not required, until rendered necessary by the new impetus which the progress of the steam-engine has given to the whole Vulcanic art.

It is intended that all work required for the naval service shall be performed here; the iron-work required about vessels, the guns, shot, and the engines of steam-boats; and this establishment is attached to the Admiralty, in the same manner as that of Sisterbeck, Toula, and many others are to the War Office. Like all of a similar nature in the Russian empire, each manufactory, or sometimes two, as in the present case,* are governed and administered by separate chiefs, and their works are considered as quite independent of any other, or of any department of administration excepting the one to whose service they are particularly attached. Each one of these establishments is at liberty to undertake any contract, either for any other department, or for any private individual, in such case receiving its full value equally from the former as from the latter, and each striking its balance of expenditure and gain at the year's end. Thus, if the Admiralty were to order anything from Sisterbeck, it must be immediately paid for, and the War Office would, in like manner, have to pay for any work ordered at Colpenas.

Colpenas, in common with the rest, enjoys, besides the advantages of its locality, and of being able to command the labour of as many thousand serfs as its

* Colpenas and Alexandrowski imperial works, a few miles distant, are both under one director.

directors choose to employ, the privilege of having the preference accorded to it in any contract required to be done for government over any private works, which are only allowed to interfere in such undertakings when all the government establishments have refused it at the same price. Now if, in Petersburg, we examine the brass and iron work about every public edifice or monument, we shall find them bearing the name of "Beird," an Englishman recently dead, who for many years conducted a private iron manufactory of his own, and who made a large fortune in competition with the government establishments, although he had both to take into account the interest of the capital laid out upon his works, and to pay at a high rate for labour, as he must either hire workmen or purchase slaves, burthens from which his competitors are exempt. Nevertheless, nine-tenths of the public orders which the colossal government establishments have refused, he performed, because he could make a lower tender. For his success, Mr. Beird, however, gave a very satisfactory reason; he was accustomed to observe, "that he was always contented with far less profit than it would content the government people to steal." There are, in fact, too many officials connected with these public establishments, who will all, from high to low, in some manner, dishonestly profit by every job, to allow them to perform the labour at the same price that a private individual can do; and the directors of such works, well aware that, on this account, it would be difficult to compete with him, usually take from him a private douceur not to bate down his prices too low. In this manner, in the

face of all the ostensible disadvantages which have been cited, we find Beird everywhere employed, and furnishing the bronze work of the Alexander column, the iron roofing of the new cathedral, the brass capitals of the columns, the public statues, the suspension bridges, and even to a large portion of the naval guns and shot.

These facts speak volumes as to the manner in which these establishments are conducted. We must add that the works at Colpenas are so favourably situated, that if the government were to farm out the place it might obtain a high rent for the locality, and besides purchase everything which it now furnishes at forty per cent, lower than it now costs to manufacture.

It would appear as if in its own hands no useful or beneficial institution could thrive, exposed to the insatiable voracity of its agents. The monopoly of the sale of spirits offers a most striking example of this. It was formerly conducted by the government, and gradually diminished until it no longer paid the expense of superintending. It was then farmed out to private individuals, who now rent it at five millions sterling ! nearly one-third of the whole revenue of the Russian empire.

In a country where the law professes to punish peculation with the utmost rigour, the bare-faced manner in which it is carried on must be witnessed to be believed. It is as impossible for any private individual to have any transaction or connexion with the government, without connivance at the dishonesty of its agents, as for the camel of the Scriptures to go through the eye of the needle.

We will cite a few instances which immediately

occur to our recollection. An artillery or commissariat officer is sent to superintend the delivery and melting down of some brass guns, in a private foundry, the metal of which was to be applied to the adornment of a certain public building in the course of construction in St. Petersburg. The master of the works had been already obliged to bribe in different quarters to obtain the job; but he was still obliged to bribe this functionary, to prevent his throwing innumerable difficulties in his way, in the most conscientious discharge of his duty, in honestly carrying through the work he had undertaken. It is therefore absolutely necessary to throw him a sop, which, joined to what he has already paid to others, would leave the contractor no profit. By bribing the officer a little higher, however, he agrees to allow the master of the works to remunerate himself very amply. A pipe is run through the wall, from the smelting-pot, into an adjoining chamber, so that whilst the brass is being run out, before the colonel and his satellites, who carefully weigh every casting, and note it down in ineffaceable black and white, which is copied and re-copied, and deposited in the military archives, about an equal quantity is being run out into pigs in the next room, to the profit of the founder.

In another instance the same works have a contract with government, to furnish some thousand shot and shell. The contract is undertaken at prices which would scarce furnish any profit, if no bribes had been required; these are, however, indispensable. But the man who superintends the bargain and delivery, colonel or general, or whatever rank he may be of, on the other hand, helps the contractor in his difficulty. He

places a man to count the number of shot and shell, as they are wheeled past him in barrows, to be embarked upon the Neva; but, instead of being put on board as soon as they have passed the gate, they are wheeled round the works, and brought in, by a back way, to pass again and again before the man who keeps the score, just as we see theatrical warriors march artfully round behind the scenes, to reappear as the tail of armies of which they formed the van. If anything should go wrong—if the colonel should have incurred the enmity of his chief, and the missing shot be noticed, the responsibility, or, at least, the criminal responsibility, of the imposition, falls not on the guilty party, but on the subaltern, who was placed to count the shot. The latter may be sent to the galleys, the former can only fall into temporary disgrace. Such explosions are now, however, so rare, that men in office have learned to regard them as men out of office do the ravages of lightning—as contingencies so remote and improbable as to occasion no uneasiness even to the most timid.

Mismanaged as the government iron works are, and must continue to be, unless a radical change can be effected in the system of administration, there are many causes which do not apply to other manufacturing establishments, which may yet render it politic to maintain them, even at the sacrifice of paying much dearer for far inferior articles than could be purchased from abroad. The steam-engine, in a naval, and no less than in a manufacturing point of view, is likely to play a part which will be very important in its results on the destiny of nations; and although it is difficult to predict what its ultimate influence may

be, everything leads us to believe that the effects of the invention of gunpowder, and of the compass, or even of the art of printing, will be thrown far into the shade, by the important changes it is likely to occasion in the political relation and destiny of states. A naval force, unaided by steamers, against another amply provided with them, would probably find itself in the position of an ancient navy, attempting to use the iron beaks of its ships against the artillery of modern men of war. Now, natural and social causes, connected with the geological formation of the country, the state of society, and the history of the mechanical arts in England, will probably ever continue to enable that country to defy competition *in price*, in everything connected with mechanism, as completely as it now defies competition, both in price and quality. Continental nations will, consequently, ever find it cheaper to purchase their steam-engines in England, and, in a pecuniary light, it would be peculiarly advantageous for Russia to do so, since, under another commercial system, she might have paid for them with her own superabundant produce. Yet, regarding the matter in a politic point of view, it would be highly injudicious to leave herself at the mercy of a rival who may refuse to allow her neighbours to profit by her skill at the very moment when most in request, when it would be attempted to turn it against herself.

The most limited acquaintance with the subject shews that the formation of a mechanical establishment, where steam-engines can be constructed, is the work of years, and can never by any effort be suddenly raised up to meet the exigencies of the moment.

Besides the advantages of possessing establishments in which it might build them, when they could no longer be obtained from abroad, it is of vital importance that the government should continue to build engines, if only to form workmen capable of keeping in repair those which are in use. These are all plausible reasons why Russia should keep up these iron works, though every article they furnish may perhaps (if every outlay is taken into consideration) have cost her tenfold what she could have purchased it for in England. She wishes to form a school of artisans who (regardless of the question of economy) may render her independent of England, in those moments when pecuniary considerations vanish before others of more vital importance.

But even in this object these works have hitherto totally and signally failed. Although the construction of the steam-engine has been assiduously studied in Russia since the earliest period of its general dissemination in England, it may be fearlessly asserted, that if the foreign superintendents (all Englishmen) were dismissed to-morrow from the government works, the Russians are as incapable of constructing a steam-boat now as they were in the time of John the Terrible. It is not for the want of thousands of good and industrious workmen, who can use the hammer and the file with as much activity as any other foreigners, but those required to plan their work are utterly wanting. The necessity of educating such a native class as should combine the practice and theory of their profession, and a thorough acquaintance with the machine in the knowledge of which it consisted, has long since been

foreseen, and was intended to have been provided for in the organization of these institutions. The means resorted to in order to produce the desired effect, have, however, proved totally ineffectual for the purpose ; and the practical folly of action here, as in everything, contradicts the paper wisdom of the legislative theory. The English superintendents who serve by contract in the works, without military rank, are men, enticed by high salaries to Russia, from various establishments in England, in which they have been either distinguished workmen or foremen. Bluff, honest, and uncompromising, they belong to that respectable and interesting class which has sprung of late years into existence since the vast extension of mechanism—a class in which no man rises to distinction, as we see men rising in the commercial and trading world, by mere plodding, or good fortune, unless uniting shrewdness and talent to industry ; therefore, all members of this class who have raised themselves above the herd, must be men of some intellectual superiority, and, though often uneducated, they can never be ignorant. These men do their work as overseers, conscientiously and intelligently, but they mix in none of the disgraceful transactions which they daily witness, and, retaining all their English prejudices, together with their independent spirit, look with undisguised contempt on the Russians associated and mixed up with them to learn their art.

These Russians are always cadets or officers, and therefore legally noblemen, and far their superiors in rank, utterly ignorant of their profession, and quite indifferent as to learning it. Their pay (about a tithe of

the salary of those over whom they possess superiority of caste, and whom they affect to treat with corresponding arrogance) is a provision inadequate to furnish the common decencies of life, and until they attain a situation where they can rob wholesale, they are obliged to eke out a miserable existence by a system of petty larceny and fraud. This is carried so far, that we remember an instance related to us, of a pile of copper which had been coined into ten kopeck pieces, which was locked in a strong room, and which, on being visited, was found to have sunk away in the middle, forming a hole like the crater of a volcano. It was discovered that a hole had been bored through the flooring, and that from an office situated below it, the officers had filched the pieces, pulling them through by a pole and wire.

It was imagined that the constant contact of these officers with the foreigners who serve by contract, and the fact of their spending half their lives in the works with them, could not fail to instruct them in their art. But these “*blagarodiè*” (nobility) are as unwilling to learn, as the contemptuous strangers are to teach; and with this corresponding want of zeal, they continue as ignorant of the profession which it is intended they should learn, as we sometimes see a sailor who has been all his life at sea, remain of navigation and of swimming. The only knowledge which they acquire is that connected with the economy of the establishment, and the art of peculation.

The English mechanic, overseer and instructor, has indeed the option of entering the service, and obtaining an officer's rank, which raises his social position

many grades; but then his pay would be changed from 300*l.* or 400*l.* per annum, to 30*l.* or 40*l.*; and this change from an honest plebeian would force him to become a *noble* rogue. Eventually, however, this new path will open to him a career of distinction. If he can humble himself, and curb his British spirit to submit to all the humiliations which, as soon as he wears epaulettes, his chiefs have the right to impose upon him, the ex-workman is sure to rise, in the course of time, to the rank of colonel or of general, bedizened with stars and decorations; but he must owe his rise to the pliancy of his disposition, and not to his mechanical ingenuity.

A certain number of naval cadets have been distributed by the minister of marine, amongst the different steam-boats, to acquire a knowledge of the steam-engine from the English engineers, and to be employed about the engines. The cadet is treated like a lacquey by his own officer, but when an Englishman out of uniform ventures to command them to take different parts of the engine to pieces, it is considered by them as a grievous degradation—not that a man wearing the imperial uniform should perform this office, but that he should perform it at the command of a man holding no military rank. He receives, in consequence, a sharp message from the minister of marine, that they are not to be employed about such dirty work. The Englishman, since he cannot set about it his own way, takes no further pains to instruct them. He determines to confine himself to giving them such information as they ask of him. If their idleness and indifference did not prevent them from

applying to him, the contempt which the Russian institutions inculcate for every one not invested with military rank, would alone render this repugnant to their pride, and the cadet or the ensign, who would bow to the man, one grade his superior, when he spat in his face, would feel humiliated in seeking instruction from a man who was his inferior. The consequence is, that after several years they are as ignorant of the subject as before, and do not when they see it know the air-pump from the cylinder, or the cylinder from the condenser of a steam-boat engine. The minister of marine, and the higher authorities of the admiralty, have, however, noted them down as men who *must* be conversant with what they have studied so long, and who, having spent the years of their probation attached to the engine-room of a steam-boat, must necessarily be well acquainted with its mechanical detail. They are promoted and employed accordingly. We are not sure that they are not examined, but if they are so, firstly, the examiners are as ignorant as themselves; secondly, without a bribe James Watt himself could not pass muster, and with a sufficient one there is no one so obtuse or ignorant who might not do so. This misconception regarding the acquirements of these men, imbibed by the minister of marine himself, naturally is so by the emperor, who is thus ignorant of a fact with which every Englishman in his service is acquainted,—that no progress whatever has been made amongst his Russian subjects, in the manufacture of engines or machines; and that, according to the present system, they will in twenty years hence be no further advanced.

As we often see that superficial knowledge leads men astray, where total ignorance, by causing them to distrust their own judgment, would have produced a very different effect, so the affectation, in imitation of Peter the Great, of a sort of encyclopædiacal proficiency in which several of the Russian sovereigns, and particularly the Emperor Nicholas, have indulged, has been productive of many evil consequences. A sovereign never wants for flattery; it is wasted even on constitutional kings; how much more, then, on absolute princes, whose frown or favour is disgrace or fortune? The Emperor Alexander inserts into the wall of Peter the Great's house at Sardaam, a marble slab; the Emperor Nicholas forges with his own hands a piece of iron at Colpenas, which is kept as a sacred relic; they are both immediately compared by their courtiers to Peter, who, if he became a proficient in few arts, studied all that he attempted to learn with such earnestness, that lie became fully sensible of their difficulties, and at least a judge who could not easily be deceived on all of them. The Emperor Nicholas, who appears either to have been persuaded of the versatility of his genius, and the comprehensiveness of his knowledge, or to wish to impose the belief on his subjects, has thus been induced to interfere in the details of matters of which he was really ignorant, forgetful that it was not the fact of having *attempted* so many things which rendered Peter so admirable, but that of his having *understood* so many. Accordingly the result was very different; if Peter looked too minutely into trifles, he did not overlook matters of importance. Nicholas, from affecting to see everything with his

own eyes, appears to be only the more easily blinded to what is passing before them, and remains to this day ignorant of the real condition of the very establishment in which he forged the piece of iron.

The private manufactories are principally in the hands of the wealthy landed aristocracy, who are the owners of about twenty-four millions of slaves. They are stated in official accounts to amount to about eight thousand in number; but more than a third of what are denominated manufactories, are tanneries, melting-houses for tallow, places where potash is collected, and establishments for making beetroot sugar. With the exception of those last mentioned, the capital and labour expended upon them might be far more advantageously spent upon the soil, as it has been already stated: let us now explain why it is not so spent.

The landowners, who are the chief capitalists, have been accustomed to consider all agents and stewards of estates as determined rogues. The Russians they employ can scarcely resist the temptation of pilfering before the eyes of their masters; Germans, or Russo-Germans are therefore usually preferred; but if more prudent and artful, these prove no more honest in the main than the Russians, and are no less oppressive to the peasantry. The capitalist, therefore, who wishes to turn his money to account, and who is generally desirous of doing so with as little trouble as possible, dreads to invest it in broad acres scattered over a wide surface—where it is more difficult to watch and control the conduct of his agents; and often, rather than even leave his land to be advantageously cultivated by his serfs, he prefers to concentrate their labour within

the walls of a manufactory, on which it is more easy to keep an eye. Yet, though in a less degree, every private manufactory is affected by the same causes which act so prejudicially on the prosperity of those which are the immediate property of the crown. But the factories of beetroot sugar must be viewed in a different light, as they not only contribute to the improvement and cultivation of the land, but give rise to another species of produce, in the hides and tallow, or the wool, of the cattle fed on the refuse of the root. They have therefore of late been rapidly increasing. In 1835, only two had been established. Since then, we see them springing up in every direction, in the governments of Toula, Kalouga, Orel, Smolensk, Penza, Tchernizow, and many others. This progress is greatly to be attributed to the exertions of Count Brobrinski, one of the most patriotic of the wealthy nobles—a man who has already conferred some signal benefits upon his country, in the course of his unceasing efforts to increase its material prosperity. The potash factories have also rapidly increased, and their produce has been exported to the amount of 200,000*l.* in one year. But these, which may be rather considered as places to collect the natural produce of the land, employ but few hands, and are not liable to the same objections which apply to others of a more decided manufacturing character.

Russia has mines of gold, of platina, of silver, of copper, and of all the baser metals. The importance, however, both of those belonging to the government, and of private property, have been greatly overrated, especially those of the precious metals.

It may appear a startling, but it is nevertheless a true assertion, that, with the exception of those from which copper is dug, it would be highly advantageous to the country at large, and to the proprietors in particular, to abandon nine-tenths of those which are worked, amongst which we include those from which the iron ore is drawn. The average yearly value of the gold, silver, and platina mines, is about 850,000*l.*; of the copper mines, 600,000*l.*; of the lead and zinc mines, 50,000*l.*; making altogether a million and a half, exclusive of the iron; with regard to the amount of which, in Russia, we have no sufficient data to form an estimate, though we know that in the kingdom of Poland, the average annual value of what is worked there does not exceed 100,000*l.*, and that in Russia and Finland it does not exceed from 800,000*l.* to 1,000,000*l.* sterling. The average produce of all her mines will thus be two millions and a half sterling, or rather less than one-sixth of the state revenue.

Gold ore is principally drawn from the government and private mines in the Ural mountains, and in the Salarski and Mimusinski hills in Siberia it is found in the pure dust. The gold sands are also found in Ekaterinburg, Beresaw, Uluss, Elisabetinski, and Puschmin, and along the Puschma and several other rivers in the government of Perm. The average produce may be valued at 750,000*l.* annually; of this, two-fifths is drawn from the government mines, and three-fifths from the private mines, which pay to government a per centage. From 1823 to 1838, 5150 pouds of gold had been collected, (the poud weighs thirty-six

pounds English;) but previous to the year 1830, the same number of hands were not employed about these mines; consequently, though they are now even less profitable than they were, more than double the quantity of gold has been found during the last eight of the sixteen years we have cited.

Silver is found principally in the Altai and the Nerehinski mountains; the principal mine rejoices in the euphonious name of *Koluwanowosskressensk*. Its average amount does not exceed 60,000*l.*

Lead and zinc are both drawn from the Altai and Nerehinski mountains, and from the governments of Cracow and Sandomir, in Poland. They may each average about 25,000*l.* per annum in value.

Platina is found in the Ural mountains, in the mines of Bogoslof, of Slatoust and Goroblagodat, which are the property of the crown; and in many private mines, of which that of Nishne Tagilsk, belonging to the Demidoff family, is by far the most productive. This metal, generally so little known in the west of Europe, more heavy, and as difficult to oxidize as gold, when found in small quantities, was originally more valued than even gold, and long maintained a value nearly approaching to the metal now the most precious. Having, however, of late years, casually been discovered in much larger quantities, its value suddenly fell to little more than double the price of silver, at which in 1840 it could be purchased. As it is a metal so hard and difficult to fashion that the goldsmiths cannot afford to work it at less than a hundred per cent. of its value, and of a dull and heavy colour, directly it ceased to be intrinsically expen-

sive, it was abandoned for all articles of ornament. But if found in such quantities as to reduce its price so far as to render it applicable to the common purposes of life, platina would prove one of the most valuable metals in its uses to mankind, from its indestructibility, its hardness, its infusibility (which is greater than that of any other metal), and the peculiarity which it possesses, in common with iron, of welding or joining at a white heat. It is now drawn from the mine in quantities which render it almost useless—being so large as to have banished it from use as an ornament, and yet so small as to render it too costly for application to the arts. Its use is principally confined to chemical vessels, and other purposes connected with that science. In 1838, sixty pouds were drawn from all the mines, of which forty-five were from those of private individuals. Its value did not exceed 20,000*l.*

A platina coinage existed in Russia, platina money to the value of upwards of 100,000*l.* having been struck during the last twenty years. It is now either abolished, or about to be so, the platina coins of the value of three roubles silver (about 9*s.* 6*d.*) having fallen almost as low as 1*s.* 6*d.* in real value.

Iron, the metal most diffused over the Russian empire, and which is worked to the largest amount, is the least worth working of any, although, at first sight, one is apt to imbibe the idea in which both the government and the majority of Russians indulge, that Russia is fitted by nature for an iron country. The fact that several of the largest fortunes in the empire are principally derived from iron

works, at first tends to confirm that opinion. It is the chief source of wealth of the rich families of Jakovlef, Demidoff, Vsevoleffski, and many others; but with very few exceptions, although these families derive a vast income from their iron mines and iron works, they are worked at a positive loss. The iron, as well as the majority of all other mines, are situated in districts where neither fuel nor food for the workmen can be obtained. Food for the men, and provender for the horses, must therefore often be brought several hundred miles, and the ore is often conveyed still further to the works where fire-wood may be found. It sometimes happens thus, that every truss of hay consumed costs three shillings and sixpence, and every pound of rye flour a shilling, as is often the case on the estates of Vsevoleffski.

The produce of a mine is thus often many thousand pounds sterling per annum, because there is always a ready sale for the iron; but when the number of thousand *peasants*, diverted from their agricultural avocations, and transported into a barren region, is taken into account, we find that, if they had been quietly left to pursue their former mode of life—mismanaged as all landed property is—that capitation tax which they pay to their lord would amount to much more than he now derives from his mines. Coal, which is both scarce and bad in quality in Russia, is found only in New Russia, in the land of the Don Cossacs, and in the government of Ekaterinoslav, thousands of miles away from where the iron ore is found. It cannot, therefore, be applied to working it. Wherever the

ore is found in tolerable abundance, wood and turf are scarce, and Sweden,* where iron is made to any considerable extent, shews us how soon the wood of whole provinces diminishes. It is, therefore, evident that this branch of industry, already unnaturally extended thus far, cannot extend much further. The most successful proprietor of iron works would now find it much more profitable to transport his serfs to the banks of the Neva, and to import the ore and the coals from England ; he could thus produce the iron cheaper and better than at present, notwithstanding the additional expense of freight. It may, therefore, be judged whether it is very likely to become a staple article, or to conduce to the prosperity of the country as an important feature of national produce.

The great bulk of the Russian iron is very indifferent in quality. This is to be attributed both to the quality of the ore, and the manner of working it. The most esteemed is the sheet iron from the mills of Jakovlef ; —some of the iron from the Altai mountains, which, like the celebrated iron of Danemoor, in Sweden, is supposed to contain a certain portion of manganese ; a small quantity which is produced for its own use by the works of Colpenas ; and that which is fished from the bogs of Peter-Zavodsk. The latter, the ore of which is found in small pieces, is an oxide which has subsided from the ferruginous waters. Many thousand government serfs are employed in fishing it from

* It has been found necessary, in Sweden, to limit the period during which the forges are allowed to work to a certain number of months in the year.

the marsh. It is found in such small quantities, that when we consider the more profitable direction which might be given to the labour, by devoting it even to the rude and ill-managed agricultural occupations from which the peasant has been taken, we find that it is only procured at an immense expense. Although a small quantity of sheet-iron has been exported already, notwithstanding the protection of prohibitory duties, a sufficient quantity of iron is scarcely produced to meet the demand of the country,—as is proved by the fact, that it is often many weeks before any particular kind of iron can be procured in the markets of St. Petersburg or Moscow.

CHAPTER X.

CIRCASSIA AND GEORGIA.

(Chiefly from the accounts of Russian officers engaged in the Caucasian campaigns.)

THE mountainous regions of the Caucasus occupy the isthmus between the Euxine and the Caspian, which enclose them upon the western and the eastern sides; on the south, the river Araxes—the modern Aras—divides them from the fertile lands of Persia and Armenia; and on the north, they are separated from the wide steppe of the southern Russian empire by the rivers Kouban and Terek, which flow in opposite directions into the above named seas. These regions comprise those territories known under the general names of Circassia and Georgia.

Circassia, the northernmost and most extensive division—the land of high mountains, of fierce and warlike nations, still independent or only partially subdued—is divided by the river Cyrus (or Kour) from the less rugged and more fertile Georgia, of which the tsar holds exclusive possession, though on a most precarious tenure.

These Caucasian districts, to the poet, the philanthropist, the politician, and the historian, are fraught with an interest more intense than any other spot upon the globe, both on account of their past history and their present condition and importance. It was on Mount Ararat, one of the Caucasian range, that, according to the Scriptures, the ark reposed after the universal Deluge; and even if we are unwilling to give credence to the hypothesis of the learned, that from these mountains descended, in different streams, the various families of the human race, to overspread the earth like the flood from which it had just been rescued, we are forced to admit that the striking coincidence of the Scriptural accounts, with the traditions of their inhabitants, renders this supposition very plausible.

Geological researches prove indubitably that the greatest part of Southern Russia and Asia has been covered, at a time comparatively recent, with the sea; and they equally demonstrate, what common sense must indicate at once, that the mountains scattered over it—the Caucasus, the Taurus, the Lebanon, the Altais, the Ourals, the highlands of Tartary, and the Himalayas—whether or not they were then raised up by some convulsion from its bed, must have spotted its waters long before they had shrunk within the narrow limits of the Euxine and the Caspian, or flowed away to the ocean. The Genesis, which tells us that the ark rested on one of the Caucasian chain, mentions, also, “that the posterity of Japhet was dispersed over the islands of nations;” and all the traditions of

the east, including those of the inhabitants of the Caucasus, people it with a people called the Dives, who, from this abode, dispersed over the neighbouring islands. Dives, in the ancient oriental tongues, signifies islands; there are many in the Indian Ocean whose names are still terminated by this generic word; and it is a singular corroboration, that the Tcherkesses call themselves Adighe, or people of the isles, from the Tartaric Ada (island.) From the Caucasus, the Greeks are supposed to have descended westward, at a subsequent date.

But, however this may be, and whether we see reason to look upon the Caucasus as the cradle of mankind or not, to us men of the north, these mountains ought to inspire that feeling of veneration which is naturally excited by contemplating the tombs of our progenitors—the hallowed soil where the race, which gave rise to our own, mingled its dust with the earth from which it sprung for successive generations, when the spirit which animated it had passed away; for it is from these mountains that the Teutonic and Scandinavian families, to which we owe our origin, are as clearly made out to have spread over Europe, as any fact concerning the early history of a people has ever been established. It is a fact abundantly confirmed by the similitude of feature to the descendants of the Germanic and Scandinavian offshoot of their parent tree, which the Tcherkessian and Ossetinean nations at present inhabiting the Caucasus continue to exhibit, retaining in its purity and beauty—in remarkable contrast to the races which surround

them—the original type from which we have already far degenerated.

The Caucasus, as connected with the past, has other claims on our attention. In ages far remote—when the Persian empire yet flourished, and the energy of life still animated Egypt, Greece, and Rome, whose cold remains *now* only remind us of the nascent enlightenment and civilization which they fostered—a light which, like the holy fire of the Ghebers, has never been extinguished from those days to the present, in which its blaze is steady, rapid, and unquenchable. A glance at the map will suffice to shew us that a prodigious barrier, extending like a belt half round our planet, from the Atlantic and the shores of Spain to Okholsk on the Siberian coast of the Pacific, divided the regions inhabited by nations amongst whom the incipient light of knowledge was dawning from the gloomy north, and protected them from the inroads of its barbarians, who in its infancy would probably have swept away every vestige of that civilization which in subsequent maturity acted upon and softened them. This mighty line of sea and rampart beginning with the Pyrenees, was continued by the Mediterranean, the Alps, the Adriatic, the mountains of Illyria and the Balkan, the Euxine, the Caucasian, the Caspian, the barren saline deserts bounding the Siberian steppe, and the Altai mountains. Even on its western side, through the Pyrenees, the Alps, and the Balkan, it is well known how few passages this wall affords. To the east of the Bosphorus, the only gates were through the defiles of the Caucasus, of which its inhabitants for centuries

and centuries have been the watchful guardians, shutting out, from the fruitful regions of Persia and Asia Minor, the desolating hordes which have always sprung up in these Cimmerian steppes, like the locusts which the fostering sun calls into life.

The great Caucasian range, stretching five hundred miles diagonally across the isthmus, from Bakou to Anapa, like a stupendous fortress, bars the passage from sea to sea. Amongst its snow-capped peaks, which rise above the clouds, more elevated than the Alps, the *Mquinwari*, (the *Kasbeck* of the Russians, the mountain on which the mythological traditions of the ancients chained Prometheus to the rock, where the insatiate vulture gnawed his liver,) and, further westward, the Elbrouz, uprear their summits, covered with snows which have never borne the polluting impress of a human footstep—the lofty Elbrouz—the hill of tempests, where Zoroaster placed the abode of *Arismanes*, the spirit of evil of his beautiful and mystic creed, whom his disciples, long since driven by persecution for refuge to the Caucasian regions, still see with the eyes of faith, as their founder poetically described it, “ taking wing from the mountain, whilst its dark form, shadowing the abyss of space, seems like an arch thrown over it from one world to another.”

Parallel with this high range, to the northward of it, runs a lower chain, whose dentated summits shew the bare rock in all the rugged shapes into which it has been thrown by volcanic convulsions. The narrow glens which intervene from peak to peak, retain the humidity and the clouds, and the forests which cover the

gloomy valleys, still further adding to the darkness of the scene, have gained for them the appellation of the *Black Mountains*. Their very names are descriptive—there is the *Bald Mountain*, the *Hill of the Gloomy Forest*, the *Dagger Mountain*, and the *Mountain of Storms*.

Transversely with this range another almost defines a line, and crosses it at an angle. Extending due southward from the town of Stavropol, at the extreme north of the Caucasian district, it traverses Georgia to its southernmost point, where the river Araxes has its source, and then, turning eastward, connects Mount Ararat, on the Armenian frontier, with the lofty group of the Caucasus, which, running exclusively through Circassia, constitute the mighty boundary wall.

Through this bulwark, which the Russians have passed to occupy Georgia, there are only three gateways, or roads, which open between tremendous defiles—at least, only three which are practicable to any living creature, excepting the mountaineer or the chamois. Treachery, intrigue, and bribery—the universally prevailing silver key—have thrown two of them open to the Muscovite, whose forces have overflowed Georgia, occupied the shores of the Caspian, and who has dotted the Abasian and Mingrelian coast with a line of forts. But just as the high lands were a refuge from the desolating waters of the flood, so they are now to the national independence of the people of the Caucasus; and, surrounded on every side by the lands which have submitted to Russian dominion, or the seas of which she is mistress, the mountains of Circassia, covered with freemen, rise

islet-like amongst the lands which encroaching ambition has subdued, and which an iron despotism oppresses.

But if Russia has possessed herself of two of these portals, she is not in possession of the bulwark through which they offer an opening, and thus is perpetually exposed to finding the gates closed suddenly behind her, and thus finding herself entirely cut off from her now difficult communication with Tiflis and her Trans-Circassian provinces—a predicament in which, if the mountaineers were united, it cannot be reasonably doubted that they might place her to-morrow. It has been to enable her to extend herself beyond this barrier, that nearly a hundred years ago she commenced her attempts to subdue the guardians of this bulwark. Impatient in her ambition, and unable to effect the object she had in view, she nevertheless succeeded by intrigue and bribery in passing onwards ; and having, by treachery, force and fraud, possessed herself of the Georgian provinces, before she attempts to expand further she is keenly sensible of the necessity of rendering herself mistress of the mountains in her rear, not only because they may at any time impede her progress forward, and bar her schemes of conquest southward, but because they may equally compromise the safety of what she has already gained.

At present the Trans-Caucasian territories of Russia can be considered only as a *tête de pont*, thrown up in Southern Asia, whilst the bridge which leads to it is liable every moment to be carried away by the mountain torrent, which threatens to leave the outwork isolated.

Of the three passes to which we have alluded, the first, which is through the mountains westward of the defile of the Terek, is little known, because no foreigner has ever crossed it. The Russians have made ineffectual efforts to force it, because it would open a direct communication between Tiflis and Taurida.

The second passage is almost in the centre of the isthmus, on the direct road from Tiflis to Mosdok ; it runs through a series of glens and defiles, for a distance of about ninety miles, which are so narrow and sunk so deep between steep hills, that the road for some miles beyond Dariol is only light for a few hours of the brightest summer's day. It is called the defile of the Terek, from the river of that name, which takes its source in these glens. It is also called the defile of the Dariol, from a castle of that name, which overhangs the road ; of the Kasbeck, from Mount Kasbeck ; and more commonly the passage of the Vladi-Caucase, from a military station of that name. From the nature of the ground, a few hundred men could, on many points, arrest the passage of any army, and two thousand men would suffice to render it utterly impassable, in spite of any human effort. Fortunately for the Russians, it lies principally through the territory of the Ossetinians and Kabardians, two of the least warlike people, whom they have partly subdued and partly gained over. But even now, though the former are ostensibly in their service, no traveller can venture along the road without a strong escort, usually accompanied with cannon ; and on the least reverse, these people, whose hatred only a

mixture of fear and the love of gain restrains, would rise, and instantly close the defiles.

The third route, that of the Demir Capu, or the iron gate, also known as the Defiles of Derbent, was the best known to the ancients, as that of the Vladi-Caucase is to the modern traveller. It runs along the shores of the Caspian, overhung by high and precipitous mountains ; it is more difficult though less precarious than that of the Vladi-Caucase ; at least, since the occupation of the cities of Derbent and Bakou on the Caspian, the establishment of posts between them, and the efforts which have been made against the Lesguis, who nevertheless are liable at any moment of difficulty to come down, to the number of twenty or thirty thousand men, and destroy or harass a column, though they are too poor to remain under arms to guard the passes continually, and though some of them occasionally perform the farce of submitting to the Russian authority.

There is a circumstance which, however, renders this road highly inconvenient for the transport of troops or convoys for the supply of Georgia—viz., that the road is at least seven hundred versts longer, and that as no proper establishments have yet been formed upon the Caspian, whence the necessary resources can be drawn, they must all be procured from Taurida, or the vicinity of the Black Sea,—which actually raises to an immense price every kind of military store, even when they have not to be carried so far round.

It may appear, at first sight, surprising that Russia, who has been so many years vainly endeavouring to

subdue the Caucasus, should not, when she usurped Georgia, have turned her attention to the establishment of an effectual communication by means of the Black Sea, which would thus supersede the passages by the Caucasus. Although by no means easy, this might have been long ago accomplished, because, although cut off from the interior by inconvenient mountains, the coast of Immerita has long been in her undisturbed possession. But it must be remembered, supposing this passage to have been rendered perfectly easy, that in the event of any aggressive demonstration towards Southern Asia, or of any attempt at extensive conquest which would bring her in collision with England, not only this communication would be directly cut off, and her Trans-Caucasian provinces insulated, but that a dangerous and active enemy, in the unsubdued Circassian, would directly menace them. There is no chance, therefore, of the realization of her aspiring hopes, without her previously conquering the Caucasian tribes.

Since the days of Potemkin, up to the present, her efforts in this respect have signally failed. By force, she has been able to effect nothing. Within the last twelve years, she has resorted, however, more actively to the joint system of intimidation and bribery; directing against some of the weaker tribes her concentrated efforts, whilst she offered them high pay to enter her service. She has thus succeeded in some measure in turning the swords of one race of mountaineers against the other—a policy of the value of which she seems of late years to have become very vividly sensible, as a means of aggrandizement on all

her oriental frontiers. Some tribes of the Kabardians and the nations of the Ossetinians had been thus led to espouse her cause, and to submit to some kind of Cossac organization; and on the eastern side of the isthmus she had, by these means, made some progress. But, notwithstanding, in the course of the year 1841 a series of terrible disasters damped again the hopes which had been thus excited, and, in consequence, Prince Tchornicheff, the Minister of War, since appointed in lieu of Paskevitch, viceroy of Poland, went in person to inspect the state of the army, previous to the campaign of 1842, against the gallant mountaineers, which proved no more successful than so many which had preceded it.

Circassia, unless we take some parts of Daghistan, is a cold and barren country compared to the sunny and fruitful Georgia; but still it abundantly supplies the wants of its inhabitants with all the produce of a temperate climate. It is true its surface is principally harsh and rugged, and offers every element of terrible sublimity—the wildest and most awful glens and precipices, in which the avalanche crashes and thunders, or which resound to the dash of the fiercest torrents. Rank and pestilential marshes also render poisonous the air of the undrained hollows to which the sun thaws down the snow of the impending hills, and into whose gloomy chasms its rays can never penetrate to dry up the sodden vegetation which absorbs the descending waters. But these same mountains offer also scenes of calm and pastoral beauty, rich meadows, beautifully wooded hills, and mountains cultivated almost to the summit, village rising

above village, surrounded by its luxuriant patches of maize, of buckwheat, and of millet. Such are all the north-eastern shores of the Black Sea,—the hills swarming with life and animation, even close to the Russian forts, upon the shore, and scarcely without the reach of the cannon of the Russian fleet.

These mountains are inhabited by several nations, divided into an infinity of tribes, who evidently do not own a common origin, but who have, apparently, at some time mingled with, and caught some of the features of, the beautiful Cherkessian race, which still remains unalloyed and pure. Notwithstanding this general family likeness, as well as certain points of resemblance, in costume, in habits, in the general love of freedom, and in their warlike temper, there exists amongst them a marked distinction of character, of language, and of physical conformation. Irreconcilable enmities array one nation against the other, and bitter feuds divide the tribes of each people within itself.

This is a fact to which the Russians allude with triumph; but it is in the face of these discouraging circumstances that the Caucasian fortress has been maintained for a long series of years against all their efforts; and so great appears to be the growing hate against the Muscovite, that of late the most inimical of the mountaineers have been seen to forget their traditional quarrels to unite against the common foe; and if this feeling should become general amongst the hitherto disunited populations, it may readily be imagined what an immense accession of strength it will give to them collectively.

The principal nations of Circassia are the Cherkesses, the Abasians, the Ossetinians, the Kabardians, the Tchetchenchis, and the Lesguis ; and of these, the Cherkesses and the Abasians, the most ancient races inhabiting the north-eastern part of the Caucasian range, are so fierce in their hostility to the Muscovites, so ardent in their execration of them, that they may be considered as utterly irreconcilable and indomitable, except by literal extermination, whilst they may, at the lowest computation, be reckoned to outnumber, by half, all the rest of the united nations of Circassia.

In the spirit of concealment and deception with which every department of the Russian government is so essentially imbued, (for on matters the most insignificant, its agents will put themselves out of their way, apparently for the purpose of disseminating gratuitous falsehoods,) one cannot expect any approach to truth where any possible object can be attained by hiding it; in consequence, the data which the Russian government must possess on the statistics of these mountains is carefully withheld from the public; and with the view of diminishing, in the eyes of Europe, the difficulties which await it in the Caucasus, in its published accounts of the population of the empire, it diminishes that of the unsubdued districts in a manner which is glaringly at variance with the private testimony of its officers employed in the Circassian war, and even contradictory to antecedent reports. It is amusing to observe so many hostile nations, which hitherto have been ever independent of his rule, classed already amongst the subjects of the tsar; his claims to Circassia, and his assump-

tion of possessing it, not a little reminding one of the Irishman's estate, *which he was kept out of by the right owner.*

The statistics published by government represent at half a million the whole Circassian population, and the Cherkessian nation alone at 300,000 of this number. On different occasions the reports of its generals mention the fact of 20,000 and even 30,000 Lesquis having taken the field together. The statistical accounts fix the whole amount of this population at only fifty thousand, including old men, women, and children, and they formerly calculated at twenty thousand souls the whole nation of the Ossetinians; though after they were gained over, the government boasted that this people had engaged to muster five-and-twenty thousand fighting men to place at its disposal. It is only, therefore, from the statements of Russian officers long employed in Circassia, that one can form any estimate of the numbers of the Caucasian tribes. From their unanimous evidence, one cannot compute the Cherkesses and Abasians at less than a million and a half, the rest of the Caucasian nations at less than one million.

The incorruptible, and, let us hope,—albeit entertaining a most bitter animosity against each other,—unconquerable defenders of the Caucasian range, the Cherkesses and Abasians, are most worthy of our notice. The Cherkesses, the self-styled Adighè, or people of the island, and probably the original inhabitants, number about one million. The Abasians have, probably, from very remote antiquity, been established in these mountains, and are supposed, by those who have equal faith and learning, to be Egyptians, led

thither during the expedition of Sesostris. It is, at least, evident that they are a people nearly allied to the Cherkessian, and who have borrowed from them the freshness of their mountain blood, though, in the outline of their features, shewing an admixture with either the Egyptian or the Mogul races.

All the other Circassian nations are relict portions of the innumerable Asiatic, and even European tribes and people, which, in the great social convulsions that agitated the old world, have been driven to the base of the Caucasus, or who have swept around it, in living tides, at different, but comparatively modern, epochs. Since then, more or less mixed with the Cherkessian race, they accordingly mingle in a greater or a less degree its characteristic beauty, and chivalric spirit, with the original type and primitive disposition of the stem on which it has been engrafted—a stem which would appear to have been, in most instances, Mongul or Tartar—sometimes Turcoman, which is, indeed, derived from the Tartar.

From these nations we must, however, except the Ossetinians, a fair-haired, blue-eyed people, almost as symmetrical in form as the Cherkesses, who, from a period very remote, have been denizens of these mountains. They are supposed, by some physiologists, to be the descendants of a colony of Medes, which Diodorus Siculus states to have been led by the Scythians, under Madyes, into the Caucasus, about six centuries before the birth of Christ. It would appear undoubted, that they spring from an original mixture of the Adighè on one side, mixed with a race neither Mongolian nor Tartar.

From the Ossetinians are further supposed to have sprung the Teutonic, or German races, and from the Cherkesses the Scandinavian, which was more generally dark-haired. Everything, except the language, corroborates this hypothesis ; but the same obstacle, in this respect, exists in endeavouring to retrace the origin of these great northern families to any other source.

From the difficulty of visiting the Circassians at home—from the impossibility of learning half a dozen different tongues, all radically different, which are spoken amongst them—and from the jealousy and misrepresentation of Russia, no people offering one tithe of the same interest are at the present moment so little known. The calumny of the Russian government, and of its hireling traveller, has long depicted them to Europe as savage, faithless, and untameable freebooters. Her officers engaged against them in a war to the knife, exaggerating facts, represent them as atrociously cruel, or attribute to their national character a ferocity which, even where it has really been displayed, arises from the very nature of the struggle.

But amidst the general anathema which is pronounced against them, every detailed and authentic fact, every circumstantial account given even of those Circassian nations which are looked on as the most ignoble, furnish us with fresh evidence that, uncultivated as head and heart must be amongst this untutored race, the moral superiority of these mountaineers over the Muscovites is as great as that which physically they exhibit.

Every anecdote which can be gathered along the frontier is directly at variance with the character attributed to them by the enmity of the narrators. The following is a story, related by an officer now in Tiflis, who, previous to the arrangement entered into with the Ossetinians, ventured to travel amongst them under the protection of the *Konak*, a term which, amongst the Circassians, means a patron who answers for your safety with his honour. Amongst the Cherkesses, or the Abasians, he observed to the author, his enterprise would not have been a matter of the slightest danger, could he once have obtained such a protection ; but the Ossetinians were always considered as the least scrupulous, as well as the least brave, of the mountaineers. Nevertheless, his fears proved unfounded ; hatred and contempt were often visible upon the lip, but he was generously and respectfully treated by his patron, and suffered to depart unharmed.

On his departure, however, a petty chief made him a request that he would seek out a certain Jew in Georgia, whither the Russian officer was repairing, and use his influence in persuading him to receive a sum of money which he had hitherto refused, in compensation of the losses he had sustained, when, in a foray, the mountaineers had burned his dwelling, and plundered him of everything he possessed. It appeared that the chief's brother, who was engaged (if the author remembers rightly) in the expedition of Abbas Mirza, had sent word to him that he would send by this Jew a part of his plunder, but he was either killed or died shortly after

the chief had received the message. He sought out the Jew, who denied the deposit, and the mountaineer took the law into his hands; soliciting the succour of his too willing friends, they made a dash across the lines, penetrated to the Jew's habitation, in a peaceful part of Georgia, and, as we have stated, burned and rifled it, the Jew himself having narrowly escaped with his life by timely flight.

A few years after, however, a companion of his brother's returned home, and from him the marauder learned that the Jew was innocent of the cheat laid to his account, the property never having been entrusted to him. The plunder obtained in the expedition against him had been divided equally amongst those who took part in it; it was impossible to get back that which his confederates had shared, but the share which he had himself received, the chief, who was a poor man, converted into money, and seeking out the Jew, tendered it to him. The Jew had refused it. The Russian was as much struck with the qualms of conscience of the freebooter, as with the refusal of the Hebrew; and it appeared to him so singular a circumstance, that, according to his promise, on his return to Georgia, he sought out the latter. But the Israelite was inexorable in his refusal to receive one para less than the whole value of what had been abstracted from him—"He has found out that he had no reason to plunder me, and the conscience of the mountaineer will give him no rest till he has made full restitution."

Let us contrast this conduct of the Circassian, who had nothing but the silent monitor within his own

bosom to urge him to this act of justice, with that of the Russian who talks of civilizing and improving him ; and not to take the Russian of too low a station, let us select him in the class of generals, and in the person of the Russian judge, whom, with the ponderous volumes of the law before him, our reader may see, if he will turn to a previous chapter on the administration of the law, trimming the balance of justice with the bank notes thrown into it.

It would appear from this story that the predatory incursions which the Circassians have so long carried on against their neighbours in the flat lands, have therefore not been in mere gratification of the lust of plunder, but probably always to revenge some injury which they had received, and to exercise what they imagined to be the right of the injured.

Tolstoi, in his life of Paskewitch, relates, that twenty of the Lesguis, descending from their mountains, swam over the Alazan and the Yori, and penetrated into Georgia, as far as Tiflis, the capital of the Russian Trans-Caucasian provinces. This was a feat as daring as it might have been for a score of Scottish moss-troopers to have ridden, formerly, up to the gates of York. It was an enterprise in which it would have been judged impossible to succeed, if it had not been executed. They arrived there at nightfall, and having abandoned their horses, succeeded in passing the outposts of a camp of dragoons in the vicinity of the city, and made their way to the barracks, which were filled with troops, and having cut down the sentinel at the gates, entered the dormitories of the soldiers, and putting out the lights,

commenced a fearful massacre, recognising each other in the dark by the feel of their beards. After a terrible carnage, succours at length arrived, and they then attempted to cut their way back, but were surrounded. When they found that escape was impossible, all who were not suddenly overpowered, stabbed themselves, (according to the custom of the mountaineers,) rather than surrender to their detested foes; not one could be taken alive, and it was thus never known what causes had urged them to their desperate undertaking. And yet the Cherkesses and the Abasians are admitted to be more conscientious in the fulfilment of what they consider their duties, and far more daring and brave, than the Ossetinians and the Lesguis, two of the least esteemed races, of whom nevertheless similar traits to those above related are recorded.

CHAPTER XI.

CIRCASSIA AND GEORGIA.

On the eastern side of the isthmus, between the high ridge of mountains and the Caspian Sea, lies Daghestan. The whole of this coast is occupied by Russia, including the seaports of Derbent and Bakou, to the inhabitants of which, or rather to some of their chiefs, it is not long since Russia paid a sort of tribute. Bakou, which lies quite to the south of the mountains, near the plains of Chirwan, is an important station as the nearest harbour to Georgia, through which it can receive such supplies as can be forwarded from Astrachan; it has also some importance in a commercial point of view; here are the springs of naphtha, and here, about the islands which surround the adjacent promontory, immense numbers of seals render the fishery so productive as to employ at least five thousand persons annually. It is principally about this district that the fire-worshippers—a gentle and harmless race—have retired, keeping alive, with the flame which Zoroaster bequeathed to them, all their poetical traditions.

Many towns are scattered along the coast and in the adjacent mountains, most of which are now more or less at the mercy of the Russians, or occasionally occupied by them—such as Kouba, Barchly, Yarsi, Akoutcha.

The inhabitants of these districts bordering the Caspian, and whose possessions extend far inland into the high mountains, are the Lesguis. They are more industrious, and when in possession of the towns along the coast, were more wealthy than the other Caucasian nations; but their agricultural resources are very limited, and they are now reduced to comparative poverty. Although their mountains are as difficult of access as any in the Caucasus, they are not so easily defended, because they do not everywhere furnish means of subsistence to their guardians, and too many of the native tribes are too poor to be able long to take the field. On this account, the Russians have succeeded in occupying a few important points, and inducing some of the tribes to submission; —that is to say, they consent to leave the Russians unmolested, in consideration of receiving an annual sum of money. But there are other tribes, and, in fact, by far the greater majority of this people, which is the most mixed and various in the Caucasus, who are incessant and bitter in their hostility; and none of them can be in the least depended on; the mountaineers, who have apparently submitted, acting as spies on the movements of the Russians for their independent brethren, and being always ready to fall on a Russian army the moment they perceive it in a critical position.

The Lesguis of the southern range are the pest of

the German and Armenian colonies of Georgia. They possess more towns in the independent part of the mountains than all the other Caucasian nations. That of the Koubetehi, about seventy miles inland westward from Derbent, has long been celebrated for its manufacture of coats of mail, which are renowned all over the east, and which are in great request amongst the Cherkessian warriors. The Lesguis are also celebrated for the fabrication of sword and dagger blades, which are very excellent in quality, but of which few are produced, from the fact of the artisans not being numerous, and devoting an incredible time to perfecting their work. The Lesguis are important as the natural guardians of the Demir Capu, or the passage of the iron-gate ; for as the road extends so great a distance along the shore, notwithstanding all the progress the Russians have made on this side, they still feel it very insecure.

Between the territory of the Lesgui tribes and the valley of the Vladi-Caucase—or rather the series of glens through which the road of the Vladi-Caucase winds—is the country of Tchetchenses, also composed of many various tribes. Their independent villages are still within a few miles of the Russian military stations of the vales of the Terek, and they are resolute and implacable enemies of these garrisons.

Those populations—eastward of the Vladi-Caucase line, which divides the isthmus into two parts, east and west—if less numerous and less resolute than the mountaineers to the north-westward of it, are often animated by a certain degree of religious enthusiasm, which gives the war something of a sacred character in their eyes, and produces the fictitious though dan-

gerous valour of excitement, which is occasionally very brilliant, but which is not like the certain, unvarying, and unquenchable spirit of the Cherkesses and Abasians, which may be counted upon at all times as surely as that of the game-cock or the bulldog—a courage, not the result of the passions, but apparently organically mingled with the blood.

Several campaigns since, when the Russian army advanced to the occupation of the town of Tcherké, a mountain-pass was defended with extraordinary gallantry by a handful of fanatics. After severe loss, the breastwork which they had thrown up was carried by the rush of a Muscovite column, and its defenders were overthrown, one upon the other, by the armed crowd which burst over it. The Russians much wished to have made some prisoners, but the two dying Mollahs, who headed the mountaineers, and who, during the fight, had thundered forth the verses of the Koran in the ears of their people, now exhorted them to take no quarter from the accursed infidels; and those, wounded, dying, and held down to the earth by the Russian soldiers, never ceased their resistance to the death—striking with their daggers, or seizing with their teeth the limbs of the victors, and biting into the sinews. Thus none of them could be secured. From this fanatical population, which is periodically excited to the holy war, the Russians sustained in the last campaign, in the autumn of 1843, some very severe defeats, having, in the district of the tribe Avares, lost as many as twelve hundred men in a single encounter, besides finding all the hill-forts stormed and carried, which it had taken several campaigns to establish.

To the north and north-west of the Tchetchenses, are situated the lower and the higher Kabardias, on the table lands and the less elevated hills to the north of the great chain. Some of them are partially subdued, in the same equivocal manner as the Lesguis; others, whose country is more accessible, like the Ossetinian, have submitted to Cossac organization, and devoted their swords to the service of the invader; many of them have been sent to Petersburg and to Warsaw, where they figure in the Mahomedan regiment, or watch at the gate of the Russian viceroy.

Others again are perfectly independent, or at least independent of the Russians, for many tribes acknowledge the supremacy of the Cherkessian princes, who entitle themselves princes of the Kabardah, amongst which we may cite as two of the principal, the Basians and the Karalchai. The Kabardians are composed of the most recent settlements of the Mongul and Tartar nomades, at the foot of these mountains, where they have been allowed to establish themselves, and where they have mixed with, and changed by the admixture, the Cherkessian race, which seems to have acted, more or less, for centuries on all the neighbouring populations, without ever itself undergoing any change or modification from the contact.

Immediately to the westward of the road of the Vladi-Caucase, lies the country of the Ossetinians, who are probably some hundred thousands in number. Inhabiting a very inaccessible country, they have behaved the most basely of any of the Caucasic nations, in submitting to the Russians, for which they have not the same excuse as those of the Lesgui and Kabardian tribes, who have acted in the same man-

ner. The latter found themselves so closely pressed on one side, so strongly tempted on the other, that it must have been, in many cases, difficult to have resisted this double influence; but with the Ossetinians, they would appear chiefly to have yielded to the temptation. This is the more to be lamented, as they, by their position, have so great a share in guarding the defiles of the Terek, and the second of the three great passages.

It is true that their fealty is very uncertain, and that for a long period the Russians will not dare to make use of them on any serious occasion; but independent of the material assistance they will furnish, by eking out the harassing and desultory labour of maintaining and relieving the garrisons along the line, the moral effect of their example must be considered; and the mere unrestrained communication will give the Russian authorities the opportunity of gradually corrupting their chiefs.

The Ossetinians are warlike and active, but although rather taller in stature, their arms and accoutrements are much lighter than those of the Abasians and Cherkesses. They were formerly tributaries to the latter, and, probably, if the Abasians and Cherkesses were united, must speedily become so again.

The two last-mentioned people maintain the north-westward extremity of the mountain range, which their valour renders the impregnable citadel of the vast fortress of the Caucasus. Here the Russians have hitherto failed to succeed in making any impression; the passage which runs through their country has remained hermetically closed, and nowhere, for half a century, has the Russian dominion encroached above the length

of a cannon shot upon their territory, though more lives than Russia ever sacrificed to gain possession of Poland, have been expended, and are yet daily being expended, to attain this object. The progress she has made has been limited to the occupation of the sea-ports on the coast of the Black Sea; but, excepting by water, she can only, along the shore, (which is only conquered within reach of their guns,) move troops from one fort to another at an expense of human life which is so costly as to be impracticable. Russia has not taken possession of a foot of ground in the Abazian and Circassian country, which she might not have carpeted with the dead bodies of her soldiers; and every spot which she has taken possession of, she has been obliged to abandon again, unless it was within reach of the assistance of her fleet.

In the winter, when the storminess of the Black Sea, and the want of hardihood and skill of the Russian sailors, prevent them from navigating its waters, they are left for several months utterly isolated, as they can maintain no land communication, and many of them have been repeatedly, and even very recently, stormed and carried by the mountaineers, who usually put the garrison to the sword, cast the guns into the sea, and destroy the fortifications.

This occupation of the coast is, however, a serious evil to the Circassians, as it has almost entirely interrupted their trade with Turkey. Not only it prevents them from exchanging their home produce for gunpowder, salt, and such articles as they most require, but from the want of a market for these superfluities, it deprives them of the means of making powder in

large quantities; for like most other warlike people, the Circassians are not ignorant of this art, and could abundantly supply themselves, if they had the requisite material in sufficient abundance. Boiling the paste of which the powder is made, a process which they employ, in a great measure supersedes the necessity of the dangerous trituration of the mill; and if in quality it be not so strong as the English, it is quite as applicable to all the ordinary purposes of war.

It is this scarcity of powder, that causes them to neglect and abandon the Russian guns which they capture. The mountaineers, who would scarcely purchase the life of an enemy at the expense of three charges of powder, would deem it insanity to waste five hundred to propel a twenty-four pound ball. If it were not for this, they would probably furnish an exception to all uncivilized people, in whose hands artillery is as ineffective as, employed by those who know how to use it, it is formidable. Quick and intelligent, and, from their experience of fire-arms, better acquainted with the nature of projectiles, than the ill-digested theory and negligent practice of this art has rendered the Russian officers, they would probably very soon surpass them in their method of using the cannon which they had taken, if they could afford the requisite ammunition.

The Abasians principally dwell on the western side of the same hills, on the reverse of which the Cherkessians live, thus inhabiting that side of the chain which faces the Black Sea. After the Cherkesses, the Abasians may be considered as the finest people in the Caucasus; but proud towards the Osse-

tinians, Mingrelians, and all others, they seem to have always entertained an acute sense of their own inferiority to the Cherkesses, with whom they have unhappily always been at variance. The Abasians do not yield even to the Cherkesses in valour, though it is of a less chivalrous nature. Their implacable enmity to Russia, against which it has principally been directed, has caused her to characterize it as ferocity. Equally bold on the water as on land, in their shallow boats they have often attacked and mastered Russian vessels becalmed off their coast, and such vessels of war as have grounded near it, they have always boarded before any assistance could reach the enemy, and it is only a few years ago that they thus plundered and destroyed a line-of-battle ship.

The Abasians, like the Ossetinians, excepting the chiefs and nobles, are not mounted, but their nobles ride a very beautiful breed of horses. The helmet and coat of mail are not so commonly worn by them as by the Cherkesses, and they shave their heads, excepting one long tuft of hair on the top of the skull. Their women are exceedingly beautiful, and the Abasian slaves, both male and female, have been confounded with the Cherkessian all over the East, where they have been called to fulfil the same destinies.

Let us now turn to the Cherkessians themselves, the lordly children of the isles, the most beautiful and valiant race, and, taken altogether, perhaps the most remarkable that the world ever beheld. Stamped by nature for supremacy and command, she seems to have constituted them the aristocracy of mankind, and to have drawn them down from their mountains in two

distinct streams, to assume over the whole of Europe, and over the vast empire of Islamism, that universal dominion for which she appears eminently to have fitted them. Whether it flowed through the triumphal arch of conquest, or beneath the caudine spears of servitude, as this stream scattered itself abroad over the miscellaneous multitudes of Europe, we find it rising to the surface, like a lighter fluid, in obedience to the laws of matter; and whether the Caucasian won his way northward as a haughty victor, or entered the seraglio of the Moslemin as a purchased slave, the result is always the same; we find him and his seed called to fulfil what seems to have been his destiny—that of ruling over his fellow-men.

The sagas of the Norsemen distinctly make out their origin to have been Caucasian. As to this fact no dispute has arisen; it has only been questioned whether the last migration under Odin, which called itself *Asa*, was not descended from the Ossetinian tribes, who were formerly called *Alains* or *Azes*. The Turco-Tartaric word, from which the Cherkessians take their name of Adighé, also bears, however, so close a resemblance to the name given to Odin's people, that it would not invalidate the supposition that the chestnut haired Norman, whom his sagas shew so deeply imbued with the chivalric spirit, and accustomed to the chivalric usages which he afterwards diffused over Europe at so early a period that he must evidently have transported them with him from the Caucasus, should rather have been descended from the dark-haired Cherkess, who in so many points bears still a striking resemblance to the Norseman, than from the fair-haired,

blue-eyed Ossetinian, the progenitor of the Germanic races. At all events, those of the learned who claim an Ossetinian origin for the last Caucasian migration under Odin, also assert that it was inconsiderable in extent; and thus the source of the great bulk of the Norman people can only, to reconcile all discrepancies, be retraced to the nation of the Adighé.

Now, if we turn to Europe, do we not find, to which-ever land we direct our steps, the remains of the widely extended Norman power more universally spread than the relics of the all-grasping Roman's dominion. The history of the middle ages, the genealogies of the nobles and princes of all nations, will shew nine-tenths of those who govern and have governed their fellow-men, to be Norman, or mingled with the lordly Norman blood.

If we turn our eyes southwards, the Mameluke kings of Egypt were Circassians; the race who have almost universally administered the empire of the caliphs, have been three-fourths Circassians, or the sons of Circassian mothers; the viziers, the beys, the deys of Africa, have been more than half drawn from individuals of the same family, brought into the harems as slaves, to rise to the government of a people whom they were purchased to serve.

What made the slave a ruler amongst the Moslemins? What enabled the Norseman, when banished from his cheerless and pine-covered rocks, to depart to conquer, as a *pis aller*, in the most fertile parts of Europe, a dukedom or a kingdom? What but that moral and physical superiority which he so eminently possessed over every other people, and those untutored

virtues which are too apt, in their rude garb, and in the wrappings of their barbarism, to escape our attention. The superiority of intellect, the fidelity and the resolution of the Circassian slave, which have always raised him, amongst the Othmen, to become a lord of slaves, are lost sight of amidst the subsequent extortions of the pasha and the severities of the vizier.

The magnificent boldness of the Norman's conceptions, the unhesitating execution of them, and the practical virtues of his chivalrous creed, which gained the admiration and excited the enthusiasm of the servile or selfish feudal populations of the dark ages, arousing every spark of congenial though latent nobility of sentiment, to the imitation of that which was admired, have also been obscured by the pride, the injustice, the brutality, and the oppression of feudality—with which it has been so much confounded in the opinion of posterity, but whose baneful effects it was principally instrumental in modifying, and whose abuses it was instituted to combat. For what could be more hostile to the spirit of that semi-slavery than the principle which inculcated the application of all valour and of all strength, with a devotion, blind to dangers and to consequences, to the relief of all oppression?

Whilst still on the subject of the origin of the Cherkesses, let us observe that the name of Cherkesse, which this people do not themselves acknowledge, and which is derived from Turco-Tartaric words, which signify free-booter, or interceptor of the road, has led to many singular misapprehensions, as this appellation has apparently been often indiscriminately given to

any predatory people having a fixed residence. The Cossacs have thus been called Cherkesses. There are still the ruins of a castle, near Sebastopol, called Cherkesserman, and the old capital of the Don Cossacs, after which the modern has also been named, was called Tcherkask.

It is probable that the term Cossac had a similar signification in some oriental idiom; thus the term Cherkesses, or, properly speaking, the Adighé, are called Kasaghi by their Ossetinian neighbours. They are supposed to have been the Kasakia of the Byzantine writers, and the Kasogi of the early Russian chronicles, which appear to have named thus all predatory tribes not Tartar or Mongolian, and thence the constant mention of Cossacs centuries before the extraordinary people properly so called (and which is Slavonic with a dash of the Hungarian and Tartar) had first started into existence, on the marshy islands of the Dnieper, at a period so recent that history enables us to follow all their movements with certainty and precision.

The Cherkesses are not tall in stature, but exquisitely proportioned, and possessed of a muscularity and activity which constant exercise has developed to a wonderful extent. None of the human family so strikingly convey the idea of high breeding, such as we see it in the full blood or the Arab horse, even to the dilating nostril and the gazelle-eye of the high-priced Mijid race, the favourite breed descending from the prophet's steeds.

The costume of these mountaineers is such as to set off the nervous, though delicate, symmetry of

their make;—a close fitting frock coat, with rows of cartridge-pockets sewed upon the breast, and tight trowsers. These vestments, which are common to all the Caucasian nations, are generally of some subdued and sober hue: for instance, the colour of the falling leaf. All the magnificence displayed is in the arms and trappings of the steed.

Most of the other Caucasian nations, as well as the Cherkess, in their peaceful equipment wear a round cap surrounded by a thick border of sheepskin fur, which gives it a turban-like appearance. This is both black and white; but the fleece of a snowy whiteness usually distinguishes the head-gear of the young and fastidious. The war-dress of the Cherkess, however, in which he is most frequently seen, is remarkable by the addition of his iron helm, surmounted by a spike; the shirt, of exquisitely finished mail, falling from the helmet over his shoulders, like the lace of a lady's veil; and the steel armlets, which seem to form part of the forgotten gauntlet—all contribute to give a knightly aspect to the warrior, which his gallantry does not belie.

The narrow belt which supports the sword is usually exquisitely worked, and fastened by an ingenious clasp. The sword and the yatagan themselves are of excellent temper, and mostly of great antiquity. Blades have always been fabricated better in the east than we have yet learned to make them in Europe, or probably than we shall ever succeed in making them, because when the method of the orientals is discovered, the people of the west will never be induced to pay the exorbitant price required as a remunera-

tion for the labour devoted to them, just as no continental manufacturer has ever produced fire-arms to rival those of our costly London manufacture, because his customers could never be induced to pay one half their value.

The Caucasians, besides the excellent blades which they themselves manufacture, have had for centuries the opportunity of gleaning the best all over the East; and, transmitted as heir-looms in families, with the care which they take of them, there appears to be no limit to their duration. A sword or a dagger blade may be worth as much as 100*l.* sterling. This value is not a mere matter of fancy, like that which the Dutchman sets upon his tulip, or the Russian merchant on his fat horse, but it is estimated according to the toughness and the sharpness which the sabre or the dagger can be made to combine, and if we could manufacture similar arms at Birmingham or at Sheffield, that sum might be immediately obtained for them.

The eastern blade is required to be pliable, and at the same time to bear so keen an edge as to divide a single hair. Now, an English razor, owing its sharpness to the hardness of its temper, will divide the hair; but then it flies like a piece of glass.

The fire-arms of the Caucasians, which consist of rifles and pistols, are as much valued as their edged weapons. The barrels are usually of admirable material, but often indifferently bored, and the locks are always indifferent. They are heavy in the barrel, and often mounted with the matchlock, both of which circumstances contribute to the accuracy with which the mountaineers discharge their contents—the former

by preventing the vibration of the piece, the match-lock by insuring its steadiness from the absence of all jerk, in producing ignition.

The Cherkesses are an equestrian people, more so than even the Kabardians and the southern Lesgui tribes. Their small but beautiful horses, which are thorough-bred—that is to say, derived in almost uncontaminated purity from the Arab—are so accustomed to their rugged mountains, as to carry the rider over places where he could not scramble on foot. Sure-footed and agile as the chamois, they gallop down the most precipitous descents, springing from rock to rock, in a manner incredible to those who have not witnessed with their own eyes how the nature of the horse adapts itself to the localities in which he is bred.

For the purpose of being able to turn round and fire as they are flying—the only position in which it is possible to acquire any accuracy of aim with the gun from the back of a galloping horse—the Cherkesses ride with one stirrup longer than the other. They also ride with a loose rein, which is found to be indispensable to insure the safe footing of their steeds, over the precipitous ground which they traverse, because it leaves the animal to trust entirely to his own judgment and exertion. But on a plain this habit, in a great measure, impairs its speed, as the natural tendency of the horse is to take short rapid steps, instead of long sweeping strides,—which he can only be taught to venture on, when accustomed to the assisting hand of the rider to gather himself together like the bent bow, ready for fresh distention.

The Cherkesses are perfectly acquainted with the art of bringing their horses into working condition, and, as they do not ride them till their full maturity, when they start on their forays, across the Russian border, the iron muscles, the sound legs and wind of their steeds, and their own light weight, enable them to traverse prodigious distances in a surprisingly short space of time.

All the Caucasian tribes are dexterous in the use of their weapons, which they practise from their earliest childhood, and the Cherkesses are said to surpass them all. Opposed to a people who are individually (except the Cossacs) utterly unacquainted with their use, their skill has been looked on by them as perfectly marvellous, and accounts the most exaggerated are popular amongst the Russians, of the dexterity of their Caucasian foes.

They are admirable riders and wrestlers, and can use all their arms on horseback ; but though it is true that every shot from their rifles tells, their shooting cannot be compared to that which is common in Switzerland and England. Excepting from horseback, they fire from the rest, and they always fire close. They also use their pistol dexterously from the horse, as may be daily witnessed in the exercise of the Mohammedan regiments in St. Petersburg, and of the Kabardians in Warsaw. They pass at full gallop, and seldom miss a piece of paper lying on the ground. Some of the more dexterous hit, with equal certainty, a silver rouble piece, or strike the earth so close to it as to make it fly into the air. But although this is a very great triumph of skill, the indifferent nature of their pistols, with which,

notwithstanding the motion of the horse, they can hit so admirably an object very near to them, does not allow them to strike with tolerable accuracy, though standing still, a mark placed at a greater distance. They have thus apparently attained all the skill of which the imperfect nature of their arms will admit.

The Russians, however, who witness these things, so far beyond their imitation, will give credence to any tale, however wild and extravagant, regarding the dexterity of the Caucasians; and many of the Georgians and Lesguis, who have assumed in their character a dash of the Gascon—that is to say, of the Persian, the Gascon of the East—when in peaceful contact with the Muscovites, indulge to the utmost their appetite for the marvellous, by their boastings and assertions. Every blade with an oriental cut is readily believed to be able to realize all that is *related* of the most wonderful specimen of Eastern ingenuity; and every man who comes from beyond the Kouban and the Terek, is supposed to be able to wield it. No one ever dreams of putting the man or the metal to the test, excepting here and there a stubborn, incredulous Englishman.

Paskevitch, when travelling on board one of the government steam-boats, had in his suite one of these Georgians, who on some occasion had saved his life. Like all Caucasians, and, in fact, like most Orientals, he paid as much attention to his arms as the Russian does to the picture of his saint, and he was so constantly examining and wiping the blade, that an Englishman who happened to be on board entered into conversation with him. The Georgian asserted that adamant would not chip, nor steel turn the

edge of his sabre, and that at a single stroke he could sever a sheep, lengthwise, in two. The field-marshall, his master, corroborated the assertion as an indisputable fact. The Englishman was answered, but unconvinced. "Do you think," said he, "you could cut that rope at a stroke?" "Like a thread," replied the Georgian. "Then," said his interrogator, resorting to a British argument, "I will bet you two dozen of champagne that you do not." The Georgian accepted the wager, and Paskevitch smiled at the incredulity of the islander. The master of the vaunted weapon, after a long aim, and a terrible concentration of strength, brought down his blow, which scarcely cleft one twist of the rope. The wager was lost. "Now," said the Englishman, who was a very muscular man, "let me try. I think I could do as well as that." Striking sideways, so as to cut in the direction of the grain of the rope, at the first blow he succeeded in cutting it half through, but on examination, it was discovered that the obliquity of the stroke had given a bend to the incomparable sword. "So much for the man," observed the narrator—"so much for the blade."

The institutions of the Cherkesses offer at the present day a strange spectacle of chivalrous feudalism, but feudalism the least degrading in its nature, because closely allied to clanship. The pecheh, or princes, receive the homage, and command the military service of the ouzdens, their nobles; and the nobles possess an authority defined and limited by custom over the people. That it is a league of mutual advantage, would appear from the profound attachment of the

vassals to the lord. That of the lords to their princes is more equivocal, and the feuds and enmities of different tribes of nobles and of princes amongst themselves, recall to us forcibly the condition of Europe in the middle ages.

The imperative necessity of avenging any injury sustained by relatives or dependents, and the incalculable brood of injuries to which this proceeding gave birth, all crying for the revenge from which they sprang, amongst a people ardent and warm in their passions, sudden and immutable in their resolutions, have naturally given rise to heart-burnings and animosities, which have weakened and wasted energies, which might have led to very different destinies than that of disputing at home the possession of their hills with an invader whose ranks are filled by men morally and physically so immeasurably below the Circassian.

But this picture also strongly reminds us of the condition of Iceland under the Norsemen, with whom individuality, carried out to its wildest extreme, had produced the same result, and broken the bond of all society. Tired and fatigued with this state of things, their chronicles shew us the touching avidity with which they received the doctrines of Christianity, and the mild and benignant creed which inculcated what they had never deemed possible, though it was the relief for which their souls panted—the power of forgiving injuries, tired as they had grown of avenging them, and sick as they were of their own stern law, and all its concomitant strife.

Has not this time long arrived for the Circassians? and have they not reached a period when words of

peace and love would not fall like grain upon a barren rock, but like the seed cast into a prepared soil?

All the luxury which the Circassian displays, is in his arms and horses; the hall of a powerful chief is only ornamented by the helmets, weapons, and suits of mail; and on the border lands the steed always stands saddled in the stall. His mode of living is very simple —his food a kind of millet paste called pasta, a word borrowed from the Genoese, maize cakes, and the roasted flesh of the sheep, which is made into a pilaf with the above named grains or rice.

The Cherkesses have amongst them many slaves, principally Russian prisoners. From the accounts of these people we have been obliged to gather most of our notions regarding their internal economy. They are universally represented as eating flesh raw and bleeding; which means that the mountaineers prefer their meat cooked to much the same point as in England is most consonant to the national taste, but which, to a Russian soldier who delights in eating hemp-seed oil like soup, appears to be perfect cannibalism.

The Circassian women enjoy a considerable share of liberty; but it is customary that the daughter of a pcheh, or prince, should only intermarry with the family of a prince; the daughter of an ouzden with an ouzden; and if she could not find a suitable match, and her charms were sufficiently attractive to content the slave-dealer, it was formerly her greatest ambition to go and seek her fortune in the harems of the west, which held out dazzling visions of luxury and splendour, and of amorous sultans and viziers, of whose serai every fair

adventuress hoped to become the mistress. It was considered much as the voyage to India on matrimonial speculation, on which so many of our British women annually depart, only that the Circassian belles set forth without either Bible, sermons, or Mrs. Somebody's advice to young women proceeding on the oriental husband-chase.

It is also well known that the sale of Circassian women was always managed by the patriarchal head of the family, father or brother, and that the young slave soon learned to be the most anxious to display her attractions to the best advantage to a purchaser; thus differing from England, where there is no go-between in the purchase of women—where, in the ball-room, the mothers instead of the fathers manage the sale, and where the more docile daughters are taught, even before they have left the parental home, to aid their chaperons in all their arts to secure the hideous, the imbecile, the deformed, or the profligate, so that they only be the rich. What moral difference is there in the conduct of those who have the avowed resolution of giving up their children, or of the children who are eager to yield up themselves to the first comer, whatever he may be, whose rent-roll will enable him to pay a seducing price—and that of the Cher-kess, who sends his daughters to Stamboul, where equally they are to become the property of the first whose wealth will allow him to purchase?

Let it not be imagined from this remark that we would for a moment defend the Circassian practice in this regard; it was only hazarded *à propos* of the observation we were about to make, that the

blockade of the Black Sea coast, by interrupting this trade to Constantinople, causes considerable dissatisfaction and regret amongst the women whose hopes of native husbands are upon the wane, for it would appear that the fair population far exceeds the number of the marrying men. Perhaps, between the prospect of “single blessedness,” and the harem, anywhere the choice might be a hard one.

The Circassian nation have no written laws. The Russians, like many of their neighbours, have a whole library containing such, but nine times out of ten these written laws are perverted; but with the Circassians custom supplies their place, and these unwritten customs are inviolate. Nowhere are these more rigidly observed than by the Cherkesses. They are also celebrated for the religious observance of their oath; and although the Zaporavians, or the Tchernomorskie Cossac, and this people, entertain towards each other a hate so deadly, that when some of both sides have fallen in their skirmishes along the line of the Kouban, the Cossacs dare not bring them together, but are at the trouble of digging separate holes, under the apprehension that the bodies would not rest in peace within the same grave. Yet no Tchernomorskie would consider himself in the slightest peril in venturing into the heart of the hostile mountains, if his safety was secured by the word of a Cherkess.

The Russians, in the face of this acknowledged fact, characterize them as faithless brigands, and adduce, in support of their charge, many instances of violated treaties and capitulations, most of them made and broken long before the war had assumed its present

serious and envenomed character; but, in point of fact, the Abasian and Cherkessian chiefs, in taking oath to the strict observation of any articles, always introduced the saving clause, providing for the ease in which the Russians should infringe them.

Amongst the Cherkesses the punishment of death is only inflicted for perjury; it was so formerly for any deception in marking horses, of whose breeds and pedigrees they are exceedingly careful. Unconnected as may seem the cultivation of a fine breed of horses with the constitution of the society which indulges in this fancy, we cannot help believing that it will always exercise an influence which is not generally imagined, and produce a tendency towards aristocratic institutions. You can never, in their inmost heart, persuade the vulgar portion of a people accustomed to horses, who see that all virtues run in certain ancient streams of the animal nobility, that also with the human race, there should be nothing in the breed; even if they should be driven to hate, they will always respect their aristocracy, and no aristocracy has ever, in the history of the world, been quenched by hate, though we have seen many withered and quelled irrevocably by contempt.

CHAPTER XII.

CIRCASSIA AND GEORGIA.

In the war carried on by Russia against the Circassians, the forces she employs, and the positions she occupies, may be counted and defined something as follows: a military line, extending from the mouth of the Kouban to the mouth of the Terek, along the banks of both these rivers, defends her Cis-Caucasian territories against the inroads of the mountaineers. This line is guarded by the Tchernomorskie Cossacs, the Cossaes of the Terek, and a contingent of organized Kirguise and Tartars. The number permanently upon this line may amount to about five-and-twenty thousand men; the fortresses and forts of Konivskoe, of Ekaterinodar, the capital of the Tchernomorskie, of Prosnoi, and of Stavropol, with intervening block-houses, protect the western half of the line. About Stavropol, between the sources of the Kouban and the sources of the Kouma, which rise on each side of a range of hills running due northward, there

intervenes a tract of territory, across which it has always been difficult to bar the passage, and which the Circassians have been long accustomed to take advantage of, to carry desolation across the hostile border. Alexandrov, Georgiewsk, and a chain of small forts running along the eastern flank of this range, connect the northern line with that of the Terek, on which Mosdock, the strongest central point, and Kislar, on the islands of the Terek, are the principal fortresses. All the strongholds along the line contain permanent garrisons, to the amount of about 15,000 men, consisting entirely of infantry and artillery ; for it is remarkable that the Russians find their regular cavalry utterly ineffectual in this warfare, and therefore employ none in the whole of the Caucasus, except some squadrons of Besabrasoff's Bessarabian regiment, which are quartered exclusively in the peaceful districts of Georgia.

On the coast of the Black Sea, the important point of Anapa, the fort of Soujouk, of Ghelengic, of Pitsunda, Bampor, and Soukoum, are occupied by garrisons amounting permanently to fifteen thousand men. This forms the western line.

On the eastern side, about seven thousand may be calculated as garrisoning the forts and stations along the Caspian, from Kislar to Bakou, including the city of Derbent. About five thousand men are distributed along the line which divides the isthmus lengthwise from Ekaterinogrod to Tiflis; the Kabardians to the northward, and the Ossetinians to the westward of this passage, perhaps scarcely furnish more than a contingent of five thousand more.

The southern line is more easily maintained than any of the preceding. Commencing near the Black Sea, the Mingrelians, whom we have reckoned amongst the inhabitants of Georgia who have submitted to the Russians, prevent any inroad of the Cherkesses or Abazeks across the country. The Ossetinians, now in the pay of Russia, maintain the central part of this southern line ; and east of Tiflis, a part of the army of Georgia, and some strong posts of Cossacs, suffice to guard the frontier against the feeble attacks of the Lesguis.

Thus, about thirty thousand irregulars and forty-three thousand regulars are constantly employed upon the frontier, to maintain the defensive cordon which encloses the Circassian provinces, and the line which, in one point traverses the centre of them. But this force, for the greater part of which all means of subsistence must be drawn from a great distance at a ruinous expense, occasioned by the cost of transport and the tax of peculation, and therefore more burthen-some to support than an army of 200,000 men would be in the Slavonic provinces, is not yet sufficient to enable the Russians to attempt any offensive operations. For this purpose fresh troops, of which it is impossible to determine the amount, are annually drawn from Taurida, or from the north-western governments. It would appear that they have seldom been able to collect, for this purpose, more than from twenty to forty thousand men. The average annual loss to the Russians may be computed at 15,000 men, who perish at the hands of the Circassians, by disease or starvation ; but there are years in which the casualties much exceed

this number; but the proportion of officers killed and wounded is so great, that sending an officer to the army of the Caucasus is considered a punishment next in severity to degradation and Siberia.

Formerly, a few officers were sometimes found to volunteer on this service, principally driven to it in a moment of excitement, by the humiliation or the tyranny to which they were exposed in their regiments. But this has now entirely ceased, except in those cases wherein men in other countries rid themselves of their lives by suicide. But from every regiment of the guards, every two or three years, one doomed individual is sent thither.

In the Russian Caucasian army may be found the basest and the noblest off-shoots of a society from which despotism has repudiated and lopped them off, as excrescences dangerous to a mass of which their exceeding depravity or their aspiring spirit might endanger the order and security. Here the man who has been guilty of awkward and palpable felonies, or whose flagrant dishonour has become disgustingly public, is sent to hide his tarnished epaulettes; here, in pursuance of the imperial policy of trampling in the dust the fallen aristocracy, are sent the young officers of the guard, ostensibly to punish faults and follies which, in any other country, would scarcely have drawn down a reprimand; and here the wit is banished to repent a pasquinade, the poet to expiate the offensive allusions to freedom which have glowed through his imprudent verses. All the most distinguished favourites of the Russian muse have undergone this dangerous banishment. Poushkin, called by his admirers the

Russian Byron, was forced to carry the musket there ; Lermantoff and Bestoujeff never returned from the fatal scene of strife.

But to the Caucasus, above all, are sent those whose liberal opinions or dangerous views have given umbrage to the jealousy of a watchful government; and into the ranks of its armies it poured thousands of the survivors of the Polish revolution, and these, who have mostly long since perished, were doomed to fight against the liberties of a gallant people, in expiation of having faithfully defended their own ! They are daily replaced by fresh exiles from Poland, who have been suspected or denounced as betraying symptoms of the restless and unquiet spirit, which the strong hand of Russian despotism keeps down, but feels that it cannot crush, until the life of nationality which it is now seeking to extinguish, shall be utterly destroyed.

The offensive operations of the Russians, usually commenced in the spring, have not been of a decisive character since those of Paskevitch, about fourteen years ago, during which he overthrew, after much difficulty, a religious enthusiast called Kosi-Moullah, who had united a band of fanatics of different tribes, and whose cause the Tchetchensis and Lesguis had espoused. Kosi-Moullah himself was slain in the defence of the castle of Gouniri, in Daghistan, which the field-marshall carried by storm. He then, entering the valley of the Vladi-Caucase, from the Georgian side, carried his operations into the mountains to the west of this line.

Though Paskevitch displayed great activity and energy in both these expeditions, he only succeeded in

gaining ground on the eastern half of the isthmus, and it is only in this direction that the Russians, by incessant efforts, have since made some further progress. These efforts are, however, for the most part wasted in over-awing tribes which have broken off from their allegiance, or in punishing them for their backsliding; and like the key of Blue Beard's chamber, from which the blood wiped off on one end appears on the other, as they proceed to one district which from submissive has become hostile, another district, from the vicinity of which the force employed has been removed, raises again the standard of rebellion.

Few incursions are made into the territories of the quite independent Tehetehensi and Lesgui tribes, whose country is of more difficult access. When they are so, after great loss in forcing passes, and from the desultory defence of a mountain guerilla, the Russian troops sometimes succeed in destroying a village or two, which they quickly abandon. The inhabitants formerly buried all their corn and stores, but the Russians having learned to find them out by sounding the earth, they are now concealed at some distance from their habitations. Immediately on their retreat, the inhabitants return to the smouldering ashes of their dwellings, and commence their reconstruction; so that six weeks after, the village rises from its ashes, and there is nothing to tell of the passage of the Muscovites, but the foul remains of their putrifying bodies, or bleaching bones, which the birds of the air have stripped and bared of the corrupted flesh.

The exceeding boldness of the mountaineers prevents the establishment of forts on any point where

they cannot be strongly garrisoned, and where it is not convenient to devote a considerable force to escorting thither provisions, and bringing opportune relief; for whenever the swelling of mountain torrents, the snows, or the disasters of the troops in the great stations, prevent them for a few weeks from sending any succour, the forts thus cut off from communication are stormed and carried by the Circassians, who, when they assemble for such a purpose, display a fierce and reckless valour which renders walls which would brave the assault of any other mountain people unaided by artillery, quite ineffectual against them.

Now there are few points judged of sufficient immediate importance to induce the Russians to spare such numerous garrisons, which they can ill afford, but especially to incur the loss of men which every convoying or relieving column must experience in maintaining communication with them. The natives dig holes in the earth, on the top of hills, and in every commanding position, and standing in them up to the neck, to the number of perhaps a dozen, armed with their deadly rifles, pick down every man that approaches, so that skirmishers cannot be got forward. No howitzer can throw a shell into a trench three feet wide, and there is, therefore, no resource but in carrying this hole by the rush of a column of some hundred men. Its defenders, however, continue discharging their pieces with unerring aim, until the enemy is quite close to them, and then, in most instances, escape, either by flight, or by some back passage from the trench, which affords an outlet on the other side.

An immense loss was formerly sustained in maintaining communication along the Vladi-Caucase; but since the accession of the Ossetinians, that danger has much diminished. On the eastern side of the isthmus, against the Abasians and Cherkesses, it has been already stated that beyond the occupation of their sea-ports on the Black Sea, no progress has been made. Reminding one of the eternally renewed web of Penelope, for many campaigns the Russians have been busied in re-establishing during the fine season, and whilst the navigation of the Euxine is open, what their adversaries have undone in the winter; for every winter the Cherkesses and Abasians storm many of the forts upon their line. Thus it is said that the Lesguis of the Zamirnie (pacified villages), only sting, like the wasps, in summer, as it is only in that season they can find food and shelter in the more inaccessible mountains; whilst the Cherkesses and Abasians are, like the wolf, more keen and daring in the frost.

The Russian armies in the Caucasus have never felt strong enough to attempt any decisive inroad on the territory of these people; all their efforts hitherto have been confined to the establishment of lines of preparatory isolation. It has merely been to effect or prevent this object that all their struggles with the Cherkesses and Abasians have been made, in which, on the very threshold of their frontier, a Russian army has been driven into the Kouban, and many strong divisions have been destroyed.

In the Kabardah, which is tributary to the Cherkessian princes, and towards the sources of the Kouban, inroads have been made, with various success. When-

ever the Circassians assemble in any force, the result is always very sanguinary, if not fatal to the Russian columns; but this is not very frequently the case. Although it may be fairly presumed that Circassia must be able to furnish 150,000 well-armed warriors, some say 250,000, they never muster above four or five thousand men, unless in the winter, when they have apparently had time to sound the note of preparation. They then come down to attack the forts, to the number of from ten to twenty thousand men. The single nation of the Lesguis sent 30,000 warriors to join the Persians, and the Cherkesses have made inroads into Russia through the opening between the sources of the Kouban and the Kouma, to the amount of eight and ten thousand horsemen.

When a Russian army marches forward, it can only do so at a snail's pace, and surrounded by a ring of skirmishers, who are constantly attacked, and obliged to keep up a fire as incessant as the reader may witness at the exercise in Hyde Park. This service is especially dangerous to the officers sent to command the *tirailleurs*, who are sure to be picked off by the enemy. The young Cherkessian chiefs take a pride in galloping along this line, so close as to discharge their arrows at the Russians. These arrows wound, but seldom kill; but though the chivalrous mountaineer has the rifle slung behind him, of which every shot is deadly, he considers it unworthy of him to waste a charge of powder on such ignoble foes. Thus many are slain by the Russians. Often they dash through the line, and kill or carry off the Russian officers, who consider all resistance as so hopeless that on such occasions they

seldom offer any. The Cherkesses, penetrating their line of skirmishers, have been seen thus to pull them from their horses, and, dragging them across the saddle bow, to dash away with them, as a cat carries off a mouse. Death or captivity is the invariable fate of every man bold enough to separate two hundred yards from his column, even if no enemy should have been previously in sight.

Sometimes it happens that the horse of the Cherkess is shot under him, and that he is surrounded before he can escape; but the Russians have never the opportunity of shewing him quarter, if so disposed, for the high-spirited race to which he belongs will never brook captivity; when escape is hopeless, he turns his yatagan resolutely against his own breast. A whole campaign may pass without the capture of a single Abasian or Cherkess.

The Cherkess seldom takes the life of the Russian unless there is no means of leading him away in safety; because he is valuable to him as a slave. To prevent any attempt at escape, when he has led him to his home, he makes an incision in the heel of the prisoner's foot, and filling it with chopped horse-hair, binds it up, and allows it to heal. Until this wound is re-opened, the foreign matter drawn out, and the wound re-healed, the patient is effectually lame of one leg, since he dare not tread upon the heel.

Between the Tchernomorskie Cossac and the Cherkess no quarter is given, and the Tchernomorskie alone has been sometimes found to face him, in a hand to hand combat.

The mountaineers most dread the artillery of the Russians, which easily knocks about their ears any

of their rude attempts to fortify. But in the hands of the mountaineers themselves, a very different result would be produced by a little artillery with sufficient ammunition; that is to say, a few howitzers to throw shrapnell against the Russians, who are obliged to mass themselves into columns, which their line of skirmishers keep quite out of the reach of the Circassians, or to vomit case-shot upon them when they attempted, by the impetus of a column, to carry any contested point—the only manner in which they can be brought to do so, though it be only defended by ten men.

How long, if unaided, and cut off from all sea communication, the Circassians will succeed in defending their territory, is very difficult to estimate. If united and organized, it is probable, from the spirit which animates the mountain population, and the peculiar difficulties offered by the nature of the ground, which is divided by a sort of desert, of prodigious extent, from those provinces whence the aggressor draws his resources, that Russia would never succeed in subduing that country. Certainly, very different efforts from any she has hitherto made will be required to accomplish this purpose, even should the Circassians continue in their present disunited state.

It is evident that Russia has so long attached the greatest importance to the possession of these great gates of Asia, that one cannot but believe she has devoted to the accomplishment of this object all the resources her policy deems the empire can conveniently spare. To furnish all the forces required, to ensure success, and to maintain them for several

years, so as to effect her object with any certainty, at least double the number of troops she now employs would be necessary; it would therefore require her to strain every nerve, in a manner which it is doubtful whether she will ever be induced to do. Hitherto her most energetic efforts, both on the eastern and western side of the isthmus, have signally failed—the progress made in one exhausting campaign being generally effaced in the next.

Should Russia once succeed in gaining possession of the Abasian and Cherkessian mountains—from which it is said to be her intention, as it is undoubtedly her policy, to transport such feeble remains of the population as will be left whenever the Muscovite foot treads triumphantly on those yet unconquered hills,—England will then have lost for ever the opportunity of checking her ambitious policy in the east, and that which now constitutes her weakness, on this side, will be the most formidable muscle of her strength. The Moslemin nations, southward, as they see the Selavonians pouring through this passage into their long-coveted regions, will deem indeed that the time of the accomplishment of Mahomet's remarkable prophecy is arrived, such as it is written in the Koran, where, alluding to the actions of Alexander the Great, called in that book “the two-horned,” he relates that he built up across the Caucasus a mighty wall of iron, soldering it with molten brass, for the purpose of barring the passage to the accursed descendants of Gog and Magog, of whom he then predicts that before the final destruction of the world, when their time is come, they will overturn it, and ravage all the earth.

So the prophet has declared to the faithful, “ and God,” says the Koran, “ announceth nothing in vain.”

The Russian populations of Taurida, and the steppes, have, however, a tradition more consoling for the Caucasians. The Caucasus, they say, is inhabited by a race of giants, who were defeated and driven to their mountains by the valour of Alexander Mackedonsky, (Alexander of Macedon.) When he retired, he caused to be placed at the foot of the hills twelve enormous brazen trumpets, so inclined, that when the wind swept through them, they sounded, arousing the echoes of the lofty hills, and striking terror into the souls of the vanquished, who, imagining that the sounds proceeded from the armed host of his redoubted warriors, dare not descend into the plain; but many of these trumpets have already fallen to the ground: and when the last shall be no longer standing, the terrible people, whom none of the degenerate modern race can cope with, shall come down from their snowy peaks to ravage and conquer all the world.

From Circassia, let us now turn to Georgia, of whose tranquil provinces Russia secured possession, by half a century of continual intrigue. Mountainous, especially towards its eastern coast, it is a country of almost universal fertility. The rich soil of Flanders, and the warm sun of Italy, fit this land for the luxuriant growth of all the valuable produce of the most favoured climes. Its picturesque scenery, its verdant plains, and its clear and unclouded sky, combine to render these regions surpassing in beauty as their soil is exceeding in richness, and not only important

as the ante-chamber of all the golden lands which lie beyond, but intrinsically of the greatest value.

Nearly all our finest northern fruits, long imported and naturalized, but only perpetuated by engrafting and unceasing care, are indigenous to Georgia; the vine, the cotton tree, the indigo plant, and the silk-worm, all flourish here in a congenial clime. The soil, however, still lies for the most part neglected and uncultivated, and wasting its wild luxuriance, nine-tenths of this fruitful land being lost to the human race, and unredeemed by its industry from a rank and useless profusion, as much as when the expedition of the Argonauts sailed up the Phasis to seek the golden fleece—the Phasis, whose solitary banks are still uninterrupted by any sound but the whirring wing of the pheasant startled by the traveller's footsteps.

The Russian government, since it has held possession of these provinces, has made some efforts to ameliorate their condition; but this has been rendered difficult by her previous policy during the reign of the Christian kings of Georgia, who had placed themselves under her protection, and to whom, having first drawn on them the enmity of their neighbours, she never afforded any effectual succour, allowing their states to be ravaged and devastated until this increasing weakness obliged them to throw themselves entirely into her arms. From the state into which the country has been thus brought, the vices of administration, the want of confidence of the native populations, and the inroads of the Lesquis, do not very easily allow it to recover, nor probably will it do so unless the subjugation of Circassia enables the Russian government

to devote more attention to this subject ; which, as long as these possessions are held on a tenure that the independence of Circassia renders so precarious, is all absorbed in devising means to overcome this stubborn resistance.

Thus, a country containing a population of nine hundred thousand inhabitants, and whose resources would feed nine millions, presents an aspect of universal misery, amidst all the liberality of nature, and cannot, in its present condition, maintain even the feeble Russian armies which occupy it.

About half a million of the population is Georgian—consisting, like the Circassian, of an infinity of races, but mingled during centuries in such inextricable confusion as to defy all effort to unravel their origin. Divided into different people, they bear a general family likeness. Far more soft, pliable, and enervated than the Circassian, although physically a fine breed of men, and generally warlike in their temper, they possess little of the rugged and enduring virtue of their northern neighbours, and have never been inspired with the same ardent love of freedom and independence.

The Mingrelians and Immeritians who occupy the mountainous districts of Western Georgia, and the former of whom in fact inhabit part of the higher range of the Circassian mountains, live under a feudal mode of government, with which Russia, content with their submission, dares not interfere. The Mingrelians are still nominally governed by a prince, a certain Dadian, who, if he be not dead, as we have heard recently reported, is effectually governed by

his wife. Stripped of his real power, the Russians have allowed him to retain the trappings and the feathers of sovereignty, and reduced to great poverty, his time is now spent in travelling with a court, bedizened like a strolling company, from one of his vassals to the other, profiting, by the mischievous rights which have been left him, to devour all their substance.

The subjects of this august personage are dirty, poor, and discontented, but constantly under arms to repress the forays of the Abasians, who carry them off into captivity wherever they can secure them. Although they have made no attempt to revolt against the Russian rule, these districts are too dangerous for isolated soldiers, or even small detachments, to traverse; and there are many parts towards the southern frontier of Georgia, where Russia, content with a nominal submission, rather observes and divides, than governs these isolated districts.

With the exception of some tribes of Turkomans and Kurds, and the Persians and Tartars in the plains of Eastern Georgia, which is perfectly tranquil and dependent, the inhabitants profess the Christian religion, and are of the Greek communion. The Armenians, who are nearly as numerous as all the rest of the population, amounting to four hundred thousand individuals, are well known to profess, in a garbled form, the Roman-catholic faith. This peaceful and industrious race asks only for quiet, and relief from direct oppression, to flourish anywhere. Hitherto, the annoyance of the neighbouring Circassians, and where this has been removed, the avidity of the Russian employés, has denied this boon, and proved to them

the futility of those humble hopes which induced them to migrate, as the greater number have done, across the Russian border, to seek refuge from the persecution and extortion of the Turks and Kizzil-bashes.

The Georgian nobility have, in some instances, been induced to enter the Russian service, and to send their children to Russia to receive their education; but on the whole they are discontented and disaffected, and several conspiracies have been detected of late years against the government, which have always been hushed up, a few of the ringleaders only disappearing. This circumstance occasioned the abandonment of the project of a Georgian army, which was planned by the Prince of Warsaw, but was not carried into effect.

When we contemplate the profound policy of the Russian cabinet, its persevering ambition and sagacity, in conjunction with its material means, irresistible if these powerful elements of strength were not neutralized by some organic defect, we are tempted to recal that beneficent law of Providence, which, where it does not, as in the elephant, deprive the monsters of its creation of malignity, when conferring on them vast superiority of strength, confines them to a single element, as we see with so many of the hideous inhabitants of the deep, or only allows them to invade the land, to satisfy their ferocity, as in the instance of the crocodile, after rendering their strength useless, by its unwieldiness.

What could have promised a more fair result to Russian ambition, or have been more dangerous to

the East, than the formation of a disciplined native-army, drawn from the Christian populations, amongst which she had intrigued so long, and who looked forward to her with so much hope and confidence—an army which might have received an unlimited augmentation from all their co-religionaries scattered through Asia Minor? This her policy devised, and to effect it, her cabinet was well aware that it was necessary to soothe and govern with the most gentle hand her newly acquired subjects.

On the frontier provinces of European Turkey, a case precisely similar is met by similar intentions. But there is always a fatal interruption to the execution of this cabinet purpose; the limbs of its body cannot, at a distance, be got to do what the head devises, and her corrupt and incorrigible administration begins too soon to render itself hateful to the populations whose good-will it was the aim of her statesmen to preserve. The Christians, both of Wallachia and Georgia, have been converted, by their contact with the Muscovites, from warm friends into sullen and suspicious foes.

The Russian army in Georgia does not exceed forty-five thousand men; it is in a very wretched condition, and much scattered over the face of the country; it proves, however, sufficient to perform the part of observing and overawing the people amongst which it is placed.

All who have sufficient interest endeavour to avoid the Circassian war, and to exchange a scene of danger for one of indolence, get draughted to Georgia from the northern part of the Caucasus; so that the valour of the officers is at a very low ebb. In

Circassia none but the irregular cavalry is employed, excepting some squadrons of a Bessarabian regiment, whose colonel, Besabrasoff, is one of the many instances of the mutability of the favour of princes, and of the extent of pliancy required in the favourite to retain it. Many years since, he was that aide-de-camp of the Emperor Nicholas who was supposed to stand highest in his good graces. One day, the Emperor asked him abruptly, if he had ever thought of marrying. The aide-de-camp answered, that if he met with a lady to suit him, the thought might very possibly suggest itself. "What do you think of So-and-so, the maid of honour?" "That she is a very charming personage, but has no fortune." "If that is all, let it be a match," said the emperor; "I wish to see you both married. I will take care of your fortune." A week after, they were married; the emperor, at the wedding, presented the young couple with some hundred thousands of roubles. But on the day of their marriage, the outrageous husband drove the wife from his house. He was, within four-and-twenty hours sent off to the Caucasus, where he remained many years, gradually fighting his way to the command of a cavalry regiment in Bessarabia, where the dépôt of the regiment is stationed, much distinguished by his gallantry, and beloved for his generosity; his wife remained at court.

Tiflis is the capital, the seat of government, and the most important military point in Georgia. Its terraced houses, in some of which the fair Georgians dance, in their national costume, to the sound of the tambourine, whilst others are inhabited by the families

of the Russian employés and officers, in all the frippery of French Moscow millinery, and the motley population which wanders about its streets, designate it at once as a spot where Europe and Asia are mingling.

The claims of Russia to Georgia are founded on the forced abandonment of his rights by the tsar, George the Eleventh, to the Emperor Paul. With his father Heraclius, the Empress Catherine, who extended to him the deadly protection of the Russian empire, made a treaty by which the sovereignty of Georgia was assured "*to him and to his heirs for ever and ever, until the end of time.*"

The queen of George the Eleventh, the tsarina Maria, after his death was forcibly removed to Russia with her children ; she was pensioned there, and a few years since was still living in St. Petersburg. Her removal, which the agent dispatched for that purpose by the governor attempted to effect with some brutality, gave rise to a tragic scene which will remain long unforgotten in the memory of the Georgians, and which was not unworthy of their fallen queen. A Colonel Lazareff was the man deputed to convey her on her journey ; he was the son or the nephew of a certain Lazareff, either a Jew or an Armenian, who arrived at the court of Catherine, bringing with him one of the most celebrated jewels now in the imperial crown, which he had stolen and succeeded in concealing in a sore which he had made in the fleshy part of his leg. Catherine, unable to pay him in money the full price demanded for it, made it up to him in slaves, titles, and stars. His family subsequently rose to considerable notoriety and

eminence in Russia. It was a scion of this hopeful stock, who, in the fulfilment of his duty, not being very courteously received by the Georgian queen, brutally took hold of her foot, to make her rise from the cushion on which she was sitting, surrounded by her sleeping children. Drawing her husband's dagger, which she carried in her sash, she stabbed him to the heart, to avenge this indignity, and he expired almost immediately. The interpreter, drawing his sword, fell upon her, and gave her several severe wounds before assistance could be procured.

The last attempt made by the Russians, whose activity is now turned against the Caucasian nations, to penetrate further into Asia, took place between 1839 and 1840. Lieut.-General Perowski, the foster-brother of the emperor, governor of Orenburg, which he had for some time administered, had long turned his attention towards Khiva, establishing intelligence with the nomades, and gathering all requisite information from the Bokarian and Kivioite caravans.

The conquest of Khiva presented many and serious obstacles, but its occupation offered tempting advantages.

Khiva is well-known to be situated beyond the southern extremity of the isthmus formed by the great Aral lake and the Caspian, and within a distance from the shores of the latter, which would have rendered it practicable for the Russians, if in possession of Khiva, to open a safe communication betwixt it and the coast. Nothing could have interrupted it between this south-western coast and the mouths of the Wolga, except the difficulties of navi-

gation. These difficulties, for vessels drawing less than twelve feet of water, consisted, and still consist, only in the awkwardness of the craft which navigate these waters, and in the utter ignorance of their crews both of seamanship and of the hidden shoals along the northern shores. These defects were remediable, and, once remedied, a sea communication across the Caspian differed in this respect from a communication across the Black Sea with Georgia, that it could not, whenever Russia chose to menace Central Asia, be cut off by a British squadron. Just as the Caucasian mountains, with their unconquerable mountaineers, form a barrier across the isthmus between the Black Sea and the Caspian, through which the Russians have only two precarious roads, so the isthmus betwixt the Caspian and the Aral seas is barred by a formidable desert, which must be crossed to get to Khiva—less formidable, indeed, than the broad belt of desert, which beyond it divides the rest of Muscovite Asia from all its rich, southern regions—but still sufficiently so to cause the Russians only to have attempted it with hesitation, and to have signally failed in their attempt.

The news of the British invasion of Affghanistan, of which the disastrous termination was not then foreseen, roused the jealousy of the Emperor Nicholas, and determined him to attempt at once the long-contemplated conquest.

Perowski, a man who had hardly reached the prime of life, affecting the costume and habits of the Asiatic Cossacs, ardent in temper, and more enterprisingly than sagaciously ambitious, received the order, or

rather the permission, at once to march forward, and to throw open a new gate into Central Asia. The deserts between Orenburg and Khiva had been traversed more than a century and a half ago, by one of the earliest tribes of Cossacs, which wandered eastward, and settling on the Wolga, formed the nucleus of what are now called the Uralian Cossacs; the same who gave so much trouble to Peter the Great, and who afterwards joining in the rebellion of the Pretender Pugat-cheff, threatened the very throne of Catherine II. Some bands of these adventurers, pushing their discoveries and conquests in every direction, penetrated to Khiva, and for some time held possession of it. At the present day these deserts are crossed by regular caravans, both in winter and summer; with these caravans arrive the Bokarian merchants, who, at the fair of Nejni, Novogorod, and in the bazaars of Moscow, display their turquoises. But the depth of the loose burning sand, and the whirlwinds into which it is raised by the wind, render this passage difficult and sometimes fatal, by overwhelming travellers. The saline nature of a great part of these deserts—the briny water—easy, indeed, in many places to find, but so difficult to obtain fresh—render a march across these deserts stretching 1000 miles from Orenburg to Khiva, exceedingly perilous for an army in the summer; the Muscovite soldiers, indeed, in that season seeming to inhale with the very air the scurvy which decimates them in such situations.

The march of the invading army was, therefore, undertaken in winter, and was commenced from Orenburg, on the 29th of November, 1839. Perowski,

whose fortune depended on the issue of his enterprise, being both administrator of the province in which his expedition was prepared, as well as commander of it, attended more effectively to the commissariat department than had perhaps ever been done for any Russian army since the days of old Suwarrow. The number of infantry of the expeditionary army might probably not have exceeded what was stated after its failure—from six to eight thousand men; but it was accompanied by clouds of Kirguise Cossacs, and hired auxiliary cavalry. It is certain that fifteen thousand camels were employed to carry the tents, provisions, and fuel, and to mount alternately the infantry soldiers. The intense cold of the winter of Central Asia is proportional to the burning heat of its summer, and this year it was unusually severe. The Russian officers almost entertain the superstition that their native cold follows the Russian eagles. When the armies of Suwarrow invaded Italy, snow fell where snow had not fallen within the memory of man. An unusually severe winter marked their great campaign against Napoleon; the same thing happened in the Turkish and the Polish wars. The severity of the weather on their march towards Khiva, furnished a fresh example; the cold averaged twenty degrees of Reaumur, and is said to have risen to eight and twenty. It was not so cold in the government of Wologda, and Wologda is colder than the nearest point man has approached to the Pole.

The men had, however, been clothed in sheep-skins; they were fed with unusually stimulating food, their tents were made after the Tartar fashion, of thick grey

felt, and piling the snow around them, and huddling together, they contrived to keep up the animal heat. The tent of Perowski himself, to which his officers repaired every evening, was kept at so warm a temperature as to give relish to his iced champagne.

Perowski had calculated on reposing with his army about midway on his march, in a certain district, which forms a sort of winter oasis in these solitudes, affording, from the mildness of its climate, a pasture to which the nomades with their herds resort. But in this hope he was disappointed: as he approached it the ground was covered to such a depth with snow, that pioneers were obliged to clear the way, and during the last twenty-five days, his army did not accomplish one hundred miles, and were at last unable to get over more than two versts, or one English mile and one-third, between sunrise and sunset. As soon as the snow reached the bellies of the camels, it was found, too, that they died by hundreds. From the enemy the expedition met with slight annoyance. Although somewhat harassed by the irregulars sent against it by the khan of Khiva, these soon learned to dread the fire of the Russian squares, and the unusual cold prevented them from hovering long around the line of march. Perowski, however, was obliged to turn back, and with the loss of nine thousand camels, and an immense number of horses, took refuge in the little fort of Gemba. He attributed his failure to the unusual rigour of the winter, which had taken the cavalry sent against him by the Khiviotes so much by surprise, that they were not only unable to annoy him, but had lost a part of their force, and nearly al-

their horses, from the cold. An officer who followed the expedition gave it as his opinion that this intensity of cold, by paralysing the enemy, was the salvation of the Russian army. "We did not," he said, "turn back on account of the cold, but on account of the snow, which we should have been liable to have met with during the mildest winter; and if an active enemy had followed us, taking advantage of the disorganization of retreat, the whole expedition must have perished."

Perowski reached St. Petersburg shortly after the account of his failure, and succeeded in averting the disgrace with which he was menaced, and which, being expected, caused his conduct to be more freely canvassed than is usual in Russian circles.

"These people," said the unfortunate commander, "in utter ignorance of the subject they discuss, all blame me, without rhyme or reason. Why, they say, have attempted to march by land hundreds of versts to Khiva, when, sailing across the Caspian, the greater portion of the distance might easily have been got over? As if a plan apparently so simple and advantageous, had it been feasible, could have escaped my consideration. In point of fact, although it be true that the Caspian is navigable, and that the principal craft upon it are at the disposal of the Russians, some of these vessels are very small, the larger ones clumsy put together from the timber of the old barks, which drift down the Wolga, and all are most wretchedly manned. The danger of transporting any considerable force with such conductors across a sea little known, and tempestuous, would of itself have been great; but further

than this, on landing, the Russian force would still have been several hundred miles from Khiva, and could never have proceeded without cavalry and camels; these there were no means of transporting."

Perowski at least succeeded in justifying his failure in the eyes of Nicholas, who contemplated, or affected to contemplate, another immediate attempt on Khiva, of which he promised the direction to him.

Whether British remonstrance with the Russian cabinet or with the Asiatic prince, or the proved difficulties of the enterprise, or all combined, produced the desired effect, the khan of Khiva agreed to make some satisfaction to the emperor, and the emperor to forego his design. Several hundred Russians were released from captivity, and transferred, by being restored to their country, from the slavery of Moslemin to that of Christian masters. They arrived at Orenburg, escorted by the present Sir William Shakespeare, the same who afterwards re-captured Lady Sale and the rest of Akbar's prisoners, and were received with great ceremony. But the emperor betrayed his disappointment and displeasure by omitting to give the British agent any mark of his satisfaction, such as the courtesies due on such an occasion rendered almost imperative.

APPENDIX,

ILLUSTRATIVE OF RUSSIAN INFLUENCE AT
THE COURT OF BERLIN.

Translation of a Pamphlet, published in Swedish, by an exiled Finn, and forbidden to be published in German, by the Royal Prussian Censorship, within the Prussian Dominions.*

FINLAND.

THIS province was conquered by the Russian arms during the year 1808, and was declared by an Imperial Manifesto, of the 5th of June, in the same year, to be "for ever united to the Russian empire." On the 1st of February, 1809, the Finnish chambers were convoked to a diet in Borga, and on the 27th of the following March, the emperor Alexander voluntarily published his royal assurance in the following terms:—"Whereas, under the

* Out of fifty-five pages, which the pamphlet contains, forty-four are here translated, being all those which contain any allusions whatever of a political nature, or which could, by any possibility, be construed to give umbrage to any existing authorities.

guidance of Providence, we have taken possession of the Grand Duchy of Finland, we have pleased hereby to assure and confirm the religion and *fundamental laws* of the country, together with all those rights and privileges which any and every class in particular in the said grand duchy, and all its inhabitants in general, whether high or low, have hitherto enjoyed according to their constitution; promising to preserve all such *privileges and enactments in full force, firm and unchangeable.*" On the Emperor Nicholas ascending the throne, he published on the 12-24th of December, 1825, a *gracious assurance to the several inhabitants of Finland*, in which the promises just translated are renewed, letter for letter, the only change being in the ingress, which was worded as follows:—"Whereas, under the guidance of Providence, we have taken possession, by inheritance, of the Grand Duchy of Finland, we have pleased hereby," &c. &c.*

The *fundamental laws* and *constitution* of Finland could be no other than those according to which that country was governed on its separation from Sweden, or those which were in force in that country up to the period in question. These are—

THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE 21ST OF
AUGUST, 1772;

AND

THE ACT OF UNION AND SECURITY OF THE 21ST OF
FEBRUARY AND THE 3RD OF APRIL, 1789.

We accordingly append these two documents, excluding only such points as can have no reference to Finland in its new circumstances, or as have no immediate relation to the question now before us. Let us commence with—

* Samling af Placater, förordningar, Manifester, m. m. Del. I. s. 19;
V. s. 56.

THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF AUGUST 21, 1772.

We, Gustaf, &c. &c., hereby make known, that as, from the commencement of our reign, we have uninterruptedly wished to use our royal power and authority, for the strength, improvement, and prosperity of our kingdom, and for the advancement, security, and happiness of our faithful subjects; and as we, for the promotion hereof, have graciously found the present condition of our country inevitably demand an improvement of the fundamental laws suitable to the highly useful objects named above; and as we accordingly, after the most exact meditations and examinations, have drawn up a form for the rule and government of this kingdom which the now assembled chambers of the realm have unanimously sworn and adopted. We will hereby, accordingly, approve, confirm and enforce this form of government, as thus consented to by the diet of the realm, literally and in the manner following hereafter, letter for letter.

We the undersigned council and chambers, counts, viscounts, bishops, nobles, and gentry, clerks, officers, burgesses, and commons of the kingdom of Sweden, who are now here assembled, for ourselves and for our brethren in their homes, declare and make known, that as we have found, by an unhappy experience, that under the name of noble liberty, divers of our fellow-citizens have raised themselves to lordship over us, which has become so much the more unbearable as it took its origin in licence, has been confirmed by selfishness and cruelty, and has finally been supported by the power and influence of foreign states, to the great misfortune of all society, and which would have plunged us into the greatest insecurity through the partial interpretation of the law, and might eventually have drawn down upon the kingdom, (the dear

fatherland of us all,) the gloomy destinies exhibited to us in the examples of our neighbours and of past history, if the manliness and love of country of zealous fellow-citizens, supported by the care and efforts of the mighty prince and ruler, Gustaf the Third, King of Sweden, the Goths, and the Vands, (the most gracious king and lord of us all,) had not rescued and saved us therefrom. We have accordingly considered how we could best confirm our freedom, so that it might not be insulted by a bold regent, inimical to his country, or by ambitious, selfish, and traitorous fellow-citizens, and proud and malicious enemies, so that the ancient realm of Svea and Gothia might continue to be a free and independent kingdom. For this reason, we have granted and confirmed, as we hereby explain and confirm, this form of government to be an unchangeable and holy fundamental law, which we, for us and our successors, *born and unborn*, engage ourselves to respect, following the literal contents thereof, and regarding him or them to be enemies to us and the kingdom, who will lead us to turn aside therefrom, just as it, word for word, follows hereafter.

SEC. I. Unity in religion and the right service of God is the most powerful foundation for a legal, enduring, and friendly government. Therefore, hereafter, as before, shall all, both kings, persons in authority, and inhabitants of this realm, in the first place hold fast to the pure and clear word of God, as it is written in the books of the Prophets and Apostles, explained in the Christian symbols, the catechism of Luther, and the unchanted Augsburg Confession, and as is ordained in the council of Upsala, and the former decisions and explanations of the state, so that the right of the church shall be supported; nothing in this admission affecting the rights of the royal house, the crown, and the whole commons of Sweden.

SEC. 2. The king hath power to govern his realm as the law of Sweden states ; he himself, and no other, defending, loving, and retaining right and truth ; but forbidding, abolishing, and keeping down iniquity and unright ; none injuring in life or honour, limb or prosperity, unless he be legally convicted and condemned ; and himself or through others depriving none of goods, real or personal, without legal doom and examination ; and governing the realm according to the royal code, the land-law and this form of government.

SEC. 3. (Regulates the succession.)

SEC. 4. (Regulates the appointment of the council, and their duties.)

SEC. 5. The king shall rule and govern, save and protect, city, and country, and all, with his and the crown's right, as the law and this form of government saith.

SEC. 6. (Relates to treaties of peace, truce, and union.)

SEC. 7. (Relates to the journeys of the king abroad.)

SEC. 8. (Of the treatment of business in the council, and of justiciary cases.)

SEC. 9. His majesty alone shall have power to pardon, and to restore, honour, life, and goods, for all such crimes as do not evidently contradict the clear word of God.

SEC. 10. (Regulates the appointment to high offices.)

SEC. 11. (How nobles shall be created.)

SEC. 12. (How cabinet business shall be treated.)

SEC. 13—33. (Of the colleges in the kingdom, the army, the court, and the provincial government.)

SEC. 34—36. (How Swedish princes shall be supported ; of their marriages, and of the entrance of the crown-prince into the council.)

SEC. 37. (How the government shall be conducted when the king is sick or on distant journeys.)

SEC. 38. (Of the meetings of the diet.)

SEC. 39. (That the fundamental law cannot be altered, without the consent of the king.)

SEC. 40. The king may not establish any new law, or abolish any old one, without the knowledge and consent of the chambers.

SEC. 41. The chambers may not abolish any old law, or establish any new one, without the yes and consent of the king.

SEC. 42. When any new law shall be passed, these rules shall be observed, as follow:—Should such new law be desired by the chambers, let them consult among themselves, and when they are agreed, let the bill be delivered to his majesty, through their four speakers, that the king may give his thoughts thereon. His majesty then consults his council, and hears their opinion, and when he has considered them and formed his decision, he shall summon the chambers to the Royal Hall (Riks-salen), and shall then, in a short speech, give his yes and consent, or else explain the reasons which prevent his consenting thereto. On the other hand, should his majesty propose any new law, let him first communicate the same to his eouncil, and after they have given their opinions in the protocol, let the whole be delivered to the chambers, who, after having debated and considered among themselves, shall ask a day on which to give their consent to his majesty in the State-Hall (Riks-salen); but should the same be a refusal, let it be given, together with the reasons which have guided them, in writing, through the hands of the four speakers.

SEC. 43. Should it happen that any new law-question should arise, a thing of which we have examples enough in former times, let it then be decided in the manner described above, in Section 42.

SEC. 44. (Of the right of the crown alone to coin money.)

SEC. 45. His majesty hath to defend and rescue his kingdom, especially against the power of foreigners and its enemies; but he may not lay on his subjects any new war-benevolences, taxes, levies, or other payments, contrary to law, his coronation oath, and his declaration, without the knowledge, free will, and consent of his chambers: however, an exception herefrom may be permitted in that unhappy case, that an armed power should attack the realm; then shall his majesty be entitled to take all such measures as may be required for the safety of the state and the well being of his subjects; but so soon as the war hath ceased, the chambers shall assemble, and all those new taxes which had been raised in consequence of the war shall cease immediately.

SEC. 46. The sittings of the chambers shall not last longer than three months at the most; and in order that the country may not be troubled by long diets, as has hitherto been the case, his majesty may close the diet at the time now fixed, and dismiss its members to their homes: and in such case, should no new grant have been fixed, the old grant shall continue to be levied as before.

SEC. 47. (Of the committees of the diet.)

SEC. 48. (That the king may not declare a war of attack.)

SEC. 49. (What protocols shall be delivered to the diet.)

SEC. 50. The condition of the expenditure and finanees shall be laid before the committee of the diet, in order that they may be eonvinced that the money has been used for the use and advantage of the kingdom.

SEC. 51. (How the members of the diet shall be protected.)

SEC. 52. (Of the privileges of the four chambers.)

SEC. 53. (Of the government of the German provinces.)

SEC. 54. (Confirms the rights and privileges of the towns.)

SEC. 55. (The bank of the diet remains under their own care and guarantee.)

SEC. 56. (Of the management of the army pension fund.)

SEC. 57. If anything obscure should be found in this law, the literal contents of the same shall be observed, till his majesty and the diet can agree thereon, in the manner fixed in Sections 39 and 42.

All this we, the now assembled chambers, have found it necessary to ordain for the orderly government of the realm, and for freedom and security for us, our brethren remaining at home, and our successors, born and unborn. At the same time, we herewith again declare, that we have the greatest detestation of royal tyranny, or the so-called sovereignty, regarding it as our greatest happiness, honour, and advantage to be and to live free and independent, *legislative*, but law-obeying chambers, under the rule of a king, powerful, but subject to the law; both united and protected, under the law which delivers us and our dear country from those dangers which disorder, licence, tyranny, aristocracy, and democracy draw after them, to the misfortune of all society, and the sorrow and burden of each individual citizen. We regard ourselves as so much the more assured of an orderly, legal, and happy government, as his Majesty has already declared that he esteems it to be his greatest glory to be the first citizen of a free people, and we hope that such a resolution will be planted in the royal house, descendant after descendant, down to all time. Therefore, we hereby declare, as enemies of

ourselves and the kingdom, any and every foolish and wicked fellow-citizen, who, secretly or openly, through cunning, intrigue, or open violence, will lead us from this law, will impose upon us royal tyranny, or the so-called sovereignty, or, under the disguise of liberty, will overturn these laws, which, by confirming a righteous and useful freedom, shut out licence and confusion, strictly examine into the offenses thereof, and, after the already described law of Sweden, sentence and punish the same. We will also, as is demanded by our oath of allegiance and this form of government, right obedience pay to his Majesty, his commands execute, in all that can be defended before God and man, for him to bid and for us to do, and hold all right, his and ours, as becomes faithful men and good subjects.

(The signatures of the four speakers.)

All this, as is written here above, we will not only ourselves adopt as our unchangeable fundamental law, but we also graciously bid and command all they who are bound by obedience and duty to us and our successors, that they shall acknowledge this form of government, obeying the same, and in all things following and observing its precepts. And, in further confirmation hereof we have, with our own hand, signed and confirmed the same, &c. &c.

GUSTAF.

We have next the—

ACT OF UNION AND SECURITY OF THE 21ST FEB. AND
3RD APRIL, 1789.

We, Gustaf, &c. make known:—That as we have seen ourselves compelled to announce to our faithful subjects,

and to declare to our chambers, that such cunning intrigues and designs have been attempted, as in their explosion would have been pointed at no less than the division of the realm, the endangering of the king, and the fall of the monarchy, together with the ruin and oppression of all honest subjects; a situation so dangerous, supported by the enemy, and as much as possible strengthened by divided opinions, discord, and selfish views, has made it necessary for ourselves and the chambers to discover means so powerful, as for this present to extinguish and suppress, and for the future hinder and turn aside, attempts and plans so unheard of, so bold, and so insolent. We have therefore, together with our chambers, regarded it as a resource leading to an object worthy of them and of us, to give to the government forms that renewed confirmation and strength, whereby the independence, honour, and glory of the kingdom may be raised to that height which our dear country once obtained under the glorious rule of former kings, and the manly and united assistance of faithful subjects. And as, at the same time, the general voice, with eagerness and zeal, has invoked and hastened on this our undertaking, we have accordingly, led by these causes and reasons, together with our chambers, agreed to, confirmed, and ordained, this Act of Union and Security, which we hereby graciously approve and accept, according to its literal contents and agreement with our hereafter following confirmation, word for word as is here set down.

Act of Union and Security.

In order to separate for ever from us and our dear country those violent disturbances which, partly through the ambition and love of power of individuals, partly

through the intrigues of foreign powers, and partly through the mutual envy and discord of the chambers themselves, have so often endangered the kingdom, and its subsistence and general security, bringing in disagreements, not only between subjects, but also between the king and his people ; and in order, once for all, to fix those grounds on which our laws of government are based, doing away for the future with all doubtfulness and one-sided additions, our most gracious king has, for himself and his successors on the throne of Sweden, been pleased to agree with us on the following Act of Union and Security.

1. We acknowledge that we have an hereditary king, who possesses full power to rule, protect, save, and defend the kingdom ; to begin war, and make peace and treaty with foreign powers ; to give pardon ; to restore life, honour, and goods ; to ordain, after his own high pleasure, respecting all the offices in the kingdom which must be filled by native Swedes ; and to guard and distribute law and justice.

The care of all other state business shall be left to be managed as the king may see fit.

2. We regard ourselves as free, obedient, and secure subjects, under a legally crowned king, who rules us after the written law of Sweden. And as we are all equally free lieges, so ought we also to enjoy equal protection under the shelter of the law. Therefore, also, shall the king's high court, in which all equity business is decided, and in which the king has two voices, consist of both noblemen and commoners ; and in consequence hereof shall the number of the royal council hereafter depend upon the pleasure of his majesty. And his majesty will protect high and low against all injustice, injuring none in life, honour, limb, or goods, till he is legally sentenced and condemned at a proper court.

3. A people equally free ought to enjoy equal rights, and therefore shall all classes have the privilege of possessing and acquiring land in their common country ; to the nobility, however, as hitherto hath been customary, shall be reserved their old privileges of holding “säterier,” &c. &c. and in-parish lands in Scone, Halland, and Bleking. Lands may not change their old local character of taxed, free, and crown lands, &c. but the posting duties shall be shared equally by all, the “säterier,” &c. alone excepted.

The right for the commons to tax-purchase of crown lands, and their secure occupation, is ordained by a separate law of this day, with the same security as if it were here introduced.

4. The highest and principal offices of the kingdom, and places in the king's court, shall be occupied by noblemen alone ; but, for the rest, skill, merit, experience, and well-proved civic virtues, shall be the only and true ground of advancement to all offices and services in the state, high and low, without regard to birth or separate class. But when a commoner, holding office, has been raised to the rank of a nobleman, he shall no longer retain that office which he before enjoyed as commoner, on account of his class.

5. As the right liberty consists in freely giving to the support of the kingdom whatever may be necessary, so the Swedish people possesses, respecting the same, an indisputable right to counsel, debate, reject, and agree, in unison with the king.

6. At the diets no other subjects are discussed in the chambers, than those proposed by the king, in the manner usual before 1680.

7. The privileges of the nobles and of the clergy of the year 1723, and the hitherto legal rights and privileges of

the towns, are confirmed in whatever does not concern this Act of Security.

8. This Act of Union and Security shall be signed with their own hands by all the kings of Sweden, at the commencement of their reigns, and no proposition or attempt shall ever be permitted for the least change, explanation, or improvement thereof, beyond its literal contents. In case the present royal house should become extinct, the king who may then be chosen, shall succeed to all these rights, and shall bind himself to observe the same, without the least alteration.

9. The form of government of the year 1772, shall remain in full force, in whatever has not been changed by this Act.

Given at our Palace of Stockholm, &c.

(Signed by the Speakers of the Four Chambers.)

This above-written Act of Union and Security we promise, for ourselves and our successors, to receive as a final and unchangeable fundamental law, whose literal contents shall be observed without change, explanation, or alteration. And we hereby graciously bid and command all those bound obediently, truly, and faithfully to serve us and our successors, and the kingdom, to acknowledge and exercise this Act of Union and Security, and to follow and observe its literal contents. Herewith, at the same time, it shall be remembered, that all judges in the higher and lower courts, and all placeholders not possessing the dignity of "Troman," or not taking part in the government of the provinces, shall not be exposed to the loss of their offices, without inquiry and sentence, according to law and the articles of war.

As regards posting, &c. the country peasants of the nobility, and out-parish estates, shall share equally with

crown and taxed estates, in all posting liabilities, as also in time of war, when necessity demands equality, when expeditions or longer marches are made through the country, or when provisions, ammunition, or clothing shall be forwarded to the army, to fortresses, or to magazines. And as we have now confirmed and assured the privileges of the nobles of the year 1723, which were not clearly acknowledged in the form of government of the year 1772, so we now bid and command that they shall now remain in full force. We also now hereby confirm the privileges of the clergy of the year 1723, together with our further assurance, given on the 2nd of March, this present year; adding, at the same time, our confirmation of the rights and liberties allowed to the cities of the realm on the 23rd of February, and those allotted to all the commons, in our order bearing the same date.

And further to confirm, &c.

GUSTAF.

It is quite undeniable, that both these documents constitute the basis of a representative constitution, although the greatest share of the executive power is by the same allotted to the regent. If we can now, at the same time, shew that they were received as the fundamental laws of Finland, the question is immediately answered, how far that province ought or ought not to possess a representative form of government.

We have seen from the above, that the high governing persons lately mentioned, in the most voluntary manner, and without the least sign of force or any compulsory circumstances having influenced them, “assured and confirmed” the “fundamental laws” and “constitution”

of Finland. But as no one can "confirm" anything that does not already exist, what was now fixed must have constituted already introduced forms of government, and thus the Emperors of Russia have admitted their elder and equitable existence. They have thereby admitted that Finland, when it came under their sceptre, possessed fixed "fundamental laws" and a legal "constitution." To these their consent has given still further support, and they must consequently belong to the Finlanders as the right of their state. But should we deny this result, we must at least admit that the regents of Russia have, by the confirmations which they have published, *given* to Finland "fundamental laws" and a "constitution;" for one of these two things must be the case—either that we have a confirmation of elder fundamental laws, or that new ones are created by gift, else the imperial expressions are merely political child's play. But as the latter can never exist in connexion with the great names ALEXANDER and NIKOLAI, we are compelled, without any choice, to adopt one of the two propositions mentioned above. In whatever light, therefore, this political action may be viewed, we shall always find that engagements have been given and renewed to the Finlanders, together with the obligation "*to preserve all such privileges and enactments in full force firm and unchangeable.*"

It therefore only remains to inquire, how such engagements must be regarded in the eyes of equity and political law.

An *agreement* (*contractus, pactum*) arises, when persons rightfully possessing the same, by accord of will, choose to exchange (transfer and receive) certain rights, or when the one contracting party voluntarily delivers his rights to the other, who, in like manner, as voluntarily receives them. Finland was a province gained by the force of

arms, and declared to be a Russian district. The emperor consequently held it by the right of arms, and could, after his own good pleasure, determine the character of its government. This right he used in the generous manner, that he “confirmed” its old “fundamental laws,” or also gave it new ones, according as we may interpret the transaction at the diet in Borga. The chambers of Finland received them, were thereby united to the ruling state by a political band, and not merely by the compulsory influence of arms, and under the protection of the emperor, arranged their interior government altogether according to the laws and fundamental enactments hitherto in force. The Emperor ALEXANDER was in possession of a right, which he transferred to the inhabitants of Finland. He was consequently hereby a *promiser*; the latter were *acceptants*. An actual agreement was thus effected. Its binding power was by no means diminished from the fact of its belonging to that kind of agreements called by the professors of this science *pactum beneficium*, or *gratuitum*, or *donationis* (an agreement not equally repaid), a class to which it must be reckoned, because its execution on the side of Russia was not equally met by another, or by the exchange of other rights on the side of Finland; for, according to the right of war, they then already constituted a portion of the great empire. In every case, the Emperor of Russia has delivered to them a right which belonged to himself. But, according to all state economy, an agreement must be strictly observed by both parties, till on each side they voluntarily abandon the same.

If, in order to overturn the very foundation of the above view, any one may urge that arms can give no right until a treaty of peace is entered into, and that the Emperor ALEXANDER had no rights which he could transfer,

the natural answer will be, that neither then was the conqueror entitled to declare Finland a Russian possession so early as in June, 1808; that consequently the diet in Borga was an illegal transaction; that the homage there given by the chambers of Finland was illegal; and, as no diet has since been held, and all subsequent measures, even "the hereditary occupation" of Finland, are built on the declaration of the 5th of June, 1808, together with the measures taken in Borga, they also would fall to the ground, as deprived of all equitable foundation. No one, however, would be inclined to make such an assertion, but would probably prefer to permit the view stated above to remain in full force.

But perhaps it may be yet further opposed, that a gift can be taken back again, and that all the rights depending thereon will consequently cease. But without stopping to remark that a gift assumes the form of a compact, when considered as a state transaction, no one will be disposed to deny that if the gifts of the ruler can be allowed an *ex parte* withdrawal, those of the people may also be reclaimed at their pleasure. The natural consequence of this would be, that when a people abandons all the rights it has enjoyed of sharing in the government of the state, and delivers all the power to the sovereign (invests him with sovereign authority), it may at its pleasure on some other occasion recal this abandonment, and without his consent claim its full share in the administration of affairs. According to this view, the despotism entrusted to Carl XI. had no actual lasting ground, and the inhabitants of Denmark were entitled to deprive their king of the despotism with which his predecessors were entrusted in the year 1660. If this principle should be strictly carried out, a great number of singular examinations and restorations in many other countries might be

entered into with quite as much right. But probably none would wish to go so far, but would rather admit that obligations once given remain in all their force for both rulers and people. Unless this rule be accepted as irrefragable, all security for every system of government is directly overturned.

One objection more remains to which we must reply. Perhaps it will be asserted that the obligations so given and so repeated must not be literally interpreted—must not be explained after the actual signification of the terms employed; that they were merely prefixed as a piece of ceremonious politeness; and that, in one word, to use the expression of Pekka Knoharinen, they merely constituted a “political parade.” But this would lead us most deeply to misunderstand two rulers so noble and high-minded as Alexander and Nikolai; such an idea would approach the bitterest contempt and execration. But besides, the royal assurances are much too exact to admit or to require any explanation. For the rest, the agreement in a contract once made must be taken after the clear meaning of the word; no interpretation of the same is permitted by any system of equity, unless evident doubleness should have crept into the expression, and in this case, he who was strongest when the contract was drawn up shall always give way to the benefit of the weaker party. The stronger of the two has the advantage in his own hands when the compact is made, and can then make whatever agreement he likes. The inferior is forced to accept whatever is allotted him, and is not able to dictate either conditions or expressions. If, afterward, different opinions should arise as to what was agreed, the stronger party must blame himself for not having foreseen more skilfully; but if an explanation should be necessary, the claims of the weaker go before his own. All jurists and

statesmen are united on this head, both in ancient and modern times.

These three objections having been, as we hope, satisfactorily replied to, we shall now return to the principal question.

Actual agreements are either *real* or *personal*. The former regard things; the latter only the persons of the contracting parties. We easily perceive that the rights obtained by the people of Finland were conferred on them by a *real* agreement. This must consequently possess all possible binding force for both the parties concerned, because, as *not* personal, it cannot cease at the death of either party. Finland has thus, by a *real*, although *not equivalent* contract, (*pactum gratuitum, donationis reale,*) received confirmation of its elder fundamental laws and enactments, or, if one so will, it has obtained them as a gift. In either case it has gained the right, sanctioned by an open and evident contract, to have and employ the constitution grounded on the form of government of 1772 and the Union and Security Act of 1789. All this no one will now probably deny; and it only now remains to explain whether or not the assurances of the two noble emperors contain any binding authority; whether they were simply a guide for their own persons, or whether they also extend to their successors.

Whatever we may decide to have been the origin of states, whether through the social feeling innate in human nature, or by force of arms, or by some compact between the governing and the governed; whether we regard power as belonging to the regent as delegated from the Deity, or as delivered to him by the people, it is nevertheless clear that the regent executes all treaties which are not merely *personal* in the name of that society of which he is the chief. He forms the point of union for

the will of the whole state; its power is concentrated in his hand, as in a focus; he is the executor of power, because he possesses it. No nation can, *en masse*, make agreements with another; it must be represented, on such occasions, by him to whom its government has been entrusted. But the result of this is, that what the ruler thus grants or decides, is not only in his own name, but also in that of his whole people; for only as their head is he at all entitled to make treaties or compacts, which, on other conditions than this, could have neither force nor even meaning. If the inhabitants of any country abolish the decisions of their government, all legal and equitable relations would cease, and a condition of dissolution or of uninterrupted war would break out among all states. If their ruler, in his measures with foreign nations, has broken those laws by which his conduct was to be controlled, the consequences must be decided by his own people; but the compact with the foreigner must remain unchanged and unchangeable. Every one will acknowledge that the opposite view would soon lead to the entire dissolution of all political enactments, and even of all social states.

But as the regent is thus a party to any contract, in virtue of the united force in his hands, or because he therein represents the state of which he is the governor, the latter must consequently be bound by the compact entered into by the chief, and which transfers to the people the same obligations or duties as were undertaken by the former. From the people, the force thereof passes to those who succeed as their head in the government, for these have entirely the same rights and duties as the land they govern, and can have no others. Thus, a regent enters into compacts, both in his own name and in that of

his people ; and his obligations, as well as his rights, are continually passed on, together with the government of the people, to his successors, in uninterrupted succession, till the contract so entered into be duly fulfilled.

All writers on the laws of nations are united on these points ; but, as regards Finland, there occurs yet another circumstance. Two of the emperors of Russia have “accepted and confirmed” the “fundamental laws” of Finland, and have “promised to preserve all these advantages and enactments *firm and unchanged in their full force.*” But the institutions thus sworn to are, as we have seen in the foregoing pages, “*The Form of Government of the year 1772,*” and “*The Act of Union and Security of the year 1789.*” The former is declared to constitute “an act unchangeable and holy,” &c. As the emperors of Russia have “accepted and confirmed” these enactments in all their extent, they have, at the same time, taken upon themselves the obligation which, through them, was incumbent on the kings of Sweden, and thus have, at the same time, “confirmed” them “*for themselves and for their successors, born and unborn.*” In these, therefore, Finland possesses, both according to clear state law and separate confirmations by those who have hitherto been its governors, two fundamental laws, whose “literal contents shall be observed, without change, alteration, or interpretation,” of course until they are voluntarily modified by both the contracting parties. This shews, at the same time, how incorrect is the assertion of Pekka Koucharinen, that “the representative constitution of the said country ought to be renewed by every monarch who receives the Russian sceptre.”* Any Russian emperor,

* “Finland och ders framtid,” 3rd ed. p. 99.

who may hereafter ascend the throne of his fathers, cannot, without insulting the glorious memory of his illustrious ancestors, and trampling under foot all state equity and every holy obligation, refuse to confirm or protect the fundamental laws of Finland.

If we sum up what has thus been stated, we shall find that the fundamental laws which ought to remain in force in Finland form a representative constitution ; that they have been confirmed by two Russian emperors, and that this confirmation must possess a binding power on all the future rulers of Russia, until the inhabitants of Finland, by a voluntary agreement with the chief of the Russian empire, give themselves a new form of government. Finland has thus a right, grounded on a formal contract, to be governed according to representative laws, and according to the import of the same, to share in the administration, legislation, and taxation, &c., of the country. If they have not hitherto actually enjoyed these rights, the clear meaning of the contract has not yet been fulfilled.

But should this latter assertion be the case, the question naturally arises, what, under those circumstances, ought to be the policy of the Finns ? The difficulty of answering this question springs from the fact, that the new social relations of Finland were formed without any clear ground. Sweden gave up this province, and the treaty of peace respecting it only contains the diplomatic compliment, that, "as his Majesty the Emperor of Russia has already given the most undeniable proofs of the justice and mildness with which his Majesty has resolved to govern the inhabitants of the country he has lately gained * * * * His Majesty the King of Sweden sees himself thereby freed from the otherwise sacred duty of making conditions hereon to the advantage

of his former subjects." (Art. VI.) Against the kingdom last mentioned no crime has been committed, even although the obligations given to the Finlanders should not have been respected; and they themselves neither requested nor received any more exact definitions of their actual political state. In case there should possibly arise any doubt hereon, or respecting their mutual claims and rights, there exists no more particular guide for their internal relations than the right possessed by them by treaty, that they shall retain their "fundamental laws" and their "constitution" "unviolated." All the rest has hitherto remained undeveloped, and continues to be doubtful and undetermined. It is true that all national law proclaims, that where a compact has not been fulfilled, everything should be restored *in statum quo ante pactum*; but such a declaration would be on the one side an absurdity, and on the other, a hateful desire to spread confusion and misfortune. *Status quo* would then be, either to return to the condition of Swedish subjects, or to the state of war of the years 1808 and 1809; both cases equally impossible; and only a bitter mockery, or an open enmity to the Finlanders, could recommend them to demand by defiance rights the most undeniable.

On the contrary, every friend of the inhabitants of Finland ought openly and warmly to encourage them, in their present situation, with perfect fidelity to observe that contract of which they are one of the parties concerned. This is their duty as members thereof; it is pointed out to them by the simplest prudence, and by their duty as far as possible, to preserve to their posterity the rights they themselves have received, or at least, not, by any premature measures, to forfeit them altogether, if it should be found that they have

never actually come into full possession of the same. Under such circumstances, conspiracies and violent explosions have always hitherto been accompanied by misfortunes and destruction. All secret intrigues are equally injurious and blameworthy. Even if their object were only some mad whim, and their efforts amounted to an absurdity, they at least excite mistrust, and give power, at all events, an excuse for exercising its ability to suppress, or, to a greater or less extent, break in upon political institutions sealed by holy promises and grounded on contracts clear and undeniably. The annals of humanity are full of examples of similar circumstances; they abound in pictures of all the misery and misfortune produced by revolts and intrigues, and Poland offers us the last proof that "they who take the sword shall perish with the sword." If Finland shall faithfully have fulfilled its engagements, and yet falls before an unpitying power, it will at least stand pure and unspotted before the doom of the present and the future, and what would otherwise have been the scourge of punishment will then become the crown of martyrdom.

But it is by no means our intention to indicate by the above that Finland is to be regarded as an offer-lamb, or considered as the victim of the caprices of authority. We, for our own part, hope the entire opposite, and it has only been our object to express the possible consequences of another method of action. It is scarcely to be imagined that in the nineteenth century, proud and noble sovereigns will break through engagements which they have of their own accord solemnly sworn; that they will reap harvests of discontent instead of love, and sow violence in order to bring in dark hate. The imperial promises must, to employ the words of Herr Hevasser, be regarded as

"debts of honour," and who will not gladly liquidate all such claims, if not the hero on his throne? But all this, however, as we have before said, on the supposition that Finland faithfully discharges all its duties.

Under such circumstances, the policy of the inhabitants of this country, naturally divides itself into the duty of those who are nearest the throne, and into that of its other citizens.

The first class ought to precede their fellow-countrymen in honourably fulfilling all those obligations which are binding on the whole of society, giving them bright examples of attachment to king and country; but at the same time, wherever they imagine they find any departure from the sworn fundamental laws, they must protest against the same mildly, firmly, and incorruptibly. Should their voice echo uselessly in the desert, and the broad career of departures from the law be persevered in, they have nevertheless discharged their duty, and their honour is saved before the relentless examination court of posterity. But the spot of eternal shame shall repose on their names, in case they themselves have brought about such breach of enactment, or have invoked it, or lent a slavish hand to its accomplishment. It is true their place is difficult, and their position far from secure; but no one can be elevated to the high places of fair fortune and civil life without exposing himself to the *coup de soleil*, or it may be, to the threatening thunders of the state authority. He who does not feel within himself sufficient strength and independence of character to meet these dangers with calm carelessness, is not formed to lead the fates of a whole people, and would have acted better, both for himself and his fellow-citizens, if he had remained in the unmarked cottage for which his soul was created, and his energies proportioned.

The qualities now mentioned are demanded most espe-

cially for him who has obtained the precious confidence, to watch over the affairs of Finland in the cabinet of its monarch. He ought to be a man of warm patriotism, unshaken justice, great earnestness in every action, and a never-moved love of everything true and noble; but principally should he possess or develop in his soul a rock-firm strength of character, as little melting before the representations and prayers of all kind of *sounders* and *intriguers* among relatives and friends, as before the threats of power, or its possible lightning glances. At the same time he should shew great flexibility of disposition, which, led by the highest social development, gives way to the storm of the moment, without exhibiting the eye-servant's suppleness, and never clothes opposition in so rough an exterior as to endanger its being dashed in pieces. To the chief of the state, his attachment shall be unshaken; but truth and right are the deepest fidelity; it is in their shadow that we find shooting up and blooming the love and reverence of his subjects.

Such a task is by no means an easy one; and great are our claims upon whosoever may receive it. Let every one, then, try his own self, before he undertakes duties so onerous; and should he not before have possessed all the qualities demanded by his position, let him seek to obtain them by degrees. Incredible are the wonders that can be accomplished by an honest will and a firm resolution.

To the other inhabitants of Finland, Providence has entrusted the precious duty of labouring for the development of a dear father-land, and of their attempting to wake up a new life, with national tendencies and a national activity, under the protection of those nearest to the seat of power.

“For every one who attentively beholds the lapse of each day, and the rushing changes of our age, it must be evi-

dent that a new era has awakened for our beloved country. Our former bonds of union have been dashed and torn, and other circumstances have commenced around us, and Aura,* in a younger form, looks disturbed around her, unused to the new world by which she is embraced. No longer can those old garments suit her shape ; a new light must be lit up with the new day. She has hitherto shared the fate of the rest of her sex, she has been treated as not yet of age ; but now are her years mature, and the right to determine her own fate has been restored to her."

These were the expressions, long since, of another author, and every year has proved the truth of his prophecy. Finland has been living in her new social form for the third part of a century, and during this time other views have arisen, and manifold energies have been displayed in almost every direction. It is no longer the child in leading strings, the youth under tutors ; it has almost reached the age of the ripened man, who can look upon his future career, grasp his coming fates, and fix the object for all his efforts. Its prosperity has increased ; its population has rapidly swelled, together with the cultivation of the soil, thus in a manner simple and not artificial ; mines have lately been opened ; its trade and productions display fresh activity ; and the interior communication has constantly developed itself, and daily aims at fresh triumphs. Thus in this department all is courage, zeal, and activity.

In a moral point of view, we find the same patriotic efforts everywhere displayed, and a true comprehension of the present condition of Finland. The people has gone back to itself and its own original nationality. From the

* The poetical name of Finland ; as Svea, of Sweden ; Nore, of Norway ; and Dana, of Denmark.

deep chambers of the Finnish popular character treasures have been brought up, of the purest ore, and on volcanoes now burned out, flowers are shooting, whose magnificence strikes the beholder with astonishment, and whose perfume none could have dreamed was so sweet. The cantos of *Kalevala* rival in original wealth the noblest national songs of any people, and surpass the beauty of most. It is the fire and phantasy of Asia burning among the snow-drifts of the north, and changing hue and warmth from the nature of what surrounds it, but never denying, or rather, always remembering, its burning origin. Our domestic annals are investigated with zeal and affection ; the few and fragmentary recollections which history has spared our ancient province are brought to the light of day, and the national life of the people is the object of incessant research.

Honour be the meed of those young men who have conceived an idea so right and so noble of their position. No people can ever die as long as it holds fast its speech. It withers and is choked, like corn among thorns and thistles, when it no longer distinguishes itself through *the word* and the spiritual voice from soul to soul. How inexplicable it is, this expression of thought through the tones of our own home-land—this intercommunication in a separate tongue for ourselves. It is not only the sound, the syllable, the root-bending, which thence speaks—over it sweeps an invisible genii—an inward power lays hold of the heart, for the language is one massed epitome of the antiquity, the fates, and the history of the whole nation.

Thus wondrous is the influence of a domestic national language, and therefore is its guardianship and rescue of such importance for every community, and the efforts which have sprung up among the youth of Finland are as

just as they are patriotic. When at the same time zealous investigations are carried on into the *eld* of the country, and its mythology and popular life, we may easily perceive how much is to be expected from investigations of this kind. May these go unceasingly forward, and may the young tree, thus planted in the sun-light of the nations, soon increase to a stem fast and magnificent, which no storms can break, and where the spirit of the history of the world can make his throne, predicting to the noble Finnish people a future career full of glory. But to reach this point we must carefully avoid all over-hasty measures, and all wish to hasten an immature fruitfulness. Only what gradually but surely shoots up from the heart of the past, and the breast of the nation, obtains lasting strength ; the eager hand that hastens violently to force open the springing bud, that it may bloom the sooner, only gives it the earlier death. May all young, burning, eager minds consider this attentively. May they behold their own fate in the mirror of the fortunes of other nations, who have striven, and still strive, to make to themselves novelties after foreign patterns, where the originals may be good enough, each in their district, while the copy never advantages the imitators. We need not seek far after such examples ; absurdities of this kind wander far and wide in many a province, and occupy many a brain, always ready for thoughtless change. In one word, the wisest rule the Finlanders can follow is, faithfully to discharge their duties, to guard their own development with an ever watchful eye, to meet coming days with calmness, and to wait with resolution for what “time may shew.”

But, on the above-mentioned condition of unshaken fidelity, the ruling state has nothing to fear from these national efforts of the Finlanders, but may, on the contrary, derive many advantages therefrom. Even if we

should not estimate the influence of Finland as a cultivation state so high as Herr Havasser, its scientific position is still of some importance. But its weight, in a political point of view, is far greater. Only that people which has received a domestic development can possess that energy and perseverance from which king and country can, with certainty, expect bravery in battle, and devoted self-sacrifice in the hour of need. A community, the national education of whose inhabitants is as much European as it is also Asiatic and African, (that I may not mention separate states,) must undoubtedly in its temper borrow something of all these, and shew itself a miserable solution or composition of good and evil. Such mixed souls are neither themselves nor any other; they are a sort of mingled seed people, with all the faults of the foreign element, without its merits; neither masters nor servants, free nor slaves; with too much light for there to be dark night, and too little sunshine for a clear day; in short, a kind of gleaming of the soul, which neither itself clearly leads our actions, nor permits others, whose eyes are purged, to lead them, and therefore can easily be persuaded to every action, noble or ignoble, cowardly or brave, but always remains a ball thrown from hand to hand, never shewing aught of sure self-activity. Faithlessness and deceit are the principal characteristics of such a race. History gives us numerous proofs of this, and our own time can shew them everywhere in the subjugated provinces of the Turks.


The domestic language and the popular character of the Finlanders were spared by their former rulers, and no annals can point out subjects more faithful or soldiers more courageous. The plains of Germany, the camp of Tilly, at Lech, and the fortifications of Wallenstein, at Nürnberg, gave glorious testimony of the confidence the

Swedish victor king reposed in the indomitable mood of his Finnish troops. And the last war in Finland—that little hero-drama, where fidelity and unconquerable bravery fought against a destiny none could shun—does this whisper aught of the cowardice of the Finnish warriors? And even at this day, need we blush at those of our brothers or sons who are fighting in the ranks of the Russian army, or at any want of courage in our young men in general? But, make us half Fins, half Russians, or half Frenchmen, and the race will soon sink down to whole Moldavians, whole Wallachians, or whole Servians. . . .

. . . . From the firm, faithful Finnish character we expect all. It is a mine-fire under a rough surface—a gentle volcano, always burning, but without any eruption. If it does not surprise the astonished spectator with towering pillars of flame and heavy showers of fire, neither does it ravage by the earthquake and the lava-stream. Spreading an even warmth under the earth, it brings forth calm though little-noticed harvests. Perhaps the day may come when we may point to a native Finnish literature, and possibly within some centuries we may point to an independent Finnish nation. But this can only be reached slowly and with peace, if the building is to last, and not become a Tower of Babel, or be thrown down by the tempest, and become the ruin, not the refuge, of thousands. We look forward to this period with joy and lively hope; but, until then, every friend of his country ought to adopt as his motto that well-known rule —“*True, fast, and on the watch.*”

THE END.





DATE DUE

GAYLORD

PRINTED IN U.S.A.

UNIVERSITY OF CA RIVERSIDE LIBRARY



3 1210 01184 2737

UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY



AA

001 377 586

1

